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ABSTRACT

TOWARDS COLLABORATION: A COMPARATIVE, LONGITUDINAL, CONVERSATION
ANALYSIS OF CHANGE IN TALK-IN-INTERACTION IN PSYCHOTHERAPY

By
Kai Le Page Bekkeli
December 2019

Dissertation supervised by: Alexander Kranjec, Ph.D.
The study utilizes conversation analysis to describe changes at the level of talk-ininteraction across four points of time (beginning, middle, late, and ending sessions) in four
different psychotherapies: two “successful” psychotherapies and two “unsuccessful” ones, with
the author of this study conducting the psychotherapies in each case. The analytic domains,
practices, and sequence types of interest were not pre-defined at the outset, though the analysis
showed alignment to be of principal interest. Patients whose therapies were “successful”
progressively aligned with therapeutic activities over time, with a difference revealed in how
quickly this alignment occurred according to the ‘type’ of activity in question: requests for
confirmation, formulations, and other activities that proposed understandings that partially
modified patients’ talk were regularly aligned with by the mid-point of the trajectory of the
patient’s overall psychotherapies; interpretations, reinterpretations, and other proposals of
understanding that were displayed as coming from the therapist’s own perspective were modestly
iv

aligned with at the “late” period of the patients’ psychotherapies, though the patients continued
to display “complex resistance” in response to these actions. Patients whose therapies were
“unsuccessful,” in contrast, showed high disalignment throughout their treatments, and the study
demonstrates that the therapist—myself—was also implicated in disaligning with the patient’s
actions (e.g., storytellings).
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Introduction
If we can say anything that is universally true about the otherwise fragmented field of
activities, theoretical foundations, specialized terminologies, and institutional allegiances that
characterize psychotherapy, it is that it aims to cause something new to occur. It seeks to
promote change. From that courageous beginning, we confront a veritable babel. In this
hinterland of a strange discipline, where disagreement extends so far that the assembled congress
cannot even agree on the nature of a human being—are they a data-processing machine?
intersubjective self-organization (Seligman, 2012)? Dasein (Heidegger, 1962/2001)? parlêtre
(Evans, 1996)?—everything becomes the privileged site of psychotherapeutic change. The
banners of change read “brain,” “behavior,” “cognition,” “affect,” “experience,” “drive,” “true
self,” “self-object,” “object relation,” “desire”...until the elected speaker finally pronounces his
Dodo bird verdict, “Everybody has won and all must have prizes.”
And yet, dissent is immediate. The Dodo bird verdict, some retort, “reflects a failure of
researchers...to adequately assess the range of phenomena that can change in psychotherapy”
(Shedler, 2012, p. 18). Reservists arrive. The debate becomes so fierce that a contingency from
Sweden declares that only their approach—cognitive behavioral therapy—will be supported by
the government (Cornelius, 2018 cites how, between 2008-2012, “authorities only supported
certificate training exams for those being trained in CBT”). An uneasy truce is made; but
quietly, members of minority traditions are pushed out of academic departments and alliances are
made with managed care mercenaries, keen to profit from the infighting.
If what I have described forms the context of the present study, it is not because I attempt
here to wade into the martial waters of change theory, but because the debate compels us to
return to what is essential about psychotherapy and assess it on its own terms. What could be
1

more true than to say that psychotherapy is a kind of conversation? This is our most immediate
experience of this institutional practice, and it begs to be treated as such.
This is easier said than done, because conversation is not an immediately self-evident
phenomenon. What are we doing when we speak with one another? Are we transmitting our
thoughts, encoded through the vehicle of language (Clift, 2016)? Are we gesturing towards, and
evoking, an emotionally-colored “world,” a gestalt of signification (Merleau-Ponty, 1945;
Merleau-Ponty, 1949/2010; Merleau-Ponty, 1960/1964)?
No study can be atheoretical. To say something about a phenomenon is to draw it into an
ordered world of articulated meaning, with its attendant (implicit or explicit) assumptions, bias,
and other coordinates that make something of the phenomenon—give it flesh and form. To
conduct this study, I have had to draw on a theory of conversation that renders the phenomenon
meaningful. Rather than a theory that understands an interlocutor’s talk as primarily transferring
information or evoking a way of being experientially in the world, I have approached the
conversations that form the primary data of this study as social actions. Using the methodology
of conversation analysis (CA), I have treated the talk that flows between psychotherapist and
patient as doing things—things like questioning, summarizing, interpreting, agreeing,
disagreeing, and storytelling.
In this study, I investigate the unfolding conversations between four patients and myself,
looking to see what it is we are doing as the treatments progress over time. At any given
moment that I or my patients produce an utterance, I adopt a mode of inquiry that asks, “Why
that now” (Clift, 2016, p. 94): Why did the patient begin his sentence with the word, “Well”,
right after I asked a question? Why did I begin my interpretation with the phrase, “I think”?
Why did no one speak after the patient finished telling a part of his story? In the process of
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investigating our “talk-in-interaction” in this way, a picture begins to emerge of what I and my
patients are doing in a given segment of our conversation; and by conducting this inquiry over
whole stretches of a psychotherapy, we can begin to describe what changes at the level of our
talk-in-interaction over time.
In addition to the assumption that conversation does things, I have also assumed that
psychotherapeutic conversations are not always successful. How else should we characterize the
fact that some patients leave after only a few sessions, without giving notice? Making a
rudimentary division between unsuccessful and successful psychotherapies, we will want to
know what happens—what I and my patients do with our speech—over time in these therapies
that are destined for such different endings. What are we doing differently as we talk with one
another? Are these differences immediately evident or do they only emerge after a period of
time?
The findings I discuss show that a key, fundamentally social, phenomenon distinguishes
the successful and unsuccessful treatments—a phenomenon that can be described in terms of
alignment or, more broadly, cooperation. It is a phenomenon that bleeds into the design of
patients’ (as well as my own) utterances and characterizes the actions carried out by the relevant
actors. I demonstrate how its relevance emerged quite early in the treatments and how it serves
as a useful indicator of whether a treatment is on a positive course. With this understanding,
psychotherapists may be better able to spot subtle manifestations of problems in this social
category. I also present the finding that non-alignment, or uncooperativeness, is normal for a
certain phase of an otherwise successful therapy. This attunes us to the temporal dimension of
psychotherapeutic talk-in-interaction and offers a possible model for how the social activity of
patients’ aligning activity might be expected to change over time.

3

Literature Review

Introduction
The relevant conversation analytic literature on change in psychotherapy is nearly
nonexistent (for one exception, cf. Voutilainen, Peräkylä, & Ruusuvuori, 2011), and so I have
approached the literature review in a way that accomplishes more than a mere summary of what
is known about this topic. Assuming no preexisting knowledge of conversation analysis in my
reader, I begin by offering what amounts to a primer in the subject, introducing key ideas and
describing central conversational practices that establish the lens, or tools, that I will apply to the
analysis of four different psychotherapy treatments. From there, I review the conversation
analytic literature relating to empathy, which, broadly speaking, refers to practices for displaying
understanding of the other’s description of some state of affairs and affiliating with her
emotional stance, or position, towards those affairs. The last sections synthesize literature from
the field of “conversation analysis and psychotherapy,” presenting the arguments that the
practice of eliciting “expansion”—that is, prompting the patient to say more—is an almost
universal characteristic of psychotherapeutic talk and that most psychotherapies have two
distinguishable “stages”—an “enquiry” phase and an “interpretative” phase—that organize its
activities. The hope is that this review will render intelligible the analysis I conduct and orient
the reader to a frame that contextualizes the practices and actions under discussion.

Introduction to Conversation Analysis
Conversation analysis (CA) is primarily a methodology—a “set of methods” and a “set of
tools” (Sidnell, 2010, pp. 20, 47)—for investigating ‘talk-in-interaction’ (Muntigl & Horvath,
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2016). Lest we come away at the outset, on the basis of this definition, with the view that CA is
somehow only a methodology, I should immediately add that it is founded on (and seems to
repeatedly confirm, empirically) a theory of human interaction—namely, that there is an
“underlying logic” to people’s conversations (Sidnell, 2010, p. 10). (Another way of stating this
is that conversations do not allow one to say whatever one wants whenever one wants, and I am
not referring, here, to prohibitions on certain taboo speech, restrictions on rudeness, etc.) This
theoretical understanding of human conversation is already embodied in the hyphenated term
‘talk-in-interaction,’ appealing to the situatedness of one’s talk in interaction with others. The
one is constrained by the other. Leaving to the side, for the moment, how it is that both parties to
a conversation will have their talk shaped or constrained by virtue of being in a conversation, we
can begin to approach some of the peculiarities of CA theory by noting that it treats even the
most apparently irrelevant of words, response cries, syntax, prosody, and silence (to mention a
few) as potentially purposive (Stivers, 2005). To provide just one example, a great body of
research by the eminent conversation analyst John Heritage (1998; 1984; 2002) has endeavored
to show how the particle “oh” (in the sense of “Oh! You don’t say!”) can work to show that a
prior speaker’s question was somehow inappropriate or problematic; to mark receipt of new
information; to signal that an element of another speaker’s story is significant; to show,
following someone else’s assessment of something, that one already possessed similar opinions
or knowledge about it (Heritage & Raymond, 2005); and to generally convey a ‘change-of-state’
in the producer of the “oh.”
Examples like this are illustrative because they bear out CA’s aim of describing
“practices” that people use in conversation (Sidnell, 2010). (Note that a practice may include the
speed at which one talks, the repetition of a just-prior speaker’s own words, or even the use of
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silence, such as when one wants to encourage an interlocutor to continue speaking.) What
composes part of the theoretical edifice of CA is its claim that parties to a conversation use
interactional practices (Stivers, 2005), like the practice of prefacing a response with an “oh.”
Still further, it assumes that these practices do some kind of interactional work, which the
discipline refers to conceptually as “actions-in-talk” or simply “actions” (Sidnell, 2010).
Examples of “actions” include assessments, complaints, compliments, requests for information,
tellings, and agreement/disagreement. Building up our sense of the theory that informs CA
(what we might more accurately describe as the discovery yielded by CA methodology), the
discipline argues that practices of talk are the vehicles of social actions. There is no direct link
between a given practice and a given action (just note, above, how many different actions can be
performed through the practice of using the “oh” particle), but ultimately we will want to
understand how certain practices, in certain contexts, can pull off a given social action. One
way, then, of defining CA is as a theoretically-informed methodology that “examines the relation
between practices of speaking and actions-in-talk within sequences” (Sidnell, 2010, p. 73). This
would be part of the “underlying logic” that CA is getting after when it studies a snippet of
conversation.
There is another sense in which a logic subtends ordinary human conversations, and an
aspect of it was alluded to in the previous quotation with its reference to “sequences,” though for
now we will proceed at the most elementary level of this logic and only slowly work up towards
an exposition on sequences. This is a logic of the various organizations that conversations
submit to, one of the most basic of these being the turn-taking system, a universal invariant of
human conversation that prescribes a rule of “one party talking at a time” (Sidnell, 2010, p. 37).
More precisely put, interlocutors implicitly orient to a norm of yielding the conversational
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“floor” to someone in the process of completing his or her in-process utterance and the action it
embodies. CA has a term for this in-process utterance that enacts some action (actually, an
utterance can effectively carry out multiple social actions, but more on this later): a turnconstructional unit, or TCU (Schegloff, 2007). A TCU does not necessarily map unto what, in
colloquial English, we refer to as a sentence—it can be realized in a response as short as a “yes”
or “uh huh”—but it does have a certain internal coherence that is the minimal necessary for
doing whatever action it is designed to do. The practice, or reply, of saying “yes,” for instance,
is minimally sufficient for pulling off the action of “agreeing.” When CA refers to the
organization called the “turn-taking system,” it has in mind a systematic rule that gives a speaker
rights to speak uninterrupted during a TCU. At the terminal boundary of a TCU—what is called
a “transition-relevance place,” or TRP—the system allows for transition to a new speaker
(Schegloff, 2007). The actual accomplishment of smoothly taking turns in conversation requires
some lightning fast negotiation and guesswork by speakers, and as anyone who has experienced
a heated discussion will know, sometimes speakers outright compete around the transitionrelevance place. The important point is that tremendous organization is evidenced even in cases
of overlapped (or apparently ‘interrupted’) talk, this occurring overwhelmingly in transitionrelevance places (Sidnell, 2010).
A particularly powerful organization in conversation that constrains the freedom of a
speaker to say or do whatever is occurring in her mind is described by the term “adjacency.” By
adjacency we mean the fact that phonemes, words, turn-constructional units, and turns-at-talk
exhibit a “relationship of adjacency or ‘nextness’” (Schegloff, 2007, p. 14). Phonemes on their
own, of course, carry no real-world signification, but through their sequential orderings, their
positions of “nextness,” they construct words; and likewise words mostly require to be spoken
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alongside other words—and generally words of a particular class (nouns, verbs, prepositions,
articles, etc.)—for their import and interactional relevancy to materialize. Notice that these
adjacencies of phonemes and words are, in a manner of speaking, imposed as a condition of
mutually recognizable language activities. I cannot, as I sit here staring at my surroundings,
evoke for my reader a notion of the “grass” I see in my backyard without yielding to a law of
adjacency that requires the phonemes (or, in this case, letters) g-r-a-s-s follow one another.
CA is rather unique among the various methodologies for studying human interaction in
showing that people’s turns-at-talk are themselves ordered by adjacency. Just as an utterance, or
sentence, arrives at some sense, meaning, or social force through the adjacency of its constituent
words, an interlocutor’s utterance is responsive to—or, more strongly, concatenated with—the
just prior speaker’s utterance. In what sense is this the case? We can begin at a rudimentary
level and note that an utterance in a conversation will always display some interpretation or
understanding of the previous speaker’s talk, and moreover, it will do some socially recognized
action that is related to the respondent’s understanding of what the previous speaker was doing
(Schegloff, 2007). In this, conversation analysis as a discipline shares some theoretical territory
in common with pragmatics, whose notions of “speech actions” and “implicature,” for instance,
are analogous to the conversation analytic concerns with analyzing how speakers both do things
in talk-in-interaction and how speakers display understandings of what the prior speaker was
doing (Drew, 2018). Note, though, that CA should not be confused with pragmatics and that
their exact relationship to one another is debated (Drew, 2018).
Let us take an example to clarify how language lends itself to social actions. We may
imagine a situation involving two parties, in a room with an open window, in which one member
remarks, “It’s cold in here,” and the other party gets up and closes the window. In this case,
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we’re interested in a physical (rather than conversational) action—namely, the closing of a
window—and how it embodies an understanding of the prior utterance not as an observation or
noticing but as a request (to shut the window). The action of closing the window in turn can be
understood as an action—a granting action—that exhibits logical adjacency, at the level of social
action, with respect to the request. According to conversation analysts, the fact that an
interlocutor’s utterance will always publically demonstrate how he or she heard, analyzed, and
understood the previous speaker’s talk—variously ratifying, updating, or seeking clarification of
that understanding—as well as the fact that this public showing of understanding is continuously
performed throughout a conversation, makes intersubjectivity possibility (Lawrence, 2003;
Sidnell & Enfield, 2014; Sidnell, 2010). To put it another way, after I speak I wait to see how/if
what I said is understood by my interlocutor by virtue of the kind of response he gives, just as he
will do the same in response to my reply (Sidnell, 2010); and through such displays of our
understandings of one another, a dynamic field of shared understanding is created. This
particular facet of adjacency, then—namely, the fact that utterances are partly shaped through the
organizational norm impelling them to embody an understanding of the talk of the just-prior
speaker—undergirds the possibility of mutual understanding and, therefore, any kind of
meaningful human interaction.
It turns out that adjacency exerts even greater influence than one might expect over talk in-interaction, affecting even the content of an utterance by dint of its coming after some other
speaker’s talk (Schegloff, 2007). To illustrate how this is the case, we must first introduce the
notion of an “adjacency pair,” the most basic organizational norm underlying the way social
actions cohere together in a conversation (Schegloff, 2007; Sidnell, 2010). As a unit of analysis,
an adjacency pair is composed of a first pair part (FPP) and a second pair part (SPP), each part
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constituting a socially recognizable action and joined together in a logical “pair type” (Schegloff,
2007, p. 13). So, for example, adjacency pairs may take the form of greeting-greeting, questionanswer, assessment-agreement, or request-granting, with one speaker initiating the action in the
first pair part and another speaker replying with a concordant action in the second pair part.
With this necessarily brief introduction, it is already possible to see how the action initiated by a
first pair part will likely have some impact on the content of the forthcoming response, since
there are a limited number of relevant actions that can follow it (Raymond, 2003). Conversation
would be at risk of breaking down if, for instance, a first pair part request (“I was wondering if
you could pick me up after work”) was followed by a second pair part storytelling (“Oh, the
strangest thing happened to me at work today...”). This is not to say that such things do not
happen in conversation, but they are what conversation analysts call accountable—i.e., either the
speaker may solicit an account for the unexpected second pair part, or the respondent herself may
provide an account for what is analyzably (for both parties) missing. What happens in the vast
majority of cases—and what is all the more invisible because of its ubiquity—is a seamless
unfolding of conversation that is composed of variations on the adjacency pair, with each first
pair part projecting very strong expectations for what kind of response will follow and most
second pair part responses readily complying. The constraints on action applied by a first pair
part on a forthcoming response has a special name in CA: “conditional relevance” (Schegloff,
2007). Hence, conversation analysts speak about an action making relevant a certain responsive
action, and it is regularly observed that interlocutors orient to something “missing” when the
conditional relevance of a first pair part is not obeyed in a second pair part (Sidnell, 2010).
We’re still some way from seeing how the organizational norm of adjacency and,
specifically, the adjacency pair exerts an influence on the content of conversation, so it is
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towards this goal that I introduce another normative organization in conversation: preference.
We have already been implicitly addressing the topic of preference insofar as we have noted that
a given first pair part action prefers a limited range of second pair part actions. Though this is a
type of preference organization, conversation analysts are more wont to discussing preference in
terms of the organizational pressure of a given first pair part to produce a particular second pair
part among the range of conditionally relevant second pair part responses. The classic example
are those first pair parts (such as assessments) that make relevant agreement or disagreement. It
turns out that in such contexts there is a preferred next action, and it is usually the one that
promotes the carrying out of the initiated (first pair part) action (Pomerantz, 1984a; Schegloff,
2007)—in the case of assessments, agreement. (In special cases, such as a first pair part that
does “self-deprecation,” the preference is for disagreement (Pomerantz, 1984a)). We can talk
then about preferred and dispreferred response types (Sidnell, 2010)—or alternatively, responses
with a “plus” (+) or “minus” (−) alignment with the first pair part (Schegloff, 2007). In most
cases, the preferred response will be positively aligned with the project or course of action
embodied in a first pair part, taking the form of agreements, confirmations, grantings, and
acceptances (Schegloff, 2007). Stated differently, the preferred response is the one that a first
pair part structurally “invites” (Pomerantz, 1984a).
There is another, related level at which we find preference organization operating, and
this concerns the preference for affiliative next actions. Broadly speaking, preference
organization is a way of describing the normative and moral pressure to respond in a way that
furthers social solidarity and cooperation between speakers (Stivers, Mondada, & Steensig, 2011;
Heritage & Raymond, 2005). The preference for (+) responses that facilitate the action initiated
in the previous speaker’s turn is cooperative at a level of structural alignment. In cases of
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storytelling, for example, a preferential aligning response will include such practices as
“continuers” (e.g., “hmm,” “uh huh,” and “yes”) that support the action of telling a story by
declining to occupy the conversational “floor” (Stivers, Mondada, & Steensig, 2011). In
addition to a preference organization for aligning responses, though, there is a normative
pressure operating on speakers to produce responses that affiliate—that is, responses that adopt
the same affective “stance” towards a person, thing, or state of affairs (Stivers, Mondada, &
Steensig, 2011). To use again the case of storytelling, a teller will implicitly or explicitly adopt
some emotional position vis-à-vis the events in the story she is relating—as surprising, as a
relief, as infuriating, and so on—and at the completion of the telling, an affiliating response
invokes the same perspective on the reported events (Stivers, 2008). Important practices are
implicated in the achievement of an affiliative response. Perhaps chief among these are prosody
(the intonation of a spoken utterance) (Goodwin, Cekaite, & Goodwin, 2012), but facial
expressions (Kupetz, 2014), grammar (Stevanovic & Peräkylä, 2014), and of course lexical items
(“I have something terrible to tell you” (Maynard, 1997, p. 99)), to name a few, play an
important role in mirrored displays of affective stance. Since affiliation entails such things as
facial expressions of dismay in response to a sad telling, sound stretches (“No:::, he didn’t!”)
when responding to surprising news, and the recycling of affective language in a respondent’s
assessment of a storytelling—these practices working to, as it were, join with the previous
speaker’s felt perspective on a state of affairs—it will come as no surprise that affiliation is
conceptually very closely connected to displays of empathy (Heritage, 2011; Stivers, Mondada,
& Steensig, 2011).
Much more could be said about preference, but showing how the fact of having a
conversation has an effect on the content of interlocutors’ utterances requires description of only
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one more preference organization. This preference norm is a facet of alignment (described
above) and concerns a first pair part’s exercising some influence over the formatting or design of
a second pair part (Stivers, Mondada, & Steensig, 2011). That is, certain practices employed in
the construction of a first pair part, such as its grammatical format, can cause correlative design
features to be preferred in a second pair part (Schegloff, 2007). A particularly illustrative
example comes form Raymond’s (2003) work on yes/no interrogatives—questions that make a
“yes” or “no” relevant in the subsequent response. He shows that, in response to such questions
as “Did you like it?” or “Have you seen the movie,” there is a preference for a “typeconforming” response that aligns with the grammatical structure of the question. Typeconforming responses, then, by “accept[ing] the terms and presuppositions embodied in a YNI
[yes/no interrogative],” will contain variations on a “yes” or “no” in their response (p. 949).
Note that we’re dealing here merely with a preference for a certain grammatical structure (a
“yes” or a “no”) in response to a YNI, not with the action-relevant preference for either a
confirming or rejecting response. This is to say that, in response to a question like “You don’t
have his number I don’t suppose” (quoted in Stivers, Mondada, & Steensig, 2011, p. 21), the
preference for type-conformity puts pressure on the respondent to say either “no” or “yes” in
whatever response he gives, while the action preference is a positive response that may or may
not contain the word “yes.” Since some authors seem to imply that type-conformity describes a
specific preference for a “yes” or a “no” in response to a YNI, depending on its particular
polarity (e.g., “Did you like it?” has a clear positive polarity, preferring a “yes” response), I
provide here a quotation from Raymond (2003) that clearly demonstrates his understanding that
the preference for type-conformity is distinct from the preference for alignment at the level of
social action: “Most frequently speakers produce responses that conform to the constraints
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embodied in the grammatical form of YNIs. Speakers can deliver both preferred and dispreferred
responses (relative to a FPP's action-type and polarity) using such responses” (p. 945). As he
makes clear, there is a level of preference organization that pertains, in some cases, solely to the
grammatical structure of an utterance.
We turn now to the point I have been aiming to demonstrate—namely, that the
constraints of adjacency in conversation affects the content of speakers’ utterances. I have
adumbrated so far four concrete pressures applied by a first pair part on the response that follows
it: the pressure to do some socially recognizably action that is relevant to the FPP (first pair part)
action; the pressure to carry out the action that is projected or invited by the FPP; the pressure to
affiliate, where appropriate, with the first speaker’s feelings about, or way of treating, a certain
state of affairs; and, in certain cases, the pressure to be responsive to grammatical and other
design constraints of the FPP. Showing how these various preferences can converge in a small
spate of talk-in-interaction, it is best to proceed by way of example. CA gives priority to
“naturally occurring” talk, so there is already a certain methodological reason for eschewing a
hypothetical or imagined bit of conversation to illustrate my point; but there is also the
advantage, through such examples, of introducing the reader piecemeal to certain known,
recurring structures of conversation that it would otherwise be tedious to enumerate individually,
in their own section. I have chosen not randomly a particular “sequence” to elucidate the power
of adjacency to shape the content of a conversation. What is not random is that I should fall on a
sequence, since a sequence is built up precisely through the building blocks of adjacency pairs
(Schegloff, 2007) and adjacency pairs are defined by the adjacency of their first and second pair
parts. (Recall that we have been exploring organizational preferences as contingent on the
structure of adjacency.) A “sequence” is a sometimes quite elaborated, sometimes quite
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compact, course of action that can be analytically demarcated with something like a beginning
and an end (Schegloff, 2007). The example I will be providing is of the “news delivery”
sequence, which is used to introduce and establish some thing as (good or bad) “news”
(Maynard, 1997).
In broad brushstrokes, the news delivery sequence is initiated with either a
preannouncement of the news, an inquiry into a known newsworthy matter (what is called an
“itemized news inquiry”), a probing into possible news to be told (called a “topic initial
elicitor”), or an outright announcement of news (Maynard & Freese, 2012; Maynard, 1997;
Button & Casey, 1984; Button & Casey, 1985). Following the announcement of news, there is a
response to it, leading (in the idealized and complete version of the sequence) to an elaboration
of the news and then an assessment of the news. Since many versions of the sequence can occur
in a conversation, I will engage with the following format of the sequence, where the “a’s”
denote a speaker and the “b’s” denote a respondent: [(0a) preannouncement + (0b) “goahead”] [(1a) announcement + (1b) announcement response] [(2a) elaboration + (2b)
assessment]. Notice first that this sequence is built up out of three adjacency pairs: a “preexpansion” (marked by the number “0”) that projects or strongly implies an upcoming “base”
first pair part (namely, the “announcement”); the base pair (marked by the number “1”); and an
expansion pair (Schegloff, 2007). Let’s begin with the pre-expansion. To aid understanding,
imagine that the preannouncement takes the form of “Have you heard what happened to Jack?”
Already a number of preference organizations impinge on the freedom of the respondent to act.
The first concerns the conditional relevance of a response that signals whether the speaker should
proceed with the news announcement, there being only a few that are relevant: a “go-ahead”
response (that encourages movement to the base action sequence), a “blocking” response (that
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works to halt the progression of the sequence), a “hedging” response (that works to show that a
go-ahead/blocking move depends on what the announcement is going to be), and a “preempting” response (that demonstrates preexisting knowledge of the upcoming news by launching
into the announcement) (Schegloff, 2007). Whatever the respondent says, there is a great deal of
pressure on him to construct an utterance that is fitted to one of the four response types that are
relevant in this sequential environment. But there is another preference at work, here: the
speaker is unlikely to have preannounced some news about Jack if she had good reasons to
believe that the respondent was personally familiar with it, so there is a sort of structural
expectation that the respondent will respond in a way that progresses the course of action. In
other words, the preferred response is a “go-ahead” response, such as “No, what?” or “What
happened?” Note as well that the preannouncement (“Have you heard what happened to Jack”)
is a Yes/No Interrogative, and so there is also a grammatical preference organization in play,
increasing the probability that the respondent will produce a type-conforming response that
includes a “yes” or a “no.” The only go-ahead response that is also type-conforming is, of
course, a variation on a “no” response (since any response that includes a “yes” will block the
preannouncement), and so we have strong reasons to assume that in such an environment the
word “no” will appear more often than not. Here we have an instance of how the preferences
projected from an utterance can affect the content of a response.
A similar analysis of the [announcement + announcement response] base pair is possible,
demonstrating how preference norms affect the form of a response. For expository purposes, let
us imagine that the news announcement is that “Jack’s mother just died in a car accident.” The
first preference will be for a response that is a relevant SPP—in this case, accepting or rejecting
the announcement as “news” (Maynard, 1997). There are two primary practices used by

16

respondents to accept an announcement as news, differing in respect to how much they
encourage the speaker’s elaboration of the news. The “news receipt,” the “weaker” of the two
practices, often takes the form of “oh” (Heritage, 1984), “oh really,” and so-called
‘nonsyntactical queries’ (“you did?”), and it functions to display an acceptance of something as
news without promoting further telling about it (Maynard, 1997). A “newsmark,” on the other
hand, taking the form of such responses as “oh-plus partial repeats (Oh do they), freestanding
but query-intoned objects (really?), and syntactical queries (did she?),” not only registers an
announcement as news but solicits an expansion of the news announcing sequence (Maynard,
1997, p. 108). (There is a third class of responses, difficult to characterize as either news
receipts or newsmarks, that take the form of [“oh” + assessment] (e.g., “Oh dear”)). In terms of
the preference for alignment—that is, promoting the course of action implemented by an
announcement—we can expect that most announcements will project a preference for acceptance
of the news as newsworthy; and therefore, the practice of using news receipts and newsmarks is
specifically preferred in this environment. So, returning to our news announcement, “Jack’s
mother just died in a car accident,” a certain norm is operative that makes the form of the
eventual response somewhat predictable: “Oh, no!” “Did she really?“ “Oh God, that’s terrible,”
and so on. But the preference for alignment is not the only one relevant in this example. Always
at stake in the delivery of news is its “valence”—whether it is “good” or “bad” news—and this is
something that is determined interactively by participants in a conversation (Maynard, 1997).
One of the practices that deliverers of news use to display their stance towards, and thereby the
valence of, their news is prosody (Maynard & Freese, 2012). Whether spoken in hushed tones,
delivered solemnly with emphasis, or interpolated with laughter or sobs, sound markings carry
something of the deliverer’s stance towards the reported events. Recalling the preference
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organization that prioritizes affiliative responses, recipients of a news announcement frequently
incorporate prosodic ascriptions into their responses that correspond to those of the announcer,
thereby displaying their understanding of the valence of the news (Maynard & Freese, 2012). In
the example we have been entertaining, the announcement would almost certainly bear prosodic
features appropriate to “bad” news, and we would expect the response to reflect this in its own
prosodic design. Taken together, preferences for a prosodically-sensitive newsmark / news
receipt would, in our example, almost certainly influence the format of the announcement
response. Again we see how the structure of adjacency plays a decisive role in shaping
interlocutors’ talk.
I want to conclude with a particularly striking example of how powerfully the design of
an utterance can influence the response it receives. This example is unique for a number of
reasons, not least of which is that it comes from what is, to my knowledge, one of the only CA
studies that has employed an experimental design. (There are several experimental studies that
use CA alongside other methodologies, such as brain imaging; but the study I am going to
introduce is elegantly simple in its use of CA methodology alone.) First, to provide some
context, the study (Heritage & Robinson, 2011) was prompted by the observation that patients
frequently do not reveal the full extent of their medical concerns to their doctors. This of course
can have serious consequences in a medical context, where the full disclosure of symptomatic
complaints bears on issues of diagnosis and treatment. Hypothesizing that the design of doctors’
“follow-up questions”—usually asked at the end of a brief doctor-patient consultation—would
impact the thoroughness of patients’ disclosures, the researchers set up three conditions (a
control and two experimental conditions) in which they varied the use of only one word. In one
condition, the follow-up question took the form of, “Are there any other concerns you’d like to
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address during this visit?”—while in the other, the doctors were instructed to ask, “Are there
some other concerns you’d like to address during this visit?” (Heritage & Robinson, 2011, p. 22,
italics added). The study, which spanned two U.S. cities and included 20 physicians and 220
patients, found that the “any” version of the question led 53% of the patients with two or more
known symptom complaints (determined earlier by surveying patients in waiting rooms) to
divulge further information. This was statistically no different than the response finding for the
control group. But when doctors employed the “some” version of the question, the response rate
jumped to 90%, and it “[reduced] the rate at which patients left the doctor’s office with concerns
outstanding from 37 per cent to 8 per cent” (Heritage & Robinson, 2011, p. 30)! How do we
make sense of this? As the authors note, the follow-up question regularly used in medical
settings is a “polar question.” The polarity of the question—that is, its preference for either a
positive or negative response—is sensitive to the polarity of the words used in its design, with
the word “any” having a negative polarity and “some” having a positive one. Participants in a
conversation strongly orient to a normative organization that encourages aligning responses, and
as this study demonstrated, they are highly attuned (most likely without awareness, I would add)
to even the preferences projected by the lexical design of an utterance.

Overview of ‘Introduction to Conversation Analysis’
We may pause for a moment and review some of the ground covered, taking stock of CA
as a methodology and as a theory of talk-in-interaction. Methodologically, CA approaches any
bit of talk in a conversation by asking not what it “means” but what it “does” (Sidnell, 2010, p.
16). What an utterance does could be said, in some sense, to transcend the materiality, raw
signification, or specific practices that constitute an utterance. To understand what some
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utterance is doing, conversation analysts look to the surrounding talk and what it reveals about
how the participants themselves understood what the utterance was doing (Sidnell, 2010). Here
methodology and theory merge, or we might say that the theory is confirmed in the practice of
the methodology: the things we “do” with our words turn out to be organized sequentially, that is
they are responsive to the just-prior, adjacent turns of our interlocutor (Muntigl & Horvath, 2016,
p. 106). Methodologically, as well as theoretically, CA places a premium on adjacency pairs—
two adjacent utterances, spoken by two different speakers—this being the smallest unit of
analysis for explicating how the action (or “doing”) of one utterance is informed by the action of
another (Voutilainen & Peräkylä, 2016). CA in turn attends to how groups of adjacency pairs
‘hang together’ in “sequences,” recurrent forms that structure courses of action. One way, then,
we may define the methodological aim of CA is in terms of the description of how people
accomplish actions through the use of practices and in interactional contexts that structure those
practices (for a similar definition, cf. Leudar, Antaki, & Barnes, 2006).
As I have also endeavored to show, CA is concerned with various preferences or
pressures (as I have been calling them) that shape talk-in-interaction, this being a point in case
where again a methodological sensitivity both informs and is informed by a theory of human
interaction: most of the time, people strive to align their talk with one another (Stivers, 2005)—
whether that is through exhibiting deference to one another’s right to speak uninterrupted,
responding meaningfully to the questions, assessments, complaints, and requests of others,
collaborating in progressing or bringing forward the social action initiated by another speaker,
designing turns-at-talk that are responsive to the grammatical exigencies of other speakers’
utterances, and/or adopting a position or stance towards some state of affairs that is similar to the
one communicated by one’s interlocutor. I have argued that CA sheds light on structures of
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conversation that undercut the illusion of our unbridled freedom to say whatever occurs to us,
whenever it occurs to us, in conversation. Harvey Sacks, the originator of the conversation
analytic method, seems to have had precisely such a notion in mind when he fell on various
metaphors of “machinery” to describe the forces that impinge on our conversational activities
(Sidnell, 2010, p. 2). (We might note a similarity, here, with the work of the French
psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan, who viewed language itself as a sort of “third term” or Other that
most people get caught up, and ultimately alienated, in (Fink, 2013a; 2013b). I am in some sense
alienated as a speaking being, because I am enforced to express myself according to the str ictures
of a system that I am born into.) Perhaps because we are a social species, we find ourselves
compelled to submit to organizational pressures that are part of the conversational apparatus, but
of course it is these organizations, as conversation analysts have argued, that underlie
intersubjectivity and the possibility of conversational interaction—so we might say it is a
sacrifice that pays off.
Before moving on to the next section, I would like to briefly point out what CA is not,
what potentially relevant areas of human interaction it does not interrogate. Peräkylä (2008), a
conversation analyst who, last I checked, was also training to be a psychoanalyst (in the
Relational tradition, apparently, as suggested by an approving citation of Ogden), notes that, in
the transcripts of conversations that are the data source for conversation analysts, we have no
access to the speakers’ private thoughts and feelings. (He at least, in his work on psychotherapy
conversations, seeks to compensate for this problem by referring to his session notes.) I believe I
would be right in attributing to a conversation analyst like Sidnell (2010), who goes as far as
suggesting that CA, in its commitment to empiricism, is closer to a natural science than a social
science, the view that this is a strength of the approach, since interaction should be analyzed on
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its own terms. I for one have settled on the belief that CA is an appropriate methodology for a
circumscribed range of research questions, especially when those questions concern the how or
what of interaction. But there are, it seems to me, certain research or clinical questions that draw
on a context that extends far beyond the adjacencies of two utterances, the organizational
relevancies of a sequence, or the immediate history of the speakers’ relationship. For some
questions, the private matters of a person’s life are indeed very important and hold obvious
relevancy to his or her interactions with others, but I will say no more on this topic, since it does
not concern the research question that prompted my writing this dissertation.

Empathy in conversation
Pick up an introductory text on conversation analysis and you will not find a section
devoted to empathy. Perhaps this is because empathy is not an organizational system onto itself;
its absence does not appear to be a regularly accountable matter. While the system of preference
organization does promote cooperative and other pro-social actions, and while empathy displays
are a species of cooperation and among the most pro-social of activities (Stivers, Mondada, &
Steensig, 2011), speakers rarely show evidence of treating the absence of empathy as a moral
issue. Just take, as a corroborating example, a CA study (Ruusuvuori, 2005) focused on empathy
that compared how homoeopathists and general practice doctors respond to patients’ descriptions
of their troubles. 40-55% of the responses, the author notes, consisted of mere acknowledgement
tokens (“yes,” “mm hm,” etc.), further interview questions, or silence (Ruusuvuori, 2005).
Though we should be careful not to generalize to everyday talk a finding based on institutional
talk-in-interaction, it is still informative that displays of empathy are not—at least in this study—
the overwhelming response in a troubles-telling environment.
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If empathy is not normatively ordered the way that turn-taking, action relevance, and
epistemics are, why devote a section to elaborating the characteristics and associated practices of
empathy? It is for the same reason that the conversation analytic study of psychotherapy is so
massively engaged with empathy. Study after study in the psychotherapy field, too numerous to
count, have pointed to empathy as the fulcrum around which successful treatment turns, with
more recent meta-analytic papers showing that it is, among the factors researched, the one most
correlated with successful treatment outcomes (with a correlation coefficient of .26; Norcross,
2010). It is, therefore, a facet of psychotherapeutic interaction of tremendous importance, and it
merits a review, prior to any investigation of it in the specific context of psychotherapy, of its
general features: what constitutes an empathic action, how empathy relates to emotion, variations
in empathic practices, how empathic moves respond to differences in the allocation of epistemic
rights, and the sequential environment of empathic displays.
In the CA literature, empathy has come to be understood as a display of understanding
that affiliates with the other speaker’s emotional stance (Kupetz, 2014; Heritage, 2011;
Kuroshima & Iwata, 2016). What we might call the precursor to an empathic move is some
other speaker’s assertion or telling about some state of affairs and an accompanying display of
how he or she is emotionally or affectively oriented towards it, what CA calls his or her
“affective stance” (Goodwin, Cekaite, & Goodwin, 2012) or “emotional stance” (Stevanovic &
Peräkylä, 2014). The empathic response that follows is one that, however minimally or
elaborately, demonstrates that the speaker’s experience is graspable, understandable, and indeed
something that the respondent can, from a certain epistemic distance, “share” in; and moreover,
it is a response that also affiliates with the emotional stance of the speaker (Ruusuvuori, 2005),
in effect ratifying his experience. From a CA perspective, then, we should think of empathy as
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an interactional move whereby I demonstrate, through my displayed understanding of my
interlocutor, that I am able to partly “enter into [his] experience” (Heritage, 2011) and that I feel
as he does about the matter being discussed—that I not only cognitively understand what he is
telling me but share in his experience.
By way of example, we can look at “response cries,” which are both eloquently simple in
their design and are an especially powerful resource for displaying empathic proximity to the
speaker’s experience. First described by Goffman, response cries take the form of signs like
“oh,” “uh” and “no” that do not communicate strict semantic information but nonetheless express
the respondent’s “sentiments” (Heritage, 2011, p. 176). When used for doing empathic work,
they tend to be prosodically marked, as when they are uttered with long sound stretches
(Heritage, 2011). Kuroshima and Iwata (2016) have coined the term “stance display token” for a
special class of response cries that utilize both prosodic and facial expressive design features to
display the respondent’s affective stance. Stance display tokens—and indeed, response cries
more generally—can capitalize on their ability to express feeling by joining up with the affective
stance of a prior speaker and thereby creating, in the words of Heritage (2011), an “empathic
moment.” The following is a simplified example of such a response cry that, through its
affiliation with the speaker’s implied emotional stance, works to empathize with the teller. It
dates from 2011, not long after a tsunami had hit Japan. A volunteer is speaking with an evacuee
who had recently witnessed someone get swept out to sea:
EVA: Then, the parent, like this-(0.4) φ touched φ several times, but
|((EVA stretches his left arm))

|((EVA slightly taps and looks at VOL’))

VOL: Uh-huh.
EVA: missed, and the parent was carried away.
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|((EVA again taps))


|((EVA does gesture of someone being carried away))

VOL: Oh:::. ((sorrowful face))) (Kuroshima & Iwata, 2016, p. 97)

Note both the stretched sound contour of the response cry, “oh,” represented in the transcript
with three colon signs (indicating its very prolonged stretch), and its falling intonation, denoted
by the period that follows it. Were we even to ignore the visible expression of sadness on the
volunteer’s face, the prosodic features of the response cry already display a kind of non-lexical
gloss of the felt impact of the telling. As is usually the case with response cries, it is difficult to
parse out whether the display is meant to signal the respondent’s own emotional reaction to the
events of the story or his reading of the teller’s feelings towards the events; and yet it is precisely
this ambiguity, or rather blurring of boundaries between the interlocutors’ respective feeling
states, that lends response cries their implied claim of empathically sharing or joining with the
teller’s experience (Heritage, 2011). But quickly, haven’t we overlooked something in claiming
that response cries are a vehicle for empathy, given that they do not exhibit one of the
definitional criteria of a full empathic response, namely displayed understanding? Response
cries turn out to be a special case, in effect postponing the articulation of one’s understanding of
what the speaker is reporting and prioritizing affiliation with her emotional stance towards it. As
Heritage (2011) writes, “response cries frequently issue an emotional IOU that must
subsequently be cashed in propositional terms” (p. 176). This leads us to the impression that
displays of empathy may be ordered in some sense, that they may follow one another in a logical
fashion, or that different empathic practices may appear at different junctures in a sequence of
talk-in-interaction.
Working with data from everyday interactions between German speakers, Kupetz (2014)
has sought to show that there is a rather predictable progression of empathy displays over the
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course of an affective telling. Broadly, this progression can be characterized as moving from
non-lexical and facial displays of empathy to more elaborate, lexicalized ones that exhibit an
understanding of the teller’s talk (Kupetz, 2014). Early in a telling sequence, for instance, we
more frequently find empathic responses that utilize a [response cry + assessment] design (e.g.,
“Oh, that’s terrible!”) (Kupetz, 2014). We can differentially analyze the two components of this
multipart practice, noting how the response cry works—as we have already seen—to affiliate,
non-lexically, with the affective dimension of the teller’s talk, while the assessment verbalizes an
understanding of the events reported. The practice, therefore, meets both of our criteria for
“doing being” empathic, even if its displayed understanding of the teller’s talk is minimal.
Another empathic practice that we find appearing in earlier or mid-range locations of a telling
sequence is recipient nodding, which works to affiliate with the speaker’s emotional stance
(Stivers, 2008). Nods appear, therefore, to share something in common with response cries, in
that they also—when delivered in mid-telling—seem to offer something of an empathy “IOU,” a
promise that a more verbalized display of empathy is forthcoming. Again, this is a practice that
does empathic work in a specialized environment (i.e., in mid-telling); and indeed, when it
occurs elsewhere, such as at the end of a speaker’s telling, it can be heard as un-empathic, since a
practice that merely endorses the teller’s stance and promotes the teller’s activity is an
inappropriate response at story completion (Stivers, 2008).
In the course of progression of displays of empathy, we may come across practices that
are more strongly oriented towards bringing out an empathic moment, practices like “candidate
understandings” (Kupetz, 2014). These types of utterances, often described as “understanding
checks,” do the work of proposing an understanding of the other speaker’s talk and belong to that
class of social actions that CA gives the appellative of “repair,” insofar as they are concerned

26

with locating and addressing problems of hearing, word use, or understanding (Heritage, 1984;
Sidnell, 2010). In CA terms, a candidate understanding is a form of “other-initiated” repair—
meaning that the person initiating the repair did not speak the repairable talk; and on a gradient
that measures the power of a repair practice to locate some confusion, uncertainty, or possible
mishearing of another’s utterance, it is the most precise form of other-initiated repair, making
relevant a response that either confirms or disconfirms the proposed understanding (Sidnell,
2010; Heritage, 1984). In terms of its construction, an utterance that functions as a candidate
understanding may be prefaced with lexical markers like “so that,” “you mean,” or simply “so”
(Sidnell, 2010; Voutilainen, Peräkylä, & Ruusuvuori, 2010). (Note that the practice of
“mirroring” as it is described and recommended in many introductory psychotherapy textbooks,
following such turn-initial formula as, “So you mean that...” or “So you’re saying...,” may
frequently do the work of a “candidate understanding.”) A candidate understanding needn’t
begin with these prefatory phrases, however, especially when it is designed as a declarative with
turn-final rising intonation, as seen in the following example from my personal corpus of
psychotherapy talk (a description of which appears in the methods section of this dissertation):
[Jon, S06, 15:50-18:32]
[The patient, “Jon,” is touching the back of his head and searching for
the name of this region of his body.]



1 Jon

now what's this called back here.

2

(3.0)

3 Therapist

the::¿ (.3)

4 Jon

medulla.

5

(.6)

6 Therapist

Oh Th- in terms of the Brain?

7

(.3)

8 Jon

>yeah<

9

(.2)
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Jon’s turn at line 1 is the beginning of what Schegloff (2007) calls an “incidental sequence,” a
sequence that can occur nearly anywhere in a larger sequence of actions. Specifically, Jon
initiates a “word search” sequence (Schegloff, 2007), where he enacts—in part through his body
language, which does not appear in the transcript—his seeking out a word. After a considerable
pause of three seconds, I (the therapist in the entirety of this data corpus is myself) draw out the
articulation of the definite article, which we might surmise functions as a kind of response
prompt. (The closest phenomenon I am aware of that describes this practice comes from
Lerner’s (2004) work on turn-prompting sequences and the use of “increment initiators”—
designed as stand-alone response words, such as “to,” “at,” “with,” and so on—that prompt the
prior speaker to elaborate on his turn-so-far. In the case I am looking at, what is prompted for is
not an increment of the prior TCU but a separate response.) At line 6, after the patient produces
the sought after word, I proffer a candidate understanding of the type of body part he had been
trying to recall, marked as an understanding check through its questioning intonation. Consistent
with the conditional relevance imposed by a candidate understanding, the patient responds with a
confirmation.
Candidate understandings are not de facto empathic, and indeed, even when they occur in
the right sort of context—one that may eventually lead to a substantial, empathic response to the
other speaker’s emotional telling—they more often function along the lines of an “empathy
offer,” aligning with the speaker as teller and helping to facilitate the elaboration of the
emotional pith of his story (Kupetz, 2014). In the example I have provided of a small interaction
between myself and a patient, the candidate understanding cannot even be said to work as an
empathy offer, instead merely serving to check that I have understood correctly the domain of
the body that sets the limits for his word search. When they are used to promote understanding
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of the teller’s emotional stance, however, I think Kupetz (2014) is right to treat candidate
understandings as a resource for moving towards empathy.
Returning to Kupetz’ (2014) claim that displays of empathy appear to progress, over the
course of another speaker’s affective telling, from transitory and non-lexicalized practices to
more substantial and elaborated ones, let us look at a practice that appears higher in the chain of
empathic moves: formulations. Formulations follow on another speaker’s talk and appear to
merely summarize what she has just been saying—the “gist” of her talk—or articulate an
inference or conclusion based on what she has been saying (Antaki, 2008; Drew, 2003; Kupetz,
2014). This can be somewhat deceptive, however, as formulations also pick over the other’s talk
and only replay some of his or her words, in effect transforming the other’s utterance (Antaki,
2008)—which, in psychotherapy, often forms part of a strategic trajectory wherein the therapist
shapes the client’s talk towards certain therapeutic ends, such as delivering interpretations
(Vehviläinen, 2003; Weiste & Peräkylä, 2014). In Antaki’s (2008) apt description of
formulations as they are used in psychotherapy, they provide a “tendentious reading” of what the
speaker has just said, but because they are presented as a faithful reproduction of what the
speaker has essentially uttered, they strongly prefer agreement and are sometimes difficult to
resist. The design of formulations is integral to their appearance and implied claim of merely
repeating the gist of the other’s talk. They often borrow from the syntax of the talk being
formulated (Vehviläinen, 2003); they are usually produced almost immediately, with little interutterance pause (Weiste, Voutilainen, & Peräkylä, 2016)—as if, we might speculate, to enhance
the effect of their being a natural inference; they do not feature epistemic downgrading (Weiste,
Voutilainen, & Peräkylä, 2016)—again, reinforcing the impression that they are summarizing a
matter that is self-evidently available to both speakers; and they are often prefaced with lexical
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phrases like “so that,” “so you could say,” and “in other words,” which frames the turn as
something that follows as an upshot or summary of what the other speaker has said (Vehviläinen,
2003; Weiste, Voutilainen, & Peräkylä, 2016). Here is an example from one of my therapy
sessions, where “Adam” is discussing his underemployment and the effect it is having on his
partner:
[Adam, S06, 30:35]
1 Adam

=ueeuhhhh .hhh (.6) ueeuhhh yeah she's ↑still

2

feeling it cause I don't- I'm not ↓working

3

yet. I have ↓promise of work (.)

4

[I have (.)I'm ↓contracted to work

5 Therapist [huhh:





6 Adam

.hh (.3) um: (1.8)

7

but there's still notta paycheck that I can

8

apply: towards (.7) actual things in the house

9 Therapist

so you're feeling guilt.

10

(.6)

11

you're saying. you- you feel guilt

12 Adam

H[HHHhhhh

13 Therapist

(.)

[about that

14 Adam

I: (4.9)

15

yea:h

16

(1.2)

17

(n)yeah

18

(.5)

19

because it has: (1.9) Hhhhhhhh

20

(3.6) hhhhh: (2.0)

21

because ideally speaking (.) I: sh- I should

22

have

been done yea:rs ago

About 27 lines earlier in the transcript, prior to line 1, he admits to feeling “I guess a
li:ttle bit uh guilt,” and at line 9, I recycle his word “guilt” in my formulation. In the context in
which he originally uses the word “guilt,” it is very unclear to what situation he connects this
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feeling, but my formulation now explicitly ties the feeling to his underemployment. It also
removes the hedge (“I guess”) and downgrade (“a little bit”) in the original utterance. Even
though the formulation is constructed as a mere summary of what Adam has been saying all
along, it introduces a transformed perspective: that he is feeling guilt—rather than “a little bit” of
guilt—and that his feelings derive from his lack of financial participation in, and contribution to,
his relationship with his partner. Perhaps because of these covert changes to Adam’s talk that
the formulation proposes, he hesitates in responding (line 10). A preferred response is normally
delivered within .1 seconds (Schegloff, 2007), while delays longer than this frequently occur in
environments where disagreement or disconfirmation is upcoming (Muntigl et al., 2013). After
.6 seconds have elapsed, perhaps sensing an impending disagreement, I reproduce the
formulation, though notably with a change in tense from present continuous (“feeling guilt”) to
present simple (“feel guilt”) tense, a change in construction that I surmise downgrades the
temporal persistence of the feeling and that, therefore, makes agreement easier for Adam. He
still, however, seems to have trouble with straightforwardly agreeing with the formulation,
producing instead, at line 12, a long exhale, in overlap with which I add an extension (“about
that”) to my prior turn. Extensions often appear in environments where there are problems with
recipient uptake, in effect renewing the social action of the turn to which it is grammatically
attached by creating a new transition-relevance place (Ford, Fox, & Thompson, 2002). Adam
finally begins to respond, but again, a long (4.9 seconds) silence ensues, one which far exceeds
the “standard maximum” of 1 second of silence (Jefferson, 1988). His delay in responding
strongly suggests trouble agreeing. At line 15, he abandons his previous TCU-in-progress and
delivers a minimal agreement token. Apparently in pursuit of an extended agreement (Bercelli,
Rossano, & Viaro, 2008), I don’t respond at any of the subsequent transition-relevance places, in
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effect refusing to let him “off the hook.” The strategy works, and Adam eventually provides an
account for his agreement, though it is interspersed with several long pauses, long outbreaths,
and a cut-off (“sh-”).
Before explaining what is empathic about formulations, I’d like to elaborate on different
types of formulations, as there seems to be a tendency in some of the literature to assume that
there is only one. Peräkylä and Weiste (2013) give evidence for four types of formulations, only
one of which I will describe. (The authors also describe “rephrasing formulations,” which are
largely identical with the standard practice we have looked at, while the other two—“relocating
formulations” and “exaggerating formulations”—are mostly confined to psychoanalytic therapy
and cognitive therapy, respectively.) This leaves us to explore “highlighting formulations,” a
practice whereby a speaker selects out a few key words or phrases from the previous speaker’s
turn and uses these to formulate his understanding of the other’s talk (Peräkylä & Weiste, 2013).
Because this kind of formulation remains so close to the other’s own descriptive language, it
makes relevant not an agreement but a confirmation (Peräkylä & Weiste, 2013). Here is a
simplified example from a psychotherapy setting, where the client is describing her fear of being
outside at night. The excerpt is a translation from the original Finnish:



1 C:

<at the night time> I don’t necessarily? (0.8)

2

not even with Ville [her boyfriend]. (0.3) I have that

3

kind of unsafe feeling indeed?

4

(0.3) >I don’t< think that he could like defend me?

5

(0.9)

6 T:

◦mm-m◦.

7 C:

#mmm# (0.4) from anyone that,

8 T:

that even with Ville you feel unsafe=m[m.

9 C:

[y-↑yeah:.
(Peräkylä & Weiste, 2013, pp. 303-304)
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The therapist’s highlighting formulation at line 8 sticks almost entirely to the words used by the
client, repeating the phrase “even with Ville” verbatim, as well as the word “unsafe,” while the
word “feeling” gets redeployed as a verb. The formulation nonetheless preserves its practice of
culling out only certain words from the formulated talk and thereby narrowing the direction in
which on-topic talk might continue. Though it is not, therefore, a veridical replaying of all of the
client’s talk, it is heard as a summary of “what the client is saying,” and it receives a positive
confirmation token (“yeah”).
On the question of how formulations can display empathy, let us start from a somewhat
oblique angle. Researchers examining the relationship between various question types used by
psychiatrists and the quality of the therapeutic relationship with their schizophrenic patients have
shown that declarative questions are positively correlated with therapeutic alliance (Thompson,
Howes, & McCabe, 2016; Thompson & McCabe, 2016). Noting that these question types were
overwhelmingly “so”-prefaced and worked to articulate conclusions that derive from patients’
prior talk, the authors argue that these declarative questions serve, in CA terms, as formulations
(Thompson & McCabe, 2016). Though it requires some inferential logic that is admittedly
suspect, we can at least raise the possibility that, given the large body of evidence linking
empathy with therapeutic alliance, and the empirical evidence showing a correlation between
formulations and therapeutic alliance (Thompson, Howes, & McCabe, 2016), formulations share
some relationship with empathy. Fortunately, we needn’t rely on studies of this kind to
demonstrate the relationship, as it is borne out from a number of different angles in the CA
literature. For one, we may note that the action of showing one’s understanding of what another
person has said—especially when what that person has said is emotionally-laden—is, for some
researchers, largely sufficient for describing it as an “empathy display” (Kupetz, 2014); and in
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the context of psychotherapy, it has been observed that formulations are one of the most
cooperative of therapist actions (Antaki, 2008)—“cooperative,” here, denoting some connection
with either alignment or affiliation (Stivers, Mondada, & Steensig, 2011). Second, formulations
are frequently leveraged as a tool for carrying out transparently empathic moves, an excellent
example being Hepburn and Potter’s (2007) work on “empathic receipts,” which, among other
environments, often appear when another speaker is crying and that are designed as formulations
of that speaker’s mental state. Third, in terms of the troubles-telling “package,” or full troublestelling sequence, one of the most obvious locations where we might expect to find
formulations—following the trouble-teller’s “exposition” of their troubles—is precisely a site
associated with empathy work (Jefferson, 2015; Jefferson & Lee, 1992). Finally, though it is
merely anecdotal, I would add that in my experience as a psychotherapist, my formulations seem
to frequently trigger in patients an outpouring of strong affect, especially when that affect is, so
to speak, “right under the surface” and when my formulations in some way affiliate with that
affect. This is completely in line with Jefferson’s (2015) observation that empathic and
affiliative moves in a troubles-telling context tend to produce “emotionally heightened talk,
‘letting go’ and/or turning to or confiding in the troubles recipient” (Jefferson, 2015, p. 42).
There is, according to Kupetz (2014), a practice that we sometimes find towards the end
of an affective telling, one that, as a practice for displaying empathy, may come after
formulations. This is the practice—first described by Sacks—of “second stories,” which are
designed as related or parallel versions of the first speaker’s telling and that may be used to
demonstrate understanding of, and to affiliate with the emotional stance imbedded in, the
speaker’s story (Kupetz, 2014). There seems to be some disagreement over the empathic
possibilities of second stories, with Ruusuvuori (2005) claiming that they are more associated
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with sympathy and that, due to the fact that they redirect focus to the second teller’s experience,
they rarely occur in professional settings (e.g., psychotherapy). I would suggest that while the
presence of second stories (i.e., therapist stories) in psychotherapy is generally minimal, certain
practitioners do utilize this practice as part of their approach and perhaps even to salubrious ends.
An interesting line of support for this possibility comes from research (Kuroshima & Iwata,
2016) that looked into interactions between volunteers and evacuees in crisis—interactions rather
structured by the institutional norms of psychotherapy and that we might characterize as “lay
therapy”—where the occurrence of second stories seems to be tied to, and work to overcome,
certain epistemic issues. This research shows that second stories may sometimes be used to
account for, or provide the grounds for, an empathic utterance that makes a strong claim of
epistemic access to the referent (Kuroshima & Iwata, 2016). Empathy, as the authors argue, can
be an accountable matter when an empathizing interlocutor appears to claim understanding of
certain emotional experiences that are by their nature highly unusual (e.g., witnessing a traumatic
event) and in some sense not understandable directly, unless lived through by the interlocutor
himself. Here is where a second story can serve to provide the justification, the epistemic
“proof,” for a speaker’s rights to empathize with a telling from a position of independent
epistemic access.
This leads us to consider more broadly how epistemic issues inform displays of empathy.
Discussing how the “two great moral systems” of epistemics and empathy play out in
conversation, Heritage (2011) notes the following problem encountered by speakers:
In particular, when persons report first-hand experiences of any great intensity
(involving, for example, pleasure, pain, joy or sorrow), they obligate others to join with
them in their evaluation, to affirm the nature of the experience and its meaning, and to
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affiliate with the stance of the experiencer toward them. These obligations are moral
obligations that, if fulfilled, will create moments of empathic communion...However,
recipients of reports of first-hand experiences can encounter these empathic moments as a
dilemma in which they are required to affiliate with the experiences reported, even as
they lack the experiences, epistemic rights, and sometimes even the subjective resources
from which emotionally congruent stances can be constructed. (pp. 160-161)
A tension exists, for recipients of an emotional telling, between the expectation to endorse the
affective way in which a speaker has experienced something and the requirement to respect the
speaker’s epistemic rights over her experience. It is a “distance–involvement dilemma,”
whereby the pressure to affiliate and draw closer to the speaker is simultaneously repelled by
norms that prohibit encroaching into territories of knowledge that are not one’s own (Heritage,
2011, p. 181). So how do recipients navigate this particular straight?
We have already seen that there is a certain class of empathic displays that effectively
skirt the problem by curtailing the elaboration of verbal understanding. In this class we can
count response cries, stance display tokens, and nods, which variously use bodily, facial,
prosodic, and other non-lexical design features to display affiliation with the speaker’s affective
stance without expressing particularities of understanding. Another example of a practice that
can display empathy without risking incursions into another speaker’s epistemic territory is
“continuers.” Continuers take such forms as “uh huh,” “mm hm,” “yeah,” “okay,” or “right,”
and they are typically used at the end of another speaker’s TCU to signal receipt of the speaker’s
talk and to show that the respondent is declining an opportunity to take the conversational floor
(Schegloff, 1981; Goodwin, 1986; Muntigl & Zabala, 2008). They’re frequently seen in the
context of storytelling, when respondents will respond at various transition-relevance places with
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a brief “mm hm” that works to display an understanding of the story as still on-going (Fitzgerald
& Leudar, 2010). In the setting of psychotherapy, they can be absolutely ubiquitous, and that
fact appears not to have escaped the attention of patients and others, as evidenced by media
depictions of dour therapists responding with “hmm” and “mm hm” at various junctures in the
patient’s talk. What is not so frequently remarked on is the deployment of continuers to do
empathic work. Fitzgerald and Leudar (2010) have coined the term “empathic continuers” for a
special sub-group of continuers that are produced with low volume and typically occur in an
environment where the primary speaker is expressing feelings. When used in this way, the
continuers not only work to encourage the speaker to take another turn-at-talk, but they “echo the
client’s poignant feelings” (Fitzgerald & Leudar, 2010, p. 3193)—they leverage prosody to
affiliate with the speaker’s emotional stance. Again, what is notable about this practice, as well
as the class to which it belongs, is its affiliative (empathic) function in the absence of a
developed display of understanding of the speaker’s experience. These features provide an
avenue for empathizing in a such a way that issues of epistemic asymmetry needn’t be addressed.
When it comes time to produce a more substantial empathic response to an affective
telling, respondents use a variety of practices that are tailored to the epistemic contingencies of
the conversation. Heritage (2011) has shown that respondents whose epistemic access to the
speaker’s experience is lacking will display empathy by making “subjunctive assessments.”
These assessments affiliate with the emotional stance of the speaker on a sort of conditional
basis, indicating that “if the recipient were to experience the things described they would feel the
same way” (Heritage, 2011, p. 169). In the following example, Dianne makes an assessment of
an asparagus pie she recently ate, and in her response, Clacia makes a subjunctive second
assessment:
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Dia:

=°It wz so good.

Cla:

°Right.

Cla:

°°( Oh: Go:d that’d be fantastic.) (Heritage, 2011, p. 170)

Other empathic practices for tackling the problem of epistemic access include “observer
responses” (Heritage, 2011). Though a respondent may not have personally witnessed a
described event, he can affiliate with it through the affordances provided by a rich speaker
description, adopting the position of a “voyeur” whose epistemic access is “imaginary”
(Heritage, 2011, p. 171). In the following extract, Emma makes an observer response after her
sister, Lottie, recounts her recent experience of skinny-dipping with a friend:
LOT:

there’s two places where thuh ho:t water
comes in ’n you c’n git ri:ght up close to’m |’n i’
(y) £feels like=yer [ta] kin’]a ]dou]:che, ]£=

((3 lines omitted where LOT and EMM laugh in overlap))
h,=



EMM:

= .hhuhhh =

LOT:

=E[n we -: ]

EMM:

[#I# C ]’N ^SEE YOU ^TWO KI:D[S ( ) (Heritage, 2011, p. 171)

Observer responses like these permit a respondent to virtually enter into a speaker’s epistemic
territory. In this way, the epistemic rights of the speaker are preserved and the moral pressure to

affiliate can be satisfied.
In some cases, respondents may opt to decline an opportunity to empathize with a
speaker’s experience, and they may explicitly cite epistemic reasons for doing so. In Kuroshima
and Iwata’s (2016) study of the interactions of volunteers and tsunami evacuees, they analyze a
segment of talk in which a volunteer provides a formulation of an evacuee’s experience as
something one “would never imagine to occur” (p. 98). The volunteer in effect appeals to the
epistemic impenetrability of what the evacuee has gone through, and we might imagine that he
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does so precisely as an account for not empathizing with the evacuee. Nonetheless, the
formulation does not come off as impertinent—rather it treats the evacuee’s story as “tellable”
(Kuroshima & Iwata, 2016, p. 99), thereby forwarding the course of action. There are other
instances in which respondents simply pass over an emerging moment in which empathy might
occur, and this may be heard as markedly non-affiliative. One practice that may be found in
environments where a speaker’s emotional stance is not attended to is “ancillary questioning,”
which entails asking a question that diverts the topic of conversation (Heritage, 2011). Later, we
will explore literature showing a general trajectory, in psychotherapeutic conversation, from an
“inquiry” phase of interaction to one focused on “elaboration” (Bercelli, Rossano, & Viaro,
2013). In the earlier phase, where the patient’s trouble is being worked up and clarified,
ancillary questions may be unproblematic and even a valuable resource; but in certain—
especially post-inquiry—phases, they may be highly disruptive. To see why this might be the
case, we will look more closely at Jefferson’s (2015; 1984) “troubles-telling sequence.”
I have already had opportunity to cite the troubles-telling sequence on a number of
occasions, but there is now sufficient reason to expound upon it, since the question of the
location of empathy in a broader course of action is now pressing. In some sense, opportunities
for empathic affiliation are ubiquitous in a conversation. For instance, a pre-emptive completion,
by a respondent, of another speaker’s yet-to-be-completed TCU—forming part of what is called
a “collaborative turn sequence”—can be highly affiliative (Lerner, 2004), and from what I can
gather, the opportunity for initiating such a sequence has few restrictions in terms of where the
speakers are located in the progression of the conversation. We could imagine that a pre-emptive
completion, such as the one appearing in line 2 in the following example, could appear at many
different points in a conversation:
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1 A:


if you start watering, it [will get gree-

2 B:
3 A:

[it will come back
y- yes uh huh

(Lerner, 2004, p. 230)

And yet despite the apparent omnirelevance of empathy displays—despite, that is, the recurring
possibilities for displaying affiliative understanding of the other person’s position—there is a sense in
which empathy is most relevant in particular contexts, at certain positions in the unfolding of a
course of action. I need only point out the inappositeness of an empathic response to a greeting

(“Hello”) or a request for information (“What time is it?”) to make the point clear.
In the CA literature, empathic responses are usually analyzed in the environment of
speaker descriptions of some trouble (see, for example, Muntigl, 2016; Ruusuvuori, 2005;
Kupetz, 2014). While it is clear that empathy is not restricted to talk about troubles, we might
speculate that a normative pressure to respond empathically is most relevant in a troubles-telling
context, a display of empathy being the expected and moral response to a person experiencing
difficulties in a way that it is not in other interactional environments. This is where Jefferson’s
work on the troubles-telling sequence takes on such importance, it being, to my knowledge, the
first and one of the most comprehensive frameworks for describing, sequentially, the work
involved in attending to a troubled person, as well as pinpointing both the location and
interactional purpose of empathy within it. Empathy has, we might say, a privileged role in the
context of the troubles-telling sequence, and so any thorough analysis of empathy must take the
sequence into account.
Something that has been alluded to already, but deserves greater explanation, is that the
troubles-telling sequence is something of an idealized or “candidate” sequence, its many
segments almost never appearing, one after the other, in an actual conversation (Jefferson, 2015).
The sequence is an example of what Jefferson calls a “big package,” an interactional structure
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composed of smaller units of interaction that, though ordered in an ideal progression, tend to get
reshuffled in the execution of the sequence (Jefferson, 2015). Bearing that in mind, the
candidate sequence, in its full form, is composed of the following elements and in the following
order: Approach Arrival Delivery Work-up Close Implicature Exit (Jefferson, 2015).
Of these, I’ll focus on the approach, arrival, and delivery aspects of the sequence, as these are the
most relevant for contextualizing empathy and examining what interactional purpose it serves.
First, let us note some general features of the troubles-telling sequence and what social
work it is engaged in. When an interlocutor orients to a speaker with some problematic
experience as a “Troubles Teller”—that is to say, correlatively, when she aligns herself as a
“Troubles Recipient”—this amounts to focusing not on the trouble as a problem to be fixed but
on the troubles teller himself (Jefferson & Lee, 1992). When an interlocutor positions himself as
a troubles recipient, he attends to the troubles teller’s experience and provides “emotional
reciprocity” (Jefferson & Lee, 1992, p. 546). That is, the primary work accomplished in a
troubles-telling sequence is emotional in nature. Jefferson (2015) explains that the sequence,
when properly oriented to by both parties, is bounded off from “business as usual”—the ordinary
interactional projects that define a conversation—and is marked by “a movement from distance
to intimacy” (p. 43). The normal, affective distance that exists between most speakers is
slackened in the course of a “successful” troubles-telling. The troubles teller may laugh after
reporting a troubling experience, but the aligned troubles recipient ignores it and hones in on the
trouble, showing affiliative receptiveness to it (Jefferson, 1984). The interlocutors become
increasingly “lock[ed] in, to the trouble and to each other” (Jefferson, 2015, p. 43), potentially
culminating in the release of strong speaker affect. In sum, the troubles-telling sequence
describes a recurring set of practices by which subject-actors join-with each other emotionally
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over a troubling experience. The work of a troubles-telling sequence is, we may say, this
emotional joining-with.
The “Approach” segment of the troubles-telling sequence can be initiated in a number of
ways, but my main interest lies in those practices by which the troubles recipient begins to
broach a possible trouble in the other speaker. On the one hand, the troubles recipient may
simply inquire into a known, possible trouble (Jefferson, 2015)—which, we might note, lends
this practice some affinity with itemized news inquiries, which can be designed as “solicitous
enquiries into troubles which recipients are known to have” (Button & Casey, 1985, p. 8).
(Whether interactants will orient to the inquiry as an approach device into a troubles-telling
sequence, or whether it will be treated as an itemized news inquiry, depends, we must assume, on
many factors, not least of which being how the respondent takes up (i.e., interprets) the action
being done by the inquiry.) Jefferson (2015) also mentions “noticing” as a practice for
approaching troubles talk. In psychotherapy talk—a setting in which we cannot overlook the
massive relevance of troubles talk—noticings take the form of explicitly pointing out some
feature of the interaction that has just occurred, such as the patient’s tone of voice, body posture,
or lexical choice (Muntigl & Horvath, 2014a). Muntigl and Horvath (2014) conclude that
noticings can be an affiliative practice for bringing patient emotion to the topical fore, but they
perhaps miss how noticings can accomplish this in terms of initiating a troubles-telling sequence.
The “Arrival” component of the troubles-telling sequence begins with an announcement
of some trouble (Jefferson, 2015). It is in response to such an announcement that we see a first,
formalized appearance of empathy and its overall, sequential import in the troubles-tellings
sequence. An aligning response, in this environment, is one that “[displays] ‘empathy,’” and by
responding empathically, the respondent commits herself as a troubles recipient (Jefferson,
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2015). Here, in the context of the first announcement of a trouble, an empathic response works
to forward the troubles-telling sequence; it is a practice for progressing the course of action to the
next segment of interactive work and propelling the interlocutors into the “intimate” space set
aside by the troubles-telling sequence. Jefferson (2015) does not define empathy, but with
reference to examples she provides of both (empathic) aligning and non-aligning responses, we
can make some inferences. Here is a non-aligning response to a troubles announcement:



L:

His mother's real low.

E:

Oh really,

(p. 38)

And here is an aligning response:


S:

We got bu:rgled yesterday.

D:

Nah: no::.

(p. 39)

The response in the first extract constitutes a news receipt (Maynard, 1997), while the response
in the second example, with its emphasized articulation and drawn out prosody, is a response cry
(Heritage, 2011). Not only does the news receipt not display empathy—either in terms of
emotional affiliation or offering for confirmation an understanding of the other’s situation—but
news receipts are among the weakest responses for encouraging the development of an
announcement (Maynard, 1997). The response cry, on the other hand, takes up rather strongly
the implicit emotional stance of the announcer, functioning in this way as a display of empathy.
It seems, then, that Jefferson’s conceptualization of empathy is largely in line with the one we
have developed here.
To briefly hark back to an earlier point left unelaborated, note that an ancillary question
(Heritage, 2011) in the response slot of the Arrival segment could be potentially disruptive.
Since it is a practice for doing a first pair part (FPP) action, an ancillary question in this slot
would reorder the sequential positions of the interlocutors—with the “teller” now cast as a
second-position respondent—possibly upsetting the movement into the next segment of the
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troubles-telling sequence. Depending on what the ancillary question topicalizes, it might also
occlude conversation on the most emotionally pertinent aspects of the trouble. But perhaps more
important, such a practice at this sequential juncture would not align its speaker as a troubles
recipient, since it would be at odds with the interactional work at stake in a troubles-telling
environment—namely, emotional closeness.
Moving on to the last element of the troubles-telling sequence that we will examine, the
“Delivery,” the troubles teller here initiates an “exposition” that “constitutes the topical and
relational heart of troubles talk, an intense focusing upon the trouble and upon each other”
(Jefferson, 2015, p. 43). Doubtless the troubles teller’s affective stance will have been implicit
before this point, but in the exposition it becomes significantly elaborated. Thereafter, how the
troubles recipient responds will determine whether the sequence progresses according to the
schema outlined by Jefferson. Again, we find that it is an empathic or affiliative response that
accomplishes this, having the effect of drawing the troubles teller towards a sort of climax of
“emotionally heightened talk” (Jefferson, 2015, p. 42). In this specific sequential position,
empathy could be said to solicit or enable displays of emotionality that are otherwise regulated in
everyday talk. We could of course theorize this further and wonder whether affiliative responses
in the context of intensive troubles-telling function as a sort of moral sanctioning of emotional
displays, a means of mirroring and thereby deepening latent affect, or a tool for co-constructing
an emotional experience. In any case, research on the troubles-telling sequence suggests an
intimate connection between empathy and emotional release, as though strong displays of
emotion are “produced specifically in response to...exhibited affiliation” (Jefferson, 2015, p. 42).
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Overview of empathy in conversation
It will have become clear from our discussion that displays of empathy require a certain
material on which to work, which—given that this material is not always present at a given point
in a conversation—explains why empathy seems to be a practice most relevant in specifiable
sequential contexts. Since empathy is a type of emotional activity, it is not surprising that this
“material” largely consists of a speaker’s emotional position or stance towards something he or
she is discussing. Displays of empathy in conversation, as we have seen, make visible—either
through demonstrations of understanding, nonverbal markers, or both—that the respondent feels
about the thing being discussed in the same way as the speaker.
We have also seen that strongly empathic responses are not simply launched into at the
first opportunity, but rather there is a sort of collaborative dance, an interactive step-by-step
progression, that entails drawing out from a troubles teller increasingly granular and affective
descriptions of his trouble in concert with a trouble recipient’s increasingly overt displays of
empathy. Empathy deepens in lock-step with a deepening of talk about troubles. Part of this
deepening involves increasingly verbalized displays of understanding of the trouble teller’s
experience—a movement from generic, even nonverbal, displays of affiliation with the trouble
teller to explicit formulations of understanding.
Epistemic asymmetries between speakers pose a particular challenge in progressing to
developed, affiliative offerings of understanding of the trouble teller’s position. Speakers attend
to their differences in epistemic access to and rights over a knowledge domain (Kupetz, 2014),
and an empathic display of understanding that in effect claims, “I feel about this as you do,” risks
being heard as an unjustified claim of access to the referent. We have already discussed various
practices at the disposal of recipients to mitigate this risk, but I should also make mention of
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resources used by troubles tellers to permit ad hoc epistemic access to their experience. Tellers
have available practices like “direct reported speech”—an utterance that is presented as an
accurate replication of what another has said (Holt, 2000)—as well as rich narrative description,
to bring recipients into a scene of action (Heritage, 2011). It seems to me that such practices
invite displays of empathic understanding precisely by temporarily lowing the walls of epistemic
access. Such considerations corroborate still further the view that empathy is a collaborative
achievement.

Introduction to psychotherapy and CA: What makes talk “psychotherapy talk”?
However else we might define it, psychotherapy is most straightforwardly described as a
form of conversation. I needn’t point out that people spend sometimes considerable sums for the
right to have one of these conversations, and they rightly expect that it will be different from the
everyday conversations they engage in—that it will exhibit some features, or will be structured
by certain norms or rules, that are not characteristic of everyday conversations. So long as we do
not get too caught up in a theory of psychotherapy that fetishizes the transmission of a certain
kind of knowledge (this is the implicit assumption, I would argue, undergirding most self help
books), we will see that the psychotherapeutic claim boils down to this: Psychotherapy is a
special kind of talk, conversation, or interaction that occurs between a psychotherapist and a
patient and that can lead to positive changes in the well-being of the patient. So what is so
unique about a psychotherapeutic conversation?
In his seminar delivered in 1953-1954, the French psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan
(1975/1991) proposed the following formulation of the structural hallmark of psychoanalytic
talk: “This experience [that is hollowed out in the experience of analytic speech] is constituted in
analysis by extremely paradoxical rules, since what is involved is a dialogue, but a dialogue
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which is as much of a monologue as possible” (pp. 230-231). Is this true, perhaps, for all
psychotherapeutic dialogue? Is this simple asymmetry in turn-taking—such that the patient does
most of the talking—the sufficient condition for framing that kind of conversation that has the
potential to treat mental health problems? It is a tempting starting point, but we need only
observe so-called “active” therapists at work, such as the Gestalt therapist Fritz Perls (Shostrom,
1965), to realize that there is quite a bit of variation, among therapists, in therapist and patient
turn-taking distributions. Lacan’s description may be an apt one for certain forms of
psychoanalytic talk-in-interaction, but it doesn’t hold for all forms of psychotherapy.
What is so difficult with describing psychotherapy talk in broad brushstrokes is that, even
if therapists largely agree that the central institutional task of psychotherapy is patient change,
they don’t agree how change is best facilitated in therapy, including what system (behavioral,
cognitive, emotional/experiential, narrative, unconscious discourse) is the intended target of
change. If these different schools of thought merely voiced their disagreements in the realm of
ideas and otherwise utilized similar conversational practices to go about their work, we could
simply bracket the former and go about describing the latter. And yet, a review of the
conversation analytic literature makes plain that clinical theory does affect practice. Moreover,
the various schools of psychotherapy have been building up for some time descriptions of their
preferred interventions and idealized constructions of these, and this has led to a situation,
naturally, whereby therapists of different clinical orientations have tended to adopt more
frequently those practices advocated by their respective schools. To use a term coined by
conversation analysts to describe the collection of interactional practices described and advanced
by an institutional body, the various schools of psychotherapy have differential “professional
stocks of interactional knowledge” (SIKs) (Peräkylä, 2008). This might suggest that we will
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have to approach the conversation analytic description of psychotherapy talk expecting only
diversity, a sort of tribalism or Balkanization of practice; but if we were to do so, we would be at
risk, I believe, of swinging too far in the opposite direction, as it appears that certain practices, or
at least interactional projects, are rather common across the psychotherapies. While differences
of practice may be the norm in psychotherapy, one gets the strong impression when studying
transcripts of psychotherapy that something typifies or marks them as “psychotherapy talk,”
something holds them together and differentiates them from everyday conversations.
As a first inroad into the complexities I am pointing to, let us consider again Lacan’s
(1975/1991) observation that psychoanalysis exhibits a certain one-sidedness in terms of who
does the talking. He is not the only one to notice this: Conversation analysts have similarly
remarked that psychoanalysts often decline opportunities to talk at transition-relevance places
and frequently allow much longer silences to elapse than is normal in everyday talk (Peräkylä,
2011; Voutilainen, Peräkylä, & Ruusuvuori, 2010). We might conjecture that this is a novelty of
psychoanalysis, perhaps stemming from the impact of Freud’s inaugural therapeutic techniques,
the most relevant here being the “law of free association”—that is, the Freudian rule, considered
an absolute condition for the possibility of a psychoanalysis, that dictates that patients should
omit nothing that occurs in their minds (Lacan, 1936/2006). (After all, if “analysands” (the
psychoanalytic term for patients) are meant to be speaking freely and frequently, the corollary
would seem to be that the psychoanalyst should, as it were, ‘get out of their way.’) And yet,
conversation analysts have observed that non-psychoanalytic therapists too—such as those
practicing couples therapy—regularly pass up opportunities to self-select and take the
conversational floor (Muntigl & Zabala, 2008). Muntigl and Zabala (2008) suggest that this is
not due to a wider institutional phenomenon but, rather, informed by a “therapeutic vision that
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calls for exercising an explicitly nondirective role in the interaction” (pp. 220-221, italics in
original). Here we have a practice, then, that is not so prevalent that we could say it has been
institutionalized, and yet it does seem to reflect some “vision” or interactional aim that bleeds
across more than one clinical orientation. Can this “vision” be described in conversation analytic
terms? Does it even show itself in the order of talk-in-interaction? Is it a describable social
action?
Before attempting to answer these questions, let us note that even if the psychotherapies
share something in common that can be described in interactional terms—and I do believe this to
be the case—they also hold discordant visions, and this translates into disparities in the use of
certain practices and actions. Cognitive-behavioral therapy, for example, with its emphasis on
encouraging patients to adopt new behaviors, is one of the few settings in which we regularly
find the action of “candidate suggestions” or advice-like “proposals” (Ekberg & Lecouteur,
2012). Usually constructed as recommendations (“maybe [you] do need to ask other
[people]...[and] maybe that’s something that you could work on this week”), yes/no
interrogatives (“Is it worth exploring some other...accommodation options...so that you’re not
living at home?”), or information-giving, proposals in cognitive-behavioral therapy are vehicles
for attempting to initiate behavioral change and are informed by a theory of “behavioral
activation” (Ekberg & Lecouteur, 2012). I am not aware of any research describing candidate
suggestions in other forms of psychotherapy; and indeed, this may be for good reason, as
Jefferson and Lee’s (1992) research on the troubles-telling sequence suggests that advice giving
is conspicuously “misfitted” in a context in which a person is positioning herself as a Troubles
Teller. Advice is misfitted, they explain, because it transforms a troubles-telling into one that is
more relevant to a “service encounter,” the Troubles Teller becoming a recipient of advice rather
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than a speaker with something to tell. It is not surprising, then, that Ekberg and Lecouteur
(2012; 2014) found that proposals in cognitive-behavioral therapy usually lead to “resistance.”
Jefferson and Lee (1992) provide a suggestion for why such proposals or advice-giving tend to
be rejected:
The recurrently found rejection of advice in talk about a trouble may, then, be accomplice
to an attempt by a troubles teller to preserve the status of the talk as a troubles telling,
with its particular structural and interactional properties, and to maintain incumbency in
the category troubles teller, with its particular and general perquisites. (p. 535)
If we were to continue by drawing up a list of practices that are uniquely associated with
given therapeutic approaches, it would—besides giving us a window into the various
interactional flavors of the different psychotherapies—prove not insubstantial. Such practices
include interpretations—mostly confined to psychoanalysis (Weiste, Voutilainen, & Peräkylä,
2016)—which draw on a wide swath of patient talk (including patient narratives and descriptions
from previous sessions) to explain how different aspects of a patient’s experience link up (much
like pieces of a “puzzle”) (Vehviläinen, 2003); topic-initiating “just thinking” turns (e.g., “Do
you know what I was just thinking?”), which have only been described in the context of child
counseling (Hutchby, 2010); so-called “unusual questions” in a therapeutic approach called The
Reflecting Team (Smoliak, Le Couteur, & Quinn-Nilas, 2018); and compliment turns in
dialectical behavior therapy designed in a [“okay” + compliment + account] format (Jager et al.,
2015). What’s more, we find that certain practices that appear in most types of psychotherapy,
such as formulations, can be adapted and refashioned to perform actions that further the specific
institutional aims of the different therapeutic approaches: hence, “relocating formulations,”
which rephrase the patient’s talk to suggest that the events and experiences described by the
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patient map unto another (usually earlier, childhood) experience, appear chiefly in
psychoanalysis (Peräkylä & Weiste, 2013); and “exaggerating formulations”—designed (often
with extreme case formulations) to rephrase the client’s talk in a way that brings out its
unreasonableness, thereby challenging the client’s conclusions—are mostly used by cognitive
therapists (Peräkylä & Weiste, 2013).
With some sense of the concrete ways in which clinicians of different theoretical
orientations diverge around practice, let us return to our starting point and ask again the question
we are trying to come to grips with: What is distinct or characteristic about psychotherapy talk as
a whole? Is there anything that therapists share in common, so to speak, at the level of their talkin-interaction? In attempting to answer this question, we could proceed by trying to cull out all
those practices that recur across clinical treatment approaches and that aren’t already common
practices in everyday talk. While I’m sure it would be possible to drum up such a list, I suspect
it would be a dismally short one; and more importantly, I have no reason to believe that it would
greatly advance our understanding of the interactional work done in psychotherapy. After all,
despite some of the conceptual awkwardness of distinguishing between “practices” and
“actions”—despite, that is, the fact that social-actors very probably do not process and categorize
the talk they hear according to prefabricated “actions,” the notion of an action being merely “a
descriptive convenience, not a veridical claim” (Sidnell & Enfield, 2014, p. 433)—we have
already seen, with multiple examples, how talk does something above and beyond what it is
doing at a more rudimentary level. I might appear to be asking a straightforward question, but
what it might be doing is greeting you (“How are you?”), offering you an invitation (“Would you
like to come to my party?”), requesting something (“Any chance you could drive me there?”),
criticizing you (“You just don’t know when to stop, do you?”), prompting you to continue your
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story (“What happened next?”), and the list goes on. It is at this sort of level—even if we end up
at a level that is not, strictly speaking, that of “social actions” in the usual sense—that we will
want to explore what sets psychotherapy talk apart from everyday talk.
Reviewing the many practices deployed by therapists and the various kinds of work they
lend themselves to, we will notice a large group of them that—in addition to whatever else they
might be doing—can be conceptually unified in terms of a shared, interactional function:
expansion of patient talk. I want to be careful not to overextend myself and imply that this is a
defining characteristic of psychotherapeutic talk, but in the conversation analytic literature,
practices designed to expand patient talk are utilized by therapists of such diverse theoretical
orientations that we can comfortably maintain that this is a rather common, interactional project
of psychotherapists, even if it remains sometimes unarticulated in their respective clinical
theories. In transcripts of psychoanalysis (Peräkylä, 2011), constructionist therapy (Smoliak, Le
Couteur, & Quinn-Nilas, 2018), existential psychotherapy (Kondratyuk & Peräkylä, 2011),
couples therapy (Muntigl & Zabala, 2008), cognitive psychotherapy and systemic psychotherapy
(Bercelli, Rossano, & Viaro, 2008; Bercelli, Rossano, & Viaro, 2013), and emotion-focused
therapy, Gestalt therapy, narrative therapy, and symbolic experiential therapy (Muntigl &
Horvath, 2014a), practices are regularly found which serve to expand patient talk.
“Expansion,” here, is a general category that describes talk that continues past the
possible completion point of a TCU, and under this descriptor we can include elaborations,
enhancements, and extensions (Muntigl & Zabala, 2008). Elaborations—often preceded with
conjunctionals like “I mean” or “like”—reword or restate a previous discourse unit, while
enhancements—often constructed with an initial conjunction like “because” or “so”—usually
work to provide some explanation for the previous discourse unit (Muntigl & Zabala, 2008).
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Extensions are a type of increment, and they are identifiable by being nonmain-clause
continuations of the prior, possibly complete TCU, carrying out the same action as the previous
TCU, and usually providing further information along the lines of an event’s location, time, or
subject-actors involved (Ford, Fox, & Thompson, 2002).
There are a variety of combinations in terms of who initiates and who performs an
expansion, but for our purposes, it is sufficient to consider just two of these: self(patient)initiated self-expansion and other(therapist)-initiated self(patient)-expansion (Muntigl & Zabala,
2008). Extensions, for instance, often appear in the form of self-initiated self-expansions in
environments where a therapist chooses not to speak at transition-relevance places, the
extensions serving as a sort of ‘second-round’ attempt by the patient to receive uptake (Ford,
Fox, & Thompson, 2002). Here is an example from everyday talk of such an extension, initiated
and executed by the same party:



1 S:

Ya know when it- (.) came from the:: I think air conditioning system,

2

it drips on the front of the cars?

3

(.)

4 S:

If you park in a certain place?

5 R:

Mm hmm

(adapted from Ford, Fox, & Thompson, 2002, p. 19)

When, at line 3, “R” fails to respond to “S,” whose turn contains a request for confirmation (“Ya
know...?”), “S” tags on a subordinate clause (“If you park in a certain place”) that continues the
action past the transition-relevance place, providing a second opportunity for “R” to respond.
Therapists, it seems, often go out of their way to set up interactions like these, knowing that by
remaining silent at the boundaries of patients’ TCUs, patients are likely to self-expand their talk
(Muntigl & Zabala, 2008).
Extensions can also be other(therapist)-initiated. A particularly powerful practice for
prompting the other speaker to extend her TCU is an “increment initiator,” a device—often
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constructed as a single word, such as “and,” “about,” or “with”—that targets for expansion typespecific information that is portrayed as missing in the TCU-so-far (Lerner, 2004). For example,
in the following extract, Kathy initiates expansion of Jack’s talk by deploying a first word of a
possible extension, which Jack completes:



Jack:

I just returned

Kathy:

from

Jack:

Finland

(Lerner, 2004, p. 162).

Similar to increment initiators are “TCU-initial prompts,” designed as main declarative clauses
with turn-final conjunctions (Muntigl & Zabala, 2008). Often the declarative clause will recycle
elements from the utterance being targeted for expansion, and the appended conjunction will
function much in the same way as an increment initiator, prompting the other to expand on the
TCU-in-progress.
We have so far looked at only a few practices at the disposal of therapists for prompting
patient expansion—one of these (viz., silence) being a sort of ‘practice of omission,’ the others
belonging to a class of “specific expansion elicitors” that target for expansion a specified part of
the patient’s utterance (Muntigl & Zabala, 2008). When we pan out and consider the full range
of expansion practices used by therapists, it is remarkable just how many therapist interventions
belong to this set. Among this group of expansion practices we can count, for instance,
continuers (Muntigl & Zabala, 2008; Muntigl, 2013)—usually taking the form of tokens like
“hm mm,” “uh huh,” “mm,” “okay,” and so on—and this is significant as continuers appear so
frequently in transcripts of psychotherapy talk. (Apparently continuers are very frequent in any
setting when emotional topics are being discussed, as suggested by a study (Peräkylä et al., 2015)
in which university students, prompted to “talk about happy events and losses in their life in a
freely chosen way,” more frequently responded to each other with continuers than any other
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responsive action under investigation.) We have earlier described continuers in terms of their
joint action of receipting the interlocutor’s talk and signaling understanding that an extended
turn-at-talk is underway (Goodwin, 1986; Schegloff, 1981). In effect, continuers function as a
“pass” on turn-transition. This is what lends continuers their property of pulling for expansion,
and it is also what makes them such an excellent practice for “information-gathering” in a
psychotherapy setting (Fitzgerald & Leudar, 2010, p. 3191). Some writers in the field of
psychotherapy have sought to describe continuers and formalize them as part of accepted clinical
practice—what amounts to developments in their respective schools’ “professional stocks of
interactional knowledge.” As is apparent in the following quotation, there is a high degree of
overlap between how conversation analysts understand continuers and how they are described by
psychotherapists:
Instead, she [the analyst] should cultivate a wide range of "hmms" and ''huhs'' (not "uhhuhs," which have come to signify agreement, at least in American English) of various
lengths, tones, and intensities, which can be used to encourage the analysand to go on
with what he is saying, to further explain something, or simply to let the analysand know
that she is following or at least awake and inviting him to continue. (Fink, 2007, p. 9)
Continuers initiate non-specific expansion, meaning that no specific facet of the speaker’s
turn is homed in on as expandable (Muntigl & Zabala, 2008)—hence, the speaker is free to
elaborate, enhance, or extend his turn in a number of different directions. Confirmation elicitors
belong to the same group of what are called “general expansion elicitors,” but they narrow
somewhat the breadth of options for expansion provided by continuers. This is especially
apparent when confirmation elicitors are designed as questioning- or declarative-intoned
repetitions of one of the words used in the interlocutor’s prior turn (Muntigl & Zabala, 2008),
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since this practice clearly calls for expansion in relation to the targeted word. Interestingly, there
is a psychotherapy that has made confirmation elicitors central to its therapeutic practice.
Lacanian psychoanalysis employs a practice that it calls “punctuation,” which boils down to an
intervention of repeating either a single word, phrase, or clausal unit in the patient’s speech,
oftentimes with questioning-intonation (Fink, 2007). No conversation analytic research that I am
aware of has yet investigated this particular practice, but that it shares both design and
interactional features in common with confirmation elicitors appears undeniable. Leaving the
question of punctuation to the side, let us note that practices that request confirmation—we
would naturally include “candidate understandings” in this category—often receive more than
mere confirmation (e.g., “yes”), frequently initiating expansion of the other’s talk.
A variety of question practices function in psychotherapy talk as other-initiators of
expansion. Therapists often ask contingent questions during patients’ extended tellings,
questions that arise in connection with what the patient has just said and that, in seeking
clarification or specification, work to expand the patient’s talk (Bercelli, Rossano, & Viaro,
2013). So-called wh-questions—questions that begin with question words like “what,” “why,”
“where,” or “how”—also can elicit expansion (Muntigl & Zabala, 2008), especially when they
work as contingent questions, as in the following example:



1

(1.0)

2 T:

wh- where ↑are you.

3

(2.0) ((D gazes slightly away from T and chuckles))

4 D:

I don’t know↑ ((slightly shifts head from side to side))

5

(2.5) ((T gazes at D))

6

T: what do you mean? (adapted from Muntigl & Zabala, 2008, p. 191)

This small extract is taken from a couples therapy session in which the therapist is
engaging an unresponsive husband. The first wh-question, at line 2, follows several previous,
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failed attempts to elicit talk from the patient. Besides functioning as a request for information, it
seems that it also works as a topic initial elicitor (Button & Casey, 1985), a practice for topic
generation that is common not only in the beginning of conversations but at moments when
topicalized talk grinds to a halt (Button & Casey, 1984). Notice that, here, the wh-question is not
a practice of other-initiation of expansion, as the husband has not produced a TCU that could be
continued. Following the husband’s “non-answer” response (“I don’t know” is a paradigmatic
case of a non-answer response (Jager et al., 2016)), the therapist produces another wh-question,
and this time, the practice is aimed at getting the patient to elaborate his turn (Muntigl & Zabala,
2008).
One type of therapist-initiated expansion elicitor seems to me very specialized to
psychotherapy settings: demands (Muntigl & Zabala, 2008). Examples of demands that can
prompt expansion include such utterances as “tell me about that” (Muntigl & Zabala, 2008), “can
you give me an example” (Muntigl & Zabala, 2008), “say more,” and “go on.” In my own
training in clinical psychology, I have had the last two utterance types—“say more” and “go
on”—explicitly modelled for me, both in classroom and supervisory contexts. What strikes me
about these is how ill-fitting they would be in everyday talk. To my ear, expansion elicitors like
“say more” have a distinctly institutional ring, and I cannot imagine that they would not at least
raise some eyebrows if uttered in an ordinary conversation. That they seem, however, so fitted
to a psychotherapeutic setting suggests that they receive their ratification from the unique
institutional roles occupied by therapist and patient, as well as the interactional project in which
they are involved (Voutilainen, Peräkylä, & Ruusuvuori, 2011).
Some practices in psychotherapy are best characterized as other-initiated otherexpansions, whereby the person initiating and carrying out the expansion is different from the
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person whose turn is being expanded. We see this in the practice of therapist extensions of
patients’ talk, which entails appending to the patient’s just-prior turn a phrasal unit or nonmainclause—often designed with a turn-initial conjunction like “and” or “but”—that continues the
patient’s talk (Vehviläinen, 2003). These extensions frequently forgo the use of a first- or
second-person pronoun, lending them the sense of speaking “from within the same world” as the
patient (Vehviläinen, 2003, pp. 581-582) and contributing to their function as other-initiated
other-expansions. Patients too, I would argue, engage in what amount to other-initiated otherexpansions. Analyzing interpretation sequences, Peräkylä (2011) has noted that patients’
extended agreements—usually designed in a [agreement (e.g., “yes”) + account] format—work
to “elaborate,” “explain,” or “expand” some part of the therapist’s interpretation (p. 290).
Bercelli, Rossano, and Viaro (2008) reach similar conclusions about the function of extended
agreements in response to “reinterpretations.” In terms of its action import, we would say that an
extended agreement agrees with and displays understanding of the prior turn (Bercelli, Rossano,
& Viaro, 2008); but at a different level of analysis, it seems to me that an extended agreement is
a form of other-expansion of the therapist’s turn—precisely because it continues, by adding to,
the therapist’s TCU.
There are many more expansion practices than the ones I’ve covered, but as my intention
here is not to provide exhaustive evidence for the claim that psychotherapy talk is distinctive in
its focus on patient expansion—my intention is only to make a case for it—let us move on and
ask why psychotherapists of so many ilks appear to encourage expansion. That is, why do so
many psychotherapists seem to be in the business of prompting patients to ‘say more’?
The notion that the institutional focus of psychotherapeutic work—the material with
which psychotherapeutic dialogue engages—is “inner experience” (Voutilainen, Peräkylä, &
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Ruusuvuori, 2010), “the patient’s mind” (Vehviläinen, 2003), holds for a number of approaches
to psychotherapy. Of course, therapists do not have access to this except as it is expressed
through the affordances of verbal and nonverbal signs, so it would be better to say that
psychotherapists are centrally focused on patients’ descriptions of their experience (Voutilainen
& Peräkylä, 2016). When formulated this way, we can see why expansion practices may be so
ubiquitous in psychotherapy: expansion of patient talk yields more opportunities for patients to
discuss their experiences. For an institutional setting set apart for talking about things that fall
under this umbrella-term “experience”—whether that be experiences of symptoms, feelings,
thoughts, memories, relationships, dreams—practices for prompting patients to continue talking
carry considerable currency.
But is this an end in itself? Are therapists expert in eliciting expansion because
“experience talk” is innately therapeutic? Most therapists would agree that more is needed.
Conversation analysts have suggested that the ultimate goal of psychotherapists is to take
patients’ descriptions of their experiences and “reshape” them (Weiste, Voutilainen, & Peräkylä,
2016, p. 646; Voutilainen & Peräkylä, 2016). Facilitating change in patients’ experiences is the
overarching institutional aim of psychotherapy (Voutilainen, Peräkylä, & Ruusuvuori, 2010). So
even within the relatively brief space of a single psychotherapy session, we will see therapists
both “encouraging [patients] to tell anything about their experience” and working to get them to
talk about their experience in a new way (Smoliak, Le Couteur, & Quinn-Nilas, 2018, p. 13).
Promoting patient talk is clearly a therapeutic endeavor that cuts across many theoretical
orientations, but it appears that eliciting expansion serves primarily to produce the material on
which another type of activity, an activity associated with change, operates. I leave for the next
section a discussion of this second interactional activity.
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Overview of “What makes talk ‘psychotherapy talk’?”
In seeking to shed some light on what is distinctive about psychotherapy talk, I have
sought to show that a number of practices that are recurrent and widespread in psychotherapy
share in common an interactional function: getting patients to expand their talk. Even the
practice of therapist silence has been implicated in this argument, showing itself to be an
organized practice that serves to prompt patients to continue speaking. In focusing on the thesis
of the prominence of expansion practices in psychotherapy, I have had to leave out references to
other interactional phenomena that may also be hallmarks of psychotherapy talk. A number of
interesting asymmetries exist, for instance, between therapists and patients, such as epistemic
asymmetries—therapists accrue a certain epistemic primacy by virtue of occupying a
professional role (Stivers, Mondada, & Steensig, 2011)—and action asymmetries—therapists
permit themselves to ask questions frequently and at any transition-relevance place, while
patients don’t (Bercelli, Rossano, & Viaro, 2008). It goes without saying that there are not just
one or two interactional activities that are constitutive of psychotherapy talk, nor is a description
of institutional norms in psychotherapy exhausted by a description of epistemic and action
asymmetries. Though we cannot claim that any conversation marked by frequent and systematic
expansion practices must be a psychotherapeutic one (wouldn’t all storytellings be forms of
psychotherapy, in that case?), it strains the imagination to think of a psychotherapy in which
patients are not encouraged to expand their talk. Prompting expansion of patient talk appears,
then, to be a fundamental activity in which therapists engage.
Just as a wide selection of practices serve, at least in part, to elicit expansion, expansion
itself serves another interactional aim. We can think of expansion as constituting an interactional
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“phase” of therapy that prepares for—by garnering the necessary material for—another phase of
activity. Expansion practices, I propose, work to collect a sufficient saturation of material in the
form of the patient’s talk such that it can be worked over in some way. In the next section, I will
present this duplex model, situating expansion practices in a more total vision of the interactional
work of psychotherapy.

Two interactional projects of “psychotherapy talk”
Broadly, the CA and psychotherapy literature supports the conclusion that therapist
provision of new outlooks or points of view on patient experience are rarely taken up, by the
patient, without a great deal of preliminary interactional work. For example, a study on
therapeutic change by Voutilainen, Peräkylä, and Ruusuvuori (2011), based on recordings from a
two-year long cognitive-constructivist therapy, found that the patient’s responses to the
therapist’s “conclusions,” or interpretations, proceeded through three phases. Initially, the
patient responded to the therapist’s interpretations with resistance, as marked by long silences
(12/13 seconds) and subsequent deviation from the topic; later, the patient responded with
ambivalent responses, characterized by confirmation of and immediate backtracking from the
conclusion; and the last phase of the therapy was typified by confirmation and agreement of the
therapist’s interpretations. Corroborating these findings, at least in part, are the results of a study
by Friedlander et al. (2012) that investigated changes, over the course of 31 sessions of shortterm dynamic therapy, in a patient’s responses to her therapist’s references to her “resistance.” In
the so-called resistance phase of the therapy, the patient typically responded to the therapist’s
claims of her resistance with justifications; while in the working through phase of the therapy,
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the patient began by disagreeing with the therapist’s interpretations of resistance and
subsequently turning her attention to describing significant events from her past.
What these and other CA studies of psychotherapy make plain is that patients do not
easily accept therapist’s observations, interpretations, or recommendations when these are
different from the patient’s current way of being. In a study that analyzed a conversational
practice—“proposals”—used by CBT therapists to encourage behavioral change in patients, the
authors noted somewhat bleakly, “Although we would not suggest that proposing a change to a
client would always lead to resistance, it does appear that proposals for behaviour change can
often lead to client resistance” (Ekberg & Lecouteur, 2012, p. 237). Similarly, Hutchby’s (2010;
2015) work on psychotherapy with children found that therapist interactions designed to elicit
children’s perspectives on various (therapeutic) issues are usually met with initial declinations;
and when therapists continue to pursue a preferred response (i.e., the child’s perspective on a
matter), the child typically offers minimal responses or downgraded responses. Therapists who
attempt the alternative strategy of offering a perspective of their own on the child’s situation tend
to find the child disagreeing (Hutchby, 2010).
What, then, are the conditions or contexts in which the therapist’s novel perspectives,
interpretations, or propositions get accepted by the patient? The question we are concerned with,
here, is how effective therapists manage the ostensibly difficult task of offering the patient
something new, something that will not be rejected outright. Returning to the notion of
“negotiation,” as described in relational psychoanalysis, we are concerned with describing the
interactional practices associated with successful uptake of more complex and variegated views
of others and relationships. CA findings seem to suggest that preparatory work along the lines of
minimizing differences of perspective is first required before introducing something new.
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Below, I describe a two-phase theory of the successful negotiation and acceptance of the
therapist’s insights into the patient’s experience. In the first phase, the therapist can be thought
of as hugging closely to the patient’s experience—validating, aligning, and affiliating with it.
This phase exemplifies the extensively documented finding that successful psychotherapies are
associated with a strong therapeutic alliance (Hilsenroth, Cromer, & Ackerman, 2012). Having
secured a minimum of difference between the therapist and patient, the second phase exposes the
patient to the therapist’s unique and subjective understandings, which are now better placed to be
appropriated by the patient. What follows is a description of the relevant CA literature that
supports this two-phase theory.
In their conversation analytic study of 57 sessions of a single cognitive psychotherapy,
Voutilainen and Peräkylä (2016) point out two basic “frames of talk” that are the vehicles of
psychotherapeutic change. The authors describe these frames as basic ways that therapist and
patient relate to one another and as distinct ways of orienting to the therapeutic work being
accomplished. In the first of these frames, therapist and patient engage in “affective talk,” which
is characterized by the therapist orienting to the patient’s talk in a way that is empathic—i.e.,
staying with and displaying an understanding of the patient’s experience (pp. 546-547). Such
empathizing is most often accomplished through practices of formulations and extensions (p.
546), though other studies (Wynn & Wynn, 2006) have shown that empathy can be achieved
through alternative practices: “echoing,” in which parts of the patient’s just previous turn are
recycled in the therapist’s turn; the use of first-person plural pronouns, which work to show the
therapist’s shared response to an experience; physical touch, which can communicate a shared
state of feeling; as well as more standard conversational practices, such as assertions and
questions. The other major frame of psychotherapeutic talk is one of “cognitive investigation,”
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and is typified by the action of challenging (Voutilainen & Peräkylä, 2016). Challenging, which
is most often delivered via formulations, works to point out aspects of the patient’s experience
that have gone unsaid by the patient (pp. 546-548)—often experiences that the patient may find it
painful or otherwise difficult to ratify.
Analyzing the same dataset of 57 sessions, Voutilainen, Peräkylä, and Ruusuvuori (2010)
earlier identified two classes of therapeutic actions—“emotion-centered” and
“cognition/consciousness-centered”—that represent different ways of responding to patients’
emotional experiences. The hallmarks of these different responses occur in the form of
recognizing and interpreting patients’ experiences. What the authors describe as the action of
recognizing shares many properties in common with empathizing, the most important of which is
the procedure of displaying an understanding of the patient’s experience. Recognizing is a
particularly affiliative move that validates and agrees with the patient’s emotional experience,
and it is designed—usually through the practice of extensions—so that it “speaks from within the
patient’s experience” (p. 91). It also frequently involves the echoing of the emotional prosody of
the patient’s utterance (p. 92). This fact allows us to make a comparison with the practice of
“mirroring,” which in the conversation analytic literature has been shown to involve therapists
matching the volume and intonational patterns of their speech to those of their patients (Davidsen
& Fosgerau, 2015). With the action of recognizing, then, we are dealing with an intervention
that, like mirroring, is highly attuned to the emotional realities of the patient, that actively
displays this attunement, and that for all intents and purposes is indistinguishable from empathy.
In contrast, interpreting, which is representative of a different type of therapeutic action, maps
almost perfectly onto the action of challenging described by Voutilainen and Peräkylä (2016): it
articulates something in the patient’s talk that has been implied but left unsaid, and it “inherently
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challenges the patient’s talk and takes it in another direction” (Voutilainen, Peräkylä, &
Ruusuvuori, 2010, p. 94).
Another study by Weiste, Voutilainen, and Peräkylä (2016) also sets up a similar division
between two basic therapeutic actions. In this case, the authors focused on formulations that
involve “co-descriptions” and interpretations. What is interesting about this study is how it
distinguishes these actions as different types of epistemic practice—that is, practices that make
different claims about the degree to which the therapist has access to the patient’s experience.
Formulations that involve “co-description” are designed as unproblematic upshots of the
patient’s talk, as voiced descriptions of the patient’s experience that are simply “there” in the
patient’s talk. Additional design features add to the sense that the description is patently
accessible to both parties: there is little gap or silence between the patient’s turn at talk and the
therapist’s formulation; the formulation is often preceded with a turn-initial conjunction (“and,”
“that”) that implies a shared perspective; and in some cases the formulation may omit a subject
of the experience, suggesting the ready availability of such an experience under the described
circumstances (Weiste, Voutilainen, & Peräkylä, 2016). Similar to empathizing and recognizing,
these formulations often mirror the patient’s prosody and intonation patterns, and partly for this
reason, they often do empathic work (p. 659). In contrast, interpretations propose something
about the patient’s experience that the patient does not (yet) know and that is based on the
therapist’s own conclusions (p. 652). Since the patient always retains rights of epistemic priority
over his own experience, successful interpretations—that is, ones that are not ultimately
challenged—downgrade their claim to know the patient’s experience. They tend to be posed in a
tentative way by being framed as a question, or they are designed with epistemic markers that
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emphasize the therapist’s perspective (e.g., “I think that”) or that point to the conjectural nature
of the interpretation (“perhaps,” “maybe,” “could,” “might”) (p. 652).
The analytic significance of formulations and interpretations also appears in the work of
Vehviläinen (2003), who places their interactional import within a larger “interpretative
trajectory”—a sequence of actions in psychotherapy (and, especially, psychoanalysis) that
culminates in the production of an interpretation. This trajectory can be thought of as having two
distinct phases, with the first—which consists of formulations, extensions, and confrontations—
devoted to ostensibly restating what the patient has just been saying, while in fact subtly
reshaping the patient’s talk in a way that creates a “case” or “puzzle” to be solved (Vehviläinen,
2003). The second phase, namely the interpretation, appears in the form of an explanation or
solution to the puzzle, a solution that is brought off by linking and reorganizing both the material
that has been described in the first phase and material that may originate in other sessions (pp.
578-579). Like other authors describing a basic division between two classes of
psychotherapeutic intervention, Vehviläinen (2003) understands one of these—represented by
formulations and extensions—to “talk ‘from within the same world’ [as the patient],” while the
other steps back to propose a hidden meaning that explicates the conundrum of the patient’s
experiences (pp. 581-582). Formulations and extensions, which are designed to hug closely to
the content and syntactic structure of the patient’s just prior turn(s), claim to merely paraphrase,
or reach incontrovertible deductions based on, the patient’s experiences. Interpretations,
however, claim to make sense of the patient’s talk and experiences in a way not immediately
available to the patient, and in this sense, the interpreting therapist adopts a very different
position from before, becoming something like “diagnostician” (Vehviläinen, 2003, p. 581).
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Perhaps a more thorough exposition of these two phases of psychotherapeutic action
appears in the work of Bercelli, Rossano, and Viaro (2013). Analyzing recorded sessions from
four different (cognitive, as well as systemic) psychotherapies, the authors show that
psychotherapeutic activity tends to progress through a phase of initial enquiry, in which patients
elaborate on their experiences, and move into a phase of elaboration, where therapists provide
their own perspective on the patient’s experiences, often leading to a change of state in patients.
This descriptive model of psychotherapeutic activity is explicitly compared to Vehviläinen’s
“interpretative trajectory,” but it has the advantage of conceptualizing the enquiry and
elaboration sequences as phases that can stretch over many sessions, with potentially multiple
enquiry sequences unfolding “in parallel” over time and eventually joining up with one another
(Bercelli, Rossano, & Viaro, 2013, p. 135). The actions that constitute and work to develop
enquiry sequences are, in the main, open-ended questions, contingent questions, and
formulations, which stimulate more tellings from the patient and eventuate in enquiry outcomes
that, like the “puzzles” described by Vehviläinen (2003), serve as the basis for later
interpretations. The elaboration phase is initiated by what Bercelli et al. (2013) call a
reinterpretation, which, despite the slight alteration in name, is synonymous with what is more
simply called an interpretation in the CA and psychotherapy literature. Designed with epistemic
markers (“I think,” “it seems”, “perhaps”) that propose the tentativeness of the therapist’s
perspective, reinterpretations offer a new point of view on the patient’s experiences. For Bercelli
et al. (2013), it is in the patient’s extended uptake of the reinterpretation that psychotherapeutic
change is realized, for it is here where we vividly encounter the patient’s change in outlook and
understanding towards his issues. As the authors demonstrate, however, considerably interactive
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work—often stretching over several sessions—prepares the ground for a reinterpretation that
may or may not recast the patient’s perspective and understanding.
Table 1 provides a brief overview of the finding, described in multiple CA studies, that a
diverse number of psychotherapies organize their activities into two broad phases. In the first,
the therapist is highly affiliative, joining with the patient’s perspectives on states of affairs,
empathizing with the patient’s displayed affect, and providing preferred responses to the
patient’s interactional moves (Stivers, Mondada, & Steensig, 2011). There is little interactional
distance between the therapeutic pair, and the therapist frequently designs his utterances as
elliptical extensions of the patient’s talk, as though he were speaking from within the patient’s
experiential world. In this phase, claimed epistemic access is high—the therapist displays
unproblematic access to the patient’s experience “as it is.” At the same time, the therapist, while
appearing to merely summarize and join with the patient’s assessments and tellings, covertly
omits parts of the patient’s talk, emphasizes others, introduces new terminology, and shapes the
talk in a therapeutically-relevant direction (Antaki, 2008). Having subtly prepared the patient’s
talk to allow for reasonable connections to be made between disparate experiences (Vehviläinen,
2003), the second phase is initiated. Here, the therapist proposes that something previously
unknown to the patient is nonetheless part of patient’s experience and mind (Peräkylä, 2011).
The therapist quite clearly speaks from her own point of view, and so her interventions are
designed to downgrade their claimed epistemic access to the patient’s experience (Weiste,
Voutilainen, & Peräkylä, 2016). A kind of interactional distance is constituted, with the patient’s
previously described world on one side and the therapist’s new perspective on the other. What is
at stake for the patient is the adoption of a new way of relating to her troubles, and arguably, this
moment is a crux of psychotherapeutic change. It is the locus of psychotherapy as “an implicit
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and sometimes explicit battleground in which two worlds or stories come into collision; then, the
radical question of which world-story will win comes to the fore” (Barton, 2012, p. 163).

Author

Table 1
First phase

Second phase

Voutilainen and Peräkylä
(2016)

Affective talk—typified by
empathizing

Cognitive investigation—
typified by challenging

Voutilainen, Peräkylä, and
Ruusuvuori (2010)

Emotion-centered action—
e.g., recognizing

Cognitive/consciousnesscentered action—e.g.,
interpreting

Weiste, Voutilainen, and
Peräkylä (2016)

formulations

interpretations

Vehviläinen (2003)

formulations and extensions

interpretations

Bercelli, Rossano, and Viaro
(2013)

enquiry sequence—e.g.,
open-ended questions,
contingent questions, and
formulations

elaboration sequence—
initiated with reinterpretation

Resistance in psychotherapy
I consider in this section a topic that has been the focus of much of the recent
conversation analytic study of psychotherapy: resistance. In contrast to how this term is
conceptualized in psychotherapy, especially in psychoanalysis, where it has been treated in a
number of ways, but especially as a phenomenon of avoiding saying something that has never
before been put into speech (Fink, 2014a), in conversation analysis it has been deployed to
describe an interactional phenomenon. Conversation analytic research on change in
psychotherapy has shown resistance to be a variable of central interest, especially as a
characteristic of patient’s responses (to therapist interventions) that is sensitive to change over
time (Voutilainen, Peräkylä, & Ruusuvuori, 2011). Because of its immediate relevance to this
study, with its focus on change in talk-in-interaction in psychotherapy, I seek here to clarify both
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what constitutes resistance in the domain of conversation and to review the relevant CA literature
on how resistance is navigated by psychotherapists.
In the conversation analytic literature on psychotherapy, resistance is almost exclusively
analyzed in connection with patient turns-at-talk and almost always as a feature of second pair
parts. Patient talk that is considered to embody resistance consists of those second-position
responses that variously disconfirm, disagree, reject, provide a non-relevant answer, deny
knowledge (e.g., “I don’t know” responses to questions), claim not to remember, or avoid the
terms and/or presuppositions of a question (Muntigl, 2013; Stivers & Hayashi, 2010; Voutilainen
& Peräkylä, 2016; Ekberg & LeCouteur, 2014). What we notice about these responses is that
they all constitute dispreferred responses, and as dispreferred responses, they disalign with—
they fail to advance—a first action (Sidnell, 2010).
An example of what we might call “resistance-as-disalignment” comes from the study of
bipolar, or Yes/No, questions (e.g., “Did you see that new movie?”). A response to a question
that is aligning—a response that is not resistant—advances the social work realized in the
question. Many Yes/No questions do the work of requesting information, and so the aligning
response will be, specifically, the one that supplies the requested information. Besides giving
“non-answers”, such as “I don’t know” responses (Jager et al., 2016), which is one obvious way
of resisting a request for information and disaligning with its action pathway, respondents may
also disalign with a question by answering a slightly different question than the one asked—this
involves undermining the question’s “agenda”—and/or by supplying an answer that introduces
lexical, syntactical, or morphological changes that adjust or challenge the question’s “terms”
(Stivers & Hayashi, 2010). An example of the latter comes in the form of responses to Yes/No
questions that do not, in their answer, employ “yes” or “no” lexis. These “nonconforming”
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responses are disaligned with the grammatical preferences of Yes/No questions (Raymond,
2003). With resistance-as-disalignment, then, we are conceptualizing a responsive action that
serves as an obstacle to the realization of the preferred action that has been proposed or
initiated—e.g., declining an invitation, disagreeing with an interpretation, or providing a
response to a question that doesn’t really answer the question. We also have in mind subtle ways
in which the intent or direction of a proposed action can be undermined. These ways include
responses that fail to accept the basic vision, agenda, or presuppositions of a proposed activity
sequence, as well as responses that contradict the lexical terms and design features of a first pair
part action.
Moving up one level of abstraction, we can say that this form of resistance—resistanceas-disalignment—embodies a form of withdrawal of cooperation (Stivers, Mondada, & Steensig,
2011; Madill, Widdicombe, & Barkham, 2001). According to Stivers, Mondada, and Steensig
(2011), cooperation is a genus term with two main levels, one of which is alignment. For
myself, I find that the language of “cooperation” has phenomenological value, as it helps us to
clarify what is at stake when we speak of certain forms of resistance. In those cases of resistance
where, for example, a patient rejects a proposed shift of topic (Madill, Widdicombe, & Barkham,
2001), what we are saying by describing the action as “resistant” is that it doesn’t cooperate with
what the therapist is trying to get accomplished with his talk. The patient is not displaying the
sort of prosocial accommodation that so frequently dictates behavior.
Lest it appear otherwise, I should stress that the term resistance is not meant to index a
value judgment, as though it were interactionally retrograde to exhibit resistance. In their
conversation analytic work exploring sequences where therapists invited their patients to engage
in “mentalization,” Keselman, Cromdal, Kullgard, and Holmqvist (2016) note that, “In our
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excerpts several other stances, sometimes seemingly indicative of resistance to mentalization,
may be seen as examples of a creative use of language resources and may in fact be based on
implicit mentalization” (p. 10). What I believe that the authors are suggesting is that a response
that exhibits resistance or disalignment with a proposed activity sequence—such as
mentalization—may nonetheless be therapeutically valuable. Indeed, I would hazard that many
psychotherapists would extoll the virtues of some resistance, in the sense of disagreeing with
views and ideas that are not congruent with the patient’s own. To value patient autonomy and
agency is to recognize the place and occasional virtue of resistance-as-disalignment, of noncooperativeness.
All the same, there is a concern evidenced in the conversation analytic literature with
describing effective responses to patient resistance—or, alternatively, describing ineffective
therapist responses to resistance and the consequences of this—insofar as a form of chronic
resistance is generally assumed to be antithetical to effective psychotherapeutic work. Madill,
Widdicombe, and Barkham (2001), for instance, analyze mutual resistance in the interactions of
an unsuccessful therapist-client dyad engaged in short-term therapy work. Both participants
display a resistance to taking up one another’s “projects” or ways of formulating the client’s
problem, with the client displaying an understanding of how her problem stems from domestic
iniquities relating to her husband and the therapist concluding that the patient’s distress stems
from an internal problem with feeling worthless. The result of their mutual resistance to
facilitating the progress of one another’s activities—activities that involve proposals for how to
understand the patient’s emotional struggle—is a lack of improvement in an outcome measure of
depression. The patient fails to improve in therapy as a result, it would seem, of a series of
interactions marked by resistance.
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Muntigl (2013) describes a similar finding in his case study of the interactional
negotiation of resistance in a couples counselling case. In his write up, he demonstrates that the
therapist’s failure to affiliate with a client’s resistance around a certain problem (namely, the
client’s “inability to share” or self-disclose) ultimately leads to therapeutic breakdown. Had the
therapist engaged the client in talk about her (the therapist’s) shared responsibility for the failure
to make headway on the proposed topic, rather than disaffiliating with the client’s resistance and
insisting that he produce a relevant response, the breakdown could have been avoided (Muntigl,
2013). At least two insights come out of this study: First, while patient resistance may pose
some difficulties to doing effective psychotherapy, responding to it with disaffiliation is
counterproductive; and second, topicalizing a patient’s resistance risks exacerbating his
withdrawal (Muntigl, 2013).
Rather than topicalizing or disaffiliating with a patient’s resistance (to a given action
sequence or topic initiation), conversation analytic research suggests that better interactional
outcomes result when therapists neither encourage nor overtly disalign with (that is, resist)
patient resistance. Voutilainen and Peräkylä (2016) discuss cases of patient resistance to ontopic talk, as when patients shift the topic of conversation away from some therapeuticallyrelevant matter. They observe that therapists sometimes manage this resistance by producing
“minimalistic” responses that empathically display understanding of the patient’s talk but do not
incite further discussion on that topic.
In contrast to the recommendations reported by Muntigl (2013), Friedlander et al. (2012)
report that “repeatedly, persistently, and thoroughly addressing a client’s resistance to emotional
expression can facilitate the successful resolution of deep emotional distress” (p. 360). Utilizing
a case study design, they explored various segments of talk-in-interaction in which the therapist
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topicalized the patient’s resistance. Organizing the results of their analysis into two sections,
“resistance” and “working through,” they note that the patient initially responded with
justifications to her therapist’s portrayals of her behavior as “resistant”; but at a later point, the
patient responded to similar portrayals with disagreement, followed by “experiential reflection
on her past” (p. 357). If these results hold for other patients, it would appear that, while
topicalizing resistance may—as Muntigl (2013) reports—stoke further resistance, doing so
systematically and repeatedly may have therapeutic effects. Importantly, though, the therapist in
this study—despite his “repeated” and “persistent” topicalizations of resistance—did not
disaffiliate with his patient’s displays of resistance. The authors note that, “Dr. G neither forced
compliance nor abandoned the pursuit of his psychodynamic agenda” (Friedlander et al., 2012, p.
360), which appears to mirror the approach described by Voutilainen and Peräkylä (2016).
Effective handling of patient resistance seems, on the basis of these studies, to call for a
measured stance that avoids the extremes of outright disaffiliation—as realized, for example, in
insisting on patient compliance with a given activity or agenda—and collusion with a patient’s
topic shifts, disagreements, and other forms of resistance.
Finally, though conversation analysis does not permit exploration of questions pertaining
to patients’ motivations for resisting their therapists’ activities, there is some research suggesting
that certain courses of action are more likely to elicit resistance than others. Ekberg and
Lecouteur (2012), in their study of how CBT therapists design their proposals for behavioral
change—that is, advice-like recommendations aimed at inducing patients to engage in a new
behavior—report that many of the various proposal types elicit patient resistance. They
speculate that patients may find it easier to resist these actions because, unlike requests for
information, they make relevant a simple acceptance/rejection response (Ekberg & Lecouteur,
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2012). This places the patient in a relatively passive position vis-à-vis the therapist’s proposal,
which may make resistance for likely (Ekberg & LeCouteur, 2014).
A somewhat different conclusion about the possible cause of patient resistant is arrived at
by Voutilainen, Peräkylä, and Ruusuvuori (2011). In their case study of a long-term
psychotherapy, they conjecture that a patient’s frequent displays of resistance to her therapist’s
“conclusions” (a type of utterance that, I surmise, does work similar to an interpretation), in the
early phase of her treatment, reflects in fact the patient’s resistance to closing the discussion
around the meaning of her trouble. In this novel understanding of the deeper significance of a
patient’s display of resistance, it is proposed that the patient does not accept the therapist’s
conclusion, because to do so would signal her readiness to close the topic (on the closurerelevance of agreeing/preferred second pair parts, cf. Schegloff, 2007). If true, this would
contribute to the argument I alluded to before that resistance should not be viewed as wanton
obstructionism; and indeed, there may be, in some cases, reason to suspect that resistance reflects
a patient’s strong alignment with a larger therapeutic agenda (of, for example, exploration of
meaning in relation to some trouble).

With this brief foray into the conversation analytic understanding of resistance, I have
sought to emphasize its interactional significance as a phenomenon of disalignment with a course
of activity—whether that activity is, for example, a topic nomination, a request for information, a
proposal, or an interpretation. Understood more conceptually, resistance describes a certain
withdrawal of cooperation. I have argued that this is not in any way aberrant or pathological,
and indeed, there may be environments where resistance should not be viewed as, essentially, an
obstacle to be overcome in the pursuit of a therapeutic agenda but, rather, as an indication of a
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patient’s commitment to and cooperation with a larger, more abstract therapeutic activity (e.g.,
the exploration of the meaning of one’s issue or trouble).
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Methodology
Introduction
This study seeks to make some initial, probing observations into how therapists and
patients change together, over time, at the level of the structural properties of their speakingtogether. When therapists and patients are viewed as interlocked at the level of social interaction,
the affordances of one person’s talk shaping the other person’s talk, it becomes possible to ask
how this two-person system changes over the course of psychotherapy. Utilizing the
methodology of conversation analysis, this study investigates and describes some features of
talk-in-interaction that change over the course of successful and unsuccessful psychotherapies.
Looking specifically to environments where emotion is discussed, displayed, or made relevant,
the study inquires into the sequential organization and micro-analytic properties of therapistpatient talk-in-interaction as it changes over time.
Findings derived from this study hold the possibility of informing future
psychotherapeutic research. Previous process-outcome studies have yielded general qualities and
content-based interventions that are predictive of outcome (Anderson et al., 2012), but these
studies have not been able to specify which specific practices and actions, at which specific
phases of a therapy, are associated with outcome. For expert psychotherapists, an implicit
relational intelligence probably dictates when and when not to employ certain interactional
moves; but for the novice psychotherapist, a greater research base is needed that describes the
interactional ebbs and flows that characterize successful psychotherapy. The conversation
analytic study of the psychotherapeutic change process has the great advantage of granularity,
and as this still seminal line of research progresses, the field will begin to build up a nuanced
picture of psychotherapeutic interaction. I predict that this knowledge will have a positive
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impact on the training of psychotherapists, and it is in support of this project that this study at
least partly aims.

Research question
My initial interest in this study stemmed from my dissatisfaction with the existing
psychological literature on therapeutic change. This literature—often based on theory-driven
case studies or on randomized controlled trials that assume each patient receives the same
“treatment”—did not do justice, it seemed to me, to the richness of the turn-by-turn unfolding of
psychotherapeutic conversations. When I eventually familiarized myself with conversation
analysis, with its granular attention to even the smallest sigh, pause, or intonational pattern, as
well as its novel understanding that talk does things—rather than, say, communicates
information—I found myself wanting to know more about how the discipline describes the
change process in psychotherapy. To my surprise, this literature was nearly nonexistent (for one
exception, cf. Voutilainen, Peräkylä, & Ruusuvuori, 2011—a case study of “therapeutic change
in interaction”).
It was this absence in the research base that prompted my proposal to conduct this study.
Guiding it, I formulated a number of variations on a question that revolves around a central
interest in therapeutic change: Do patients who have a successful therapy display a different
pattern of talk-in-interaction from their counterparts who terminate early, and if so, what is it?
Does psychotherapeutic talk-in-interaction change in some unclear way over time? That is, do
certain actions become more or less frequent over time? Are certain practices used by patients or
therapists at one point in time and then abandoned later? Do patients’ response patterns to
therapists’ questions, propositions, and other interventions change over time? What are the
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specific sequence types in which change occurs, and what is the thing that, in interactional terms,
changes?
Summarizing these questions, the present study asks—in as broad a way as possible—
What changes, over time, at the level of talk-in-interaction in psychotherapy conversations? And
how do the patients from successful and unsuccessful psychotherapies compare when conducting
such an analysis?

Data collection and sampling
It has been estimated that it takes about 1 hour to transcribe, using CA transcription
conventions (see below), a minute of recorded conversation. Given my aim of studying
interactional change across multiple sessions and the extensive labor required were sessions to be
transcribed in their entirety, it is essential to sample small segments of conversation from
individual sessions, as well as to sample sessions from the overall course of what are, sometimes,
rather long psychotherapies (>100 sessions).
The approach I have taken is to select four sessions for analysis from each psychotherapy
being investigated, these sessions representing roughly the initial, halfway, ¾-length, and
terminal sessions of the respective psychotherapies. Only one, approximately 5-minute segment
of talk was selected for transcription from each of these four sessions. Taking my lead from a
study by Voutilainen, Peräkylä, and Ruusuvuori (2010), this study honed in on those portions of
the broader conversational environment in which some expression or lexicalization of emotion
occurred or was made relevant. Given the sizable research implicating emotion and its
expression as a special factor in the treatment of psychopathology (Busch & Milrod, 2009;
McCullough & Magill, 2009; Osimo, 2002; Fosha, 2009), as well as the massive burden that
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transcribing whole sessions would entail, it made sense to limit the data selection to this
environment of talk. This sampling approach yielded a total of sixteen 5-minute segments that
constitute the qualitative dataset, or corpus, on which the study based its analysis and
conclusions.
The question still arises, Of the potentially many emotionally rich moments in any given
session, what was my method of selection? Here I must acknowledge my subjectivity as the
primary factor. Though a questionable approach when viewed according to an ideal of
replicability and operationalization, I drew on my experience as a practicing clinician as my
guide when determining what segments of interaction were the most emotionally laden. My
decision to do so was influenced, in part, by my conviction that emotionality is expressed in, for
example, the emotional deadness of a droning monologue as much as it is in the boiling over of
angry insults. How could I operationalize this complex understanding of emotionality that I have
developed implicitly over the course of my clinical training—that recognizes strong emotion in a
patient’s nonverbal signs, a certain terseness in his style of response, a sudden and
uncharacteristic way of stretching his words, the way he now drops into long silences in response
to pointed questions...? Though it comes with certain risks—given that I occupy in this study
both the role of researcher and participant-member and, therefore, may be unconsciously
motivated to approach my data gathering and analysis in such a way that satisfies foregone
conclusions—I opted to trust my clinical sensibility about what constitutes an “emotional” or
emotion-relevant stretch of interaction. My approach, then, was to listen through a selected
session from start to finish and note those sections where something of felt significance
occurred—where, for example, a patient entered a complaint sequence, or where, in contrast, a
certain sluggishness or immovability marked a stretch of patient talk. On my second pass
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through the session, I would select for analysis a section of interaction—again, on the basis of a
felt factor, which I readily admit suggests a level of arbitrariness—that had the greatest
impression on me, that seemed to me to capture the moment of greatest aliveness, tension, or
struggle in the session. This was the actual practice that guided my selection of the sampled
conversations that formed the primary data of this study.
For the typical conversation analyst, I think such an approach to narrowing down my
corpus will seem particularly inexact, guided, as it is, by a subjective yardstick that belongs to
me alone. It seemed necessary to do so, in the context of this study, because I have not been
guided by an interest in any one particular interactional practice, social action, or action
sequence, which would have, in that case, constituted its own data selection parameter. I have
opted, instead, to begin to tackle the challenging question of what interactional phenomena are
most implicated in—most sensitive and supple with respect to—the passage of time in the
context of deliberate, institutionalized conversations that have as their aim the inducement of
behavioral change in at least one party. My motivating research question has been one of a
general nature. Had I operationalized my definition of “emotionality” in interaction, I opined
that there was a risk of reducing the broad scope of the study to technical, specialized
environments of interaction—such as complaint sequences, troubles-telling sequences, or
sequences in which crying occurs—which, while adding to the literature on these sequence
types, would permit fewer conclusions about what changes in general, over time, in
psychotherapeutic talk-in-interaction. Indeed, at the earliest phases of planning for this study, I
entertained the thought of randomly selecting 5-minute segments of conversations from my
broader corpus, deciding against this when it became apparent that I risked sampling data in
which only the patient spoke (psychotherapy—especially psychoanalytic psychotherapy—can be
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a very one-sided type of conversation). This would have been somewhat problematic in a study
interested in interactional change. (I am aware that a stretch of conversation in which only the
patient is speaking is, by definition, a form of interaction—storytellings, for example, are
interactional achievements—but had my sampled data consisted primarily of such univocal
tellings, it would likely have shed little light on my research interest.) It was necessary,
therefore, to deliberately select data in which both therapist and patient were actively speaking,
while at the same time avoiding the other pitfall of a too narrowly-defined sequential
environment. The method I fell on—to select passages of conversation in which something of an
emotionally and, I would add, clinically significant nature was occurring, as judged through the
lens of my experience doing psychotherapy—is disadvantaged by the fact that it is impossible to
fully replicate the study design, but it offers certain advantages in the form of keeping the data
selection open and varied (in line with the study’s interest in general changes in talk-ininteraction), while still focusing on interactional environments that are likely to have some
clinical importance (and, therefore, likely to be environments where phenomena related to
therapeutic change may occur).
With regards to the sampling of therapist-patient dyads, I drew from two populations:
therapies in which termination was mutually agreed upon and therapies in which the patient
abruptly ended the therapy (for reasons other than symptom relief, job relocation, injury, or
death). The most common way in which patients prematurely terminated therapy in this study
was to stop coming to therapy without any advance warning, after which they typically fail to
reply to therapist attempts to communicate with them by phone or email. An estimated 40-50%
of patients terminate therapy early (Hilsenroth, Cromer, & Ackerman, 2012). Of the many
variables that predict termination, alliance is one of the most robust. Hilsenroth et al. (2012) cite
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research showing a correlation between a weakening alliance and negative patient behaviors,
such as expressing dissatisfaction with the therapist, withdrawing from the therapist, and
growing distant. In contrast, when alliance is high—or alternatively, when ruptures in the
alliance are appropriately repaired—patients stay in therapy and they are much more likely to
have positive outcomes (Hilsenroth et al., 2012). In research that has looked at therapist qualities
as they relate to patient outcomes, the most effective therapists have a smaller percentage of
premature terminations (Blatt, Zuroff, & Hawley, 2009). Extrapolating from these findings,
“remaining in therapy” and/or terminating by consensus seemed to me the best available
operational definition of “success” in psychotherapy. A more robust approach would have
utilized measures of symptom reduction over time, but at the time that I was designing this study,
the treatments I was conducting were too far advanced to allow collecting such longitudinal data.
Given the selection criteria and my limited access to video recordings, this study utilizes
a convenience sampling approach. The video-recordings come from psychotherapy sessions
held at the Duquesne University Psychology Clinic, a training clinic in Pittsburgh, P.A., open to
the public and mostly staffed by graduate students studying for a Ph.D. in Clinical Psychology.
My access was limited to my own video recordings, and thus, the pool from which I could
sample was whittled down to those in which I was in the role of psychotherapist.

Transcription
This study investigates macro-level patterns of micro-level interactions. To better locate
and describe micro-level interactions, it is necessary to transcribe the utterances that constitute
them. How fine-grained, though, should a transcription be? In phenomenological research, it is
customary to transcribe only the words spoken in an interview, not the intonations, stresses, cut
offs, prolongations, overlaps, silences, and inhalations and exhalations that accompany everyday
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conversation. At least in the human sciences, the “noise” of certain conversational data are
filtered out (Sidnell, 2010, p. 35). For the purposes of analyzing talk-in-interaction, however,
such an approach is inadvisable. Sidnell and Enfield (2104) argue that conversationalists make
sense of what the other is doing by attending to small features of the other’s talk and making
“token inferences” about these (p. 441). Speakers very likely do not categorize each other’s talk
according to action-type, but rather, they attend to “specific choices of words, grammatical
construction, prosody, positioning of the utterance in relation to what has come before, and so
on” (p. 438). In an attempt to reconstruct the interactional environment in which speakers’ make
sense of one another’s talk, it behooves one to transcribe those small features of talk that
speakers so frequently attend to. These aspects of talk—changes in intonation, pauses, relative
speed of talk—are in many instances the very practices that make possible social actions.
Naturally, if these features are not transcribed, it is difficult to ascertain the interactional intent of
a given utterance.
Conversation analysis comes equipped with a method for transcription—originally
pioneered by Gail Jefferson—and includes conventions for marking laughter, overlapping talk,
various volumes of speech, silence (transcribed in tenths of a second), and many others. This
study employs this method, and an overview of the relevant transcription symbols can be found
in the Appendix.
To aid transcription, I used the software program ELAN (version 4.9.3), developed by the
Max Planck Institute for Psycholinguistics. It allows the user to slow down a conversation
considerably, in order to hear and transcribe various details of talk; it features a kind of
chronological ‘ruler’ that allows one to easily count pauses in tenths of a second; and it has a
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feature to replay segments of talk on a ‘loop,’ which facilitates what is an otherwise timeconsuming procedure if one requires to listen to a segment of talk repeatedly.

Method of analysis
In this study, I analyze psychotherapy conversations through the lens of the descriptive
categories and methodological framework of conversation analysis. A more intuitive or
idiosyncratic approach would risk a.) making unwarrantable claims about interactional practices
that have not been independently verified by the CA community and b.) blurring over important
differences between actions (e.g., candidate understandings vs. formulations) that lend
themselves to different interactional work. I have therefore eschewed extensively speculating
about conversational phenomena not previously described in the CA literature. Nonetheless, the
various practices and actions that have been investigated in CA is dauntingly large, and so the
quality of my analysis reflects to some extent my familiarity with the relevant literature—which,
for all but a few researchers, is bound to be incomplete. The interactional phenomena I am
prepared to see in my data is constrained by my preexisting fluency with them, and as such, my
preparation for this study, as reflected especially in the literature review, was tremendously
important and marks, to some extent, the boundaries of what I was capable of analyzing.
There are distinct limitations to this study stemming from the fact that it has only a few
precursors. There are many phenomena that one might make the focus of a conversation analytic
study of how talk-in-interaction in psychotherapy changes over time, but given the limited
research base, it would be uncertain whether these are the most crucial for understanding what
occurs in “successful” versus “unsuccessful” psychotherapy talk. As such, this study was forced
to cast a large analytic net, not limiting itself to a predetermined sequence type or set of
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practices. This comes with some advantages, insofar as a broad range of actions and practices
are attended to; but it also entails some disadvantages, as it does not systematically focus on and
track developments in, say, patients’ responses to a particular action type (e.g., interpretations).

Reflexivity
In conducting this study, it was necessary to adopt a reflexive stance to interrogate—and
hopefully minimize the impact of—certain biases that attend my peculiar role in the study as both
researcher and principal psychotherapist. It is normal to distinguish between “insider” and
“outsider” roles in qualitative research (Finefter-Rosenbluh, 2017), but in this study, my “insider”
status is so pronounced that it constitutes the sine qua non of the data. As the psychotherapist in the
sampled conversations, I am the object of the research as much as my patients, and I am inextricably
linked as co-interlocutor in our conversations.
The notion of reflexivity is taken up in disparate ways in qualitative research, with as many
as five styles or modes of reflexive orientation being described by Finlay (2003): introspection,
intersubjective reflection, mutual collaboration, social critique, and ironic deconstruction. What
more broadly cuts across these specific types of reflexive stances, however, is the adoption of the
following epistemological premises: (1) The generation of knowledge is inescapable influenced by
the researcher’s preexisting beliefs, biases, ideology, history, class, race, gender, sexual orientation,
political beliefs, and language spoken (Berger, 2013; Dodgson, 2019). In short, the person of the
researcher effects everything from her research interests and questions to her way of collecting data
and interpreting them (Berger, 2013). (2) Also, the researcher’s positioning vis-à-vis her research
and participants—including her emotional response (indeed, her transference reaction) to her
participants—generates contextually-specific knowledge (Finlay, 2003). The encounter with the
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setting and participants that constitute a study has an effect on the researcher, and this is
consequential for the production of knowledge.
In the study being conducted here, the role of my theoretical lens and methodology—
conversation analysis (CA)—is obviously crucial in both rendering and making possible a certain
type of knowledge and limiting the horizons of what can be interrogated and made intelligible. This
is not a detrimental limitation, however, as it describes the necessarily perspectival approach that
attends any research. Assuming a constructivist epistemology, it is presumed that the Real of natural
phenomena—that is, Truth, with a capital ‘T’—must go through the ‘acid wash’ of human
interpretation to be made real (with a lowercase ‘r’).
What I seek to bring the most attention to is the impact on my data analysis and interpretation
that stems from my being both researcher and researched. In the process of adopting a reflexive
stance towards the transcripts that make up my corpus of data, I became aware of how I was initially
abstracting my role as therapist and assuming that any response outcome in a given sequence—e.g., a
disagreeing response to one of my interpretations—was a strictly patient-centered phenomenon. We
may wonder whether I was resistant to implicating myself in the outcome of the “unsuccessful”
psychotherapies, setting myself up as a kind of idealized input that placed the burden of the success
of the therapies on the patients’ shoulders. Prior to reflexively interrogating this stance, I had been
approaching the phenomenon of resistance, in particular, as something indwelling in my patients—a
kind of trait or predisposition reflecting the patient’s psychology. Fortunately, the combination of an
attitude of skepticism towards my initial conclusions, a methodologically informed attitude of
approaching conversational phenomena as interactive in nature, as well as a stroke of good luck (I
am not sure what else to call it), taking the form of a progressive realization of my own tendency to
disalign with certain of my patients’ action sequences, disabused me of this assumption. As the
analysis and discussion sections of this study demonstrate, patient resistance (or disalignment) is
found to be largely symmetrical with my own.
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After this first discovery of how my role as “the researched” constellated reactions in me that
risked occluding my pivotal role in the outcome of the psychotherapies under investigation,
background assumptions informing my approach to the data more frequently entered my awareness.
Was I not finding ways to gloss the turn-by-turn talk with my patients in “successful” treatments in a
way that bore out my unspoken assumption that they would engage in sequential activities
differently, over time? Wasn’t I tending to pass over indicators of aligning and cooperative behavior
in my patients from “unsuccessful” treatments as somehow anomalous, not worth too much
consideration? Didn’t my initial analysis seem somehow too neat, too compelling? Reviewing the
findings of my first pass over the data, I spotted subtle ways in which biases were influencing my
analysis; and indeed, I discovered that, in one instance, I had analyzed a nearly identical sequence
type—one appearing in conversation with a patient from an “unsuccessful” treatment, the other with
a patient from a “successful” treatment—as displaying resistance in the former case and “complex
resistance” in the latter! Not only did this require me to systematically define my criteria for what I
considered “resistance” proper and what I was calling “complex resistance,” but it enjoined me to
draw attention in my analysis to the exceptions in the data—those instances that challenged the
emerging picture of a patient group that was increasingly cooperative over time and another that
persistently stymied me (see the ‘Discussion’ section). In doing so, my findings became,
unsurprisingly, more nuanced. It became clear, for instance, that the patients whose therapies were
unsuccessful were rather aligned with some enquiry sequence actions—such as requests for
information—and that the patients whose therapies were successful were still quite resistant to my
interpretations throughout their treatments.
My reflexive practice in this study was not systematic—I did not keep, for instance, a journal
or apply a hermeneutic circle of inquiry to the findings of my study. Rather, I adopted an attitude of
openness to my data that engendered, piecemeal, awareness of certain background beliefs and biases
informing my analysis. I would describe my application of a reflexive stance as a general readiness
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to see disconfirmations of the patterns of talk-in-interaction that were emerging in my analysis and to
have these disconfirmations reflected in the findings as I articulated them. This stance was itself
largely backgrounded, but it nonetheless modulated and informed my analysis through its
intermittent percolations that produced awareness of contradictions and complexity.
A more systematic application of reflexivity would have entailed grappling with, for instance,
my identity as a (relatively) young, white male. (One of my patients was advanced in age, while
another hailed from a country outside the United States.) I also did not rigorously reflect on the role
that my clinical framework of psychoanalysis may have had on my interpretation of the data. The
language of “resistance,” for instance, while replete in the conversation analytic study of
psychotherapy, is a term borrowed from psychoanalysis that reflects a certain frame of
understanding. While I was careful in the study to identify resistance with the conversation analytic
notion of “disalignment,” I did not critically reflect on whether facets of the psychoanalytic
understanding of resistance crept into my use of the term. Psychoanalysis remains, in this study, a
“deep structure” (a golden calf?) that I have been, I suspect, unwilling to interrogate and that
undoubtedly has influenced everything from my research question to the study design and findings.

Informed consent and other ethical considerations
This study received IRB-approval from the Duquesne University Institutional Review
Board for Human Subjects Protection in Spring 2019. Participants to the study agreed at the
time of beginning psychological treatment at the Duquesne Psychology Clinic to having their
sessions video-recorded “for clinical training and/or research.” Participants were informed that
their receiving services at the Duquesne Clinic were not dependent in any way on their agreeing
to be video-taped and/or having these sessions used for research purposes; and they were also
verbally informed that they could opt out of having their sessions recorded at any time.
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Upon completion of transcribing the segments of conversation used for this study, all
identifying information in the transcripts—personal names, occupational references, educational
and other institutional references, geographical references, and any and all descriptions that
could cumulatively suggest the client’s identity or those who might know him—were deleted or
purposively changed. Pseudonyms were created for each of the four clients represented in the
transcripts, and no master list, or other device, are in my possession that could trace the
transcribed transcripts back to the real names and identifying information of the clients. Upon
completion of the study, I deleted from my hard-drive my own copies of the recorded sessions.
During the time that I was analyzing these recordings, they sat behind two layers of passwordprotected encryption—viz., FileVault encryption of a Mac-based startup disk and individual
password-protected encryption for the individual files.
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Analysis
Introduction
In the following, I analyze segments of talk-in-interaction from four different
psychotherapies, spanning four different points in time. The sections are presented
chronologically and organized by treatment group (“successful” vs. “unsuccessful”). Following
a brief contextualization of the first extract analyzed for each patient, I conduct a sequential
analysis of the relevant conversational phenomena appearing within an approximately 5-minute’s
length section of talk, broken up into extracts to aid readability. The “content” of the
conversations receives secondary importance in the analysis, except where a given “display of
understanding” is the focus of inquiry and/or interpretive work across sequences, in which case I
attempt to track how this understanding shifts—or doesn’t—over time. Otherwise, focus is
placed on turn design, action analysis, displays of emotion, alignment, affiliation, epistemics, and
topic nomination and pursuit. I especially hone in on three types of sequences, which, broadly
described, work to seek information from the patient, seek confirmation or agreement of some
partial modification or summarization of his talk, or offer an interpretation of the patient’s
experience, problem, or trouble. In these sequence types, I aim to analyze the patient’s practices
for displaying (dis)alignment/dis(affiliation). Alignment, in particular, as a descriptive category,
captures the level of “resistance” displayed in the patient’s response, and I use alignment and
resistance largely interchangeably in the analysis.
The organization of the analysis prioritizes close examination of my sessions with those
patients whose psychotherapies were successful. This is because these sessions were more
complicated, in the main, in comparison to those patients whose psychotherapies were
unsuccessful; and this necessitated both more space to bring out and remark on these
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complexities and the inclusion of separate sections for these patients. In contrast, it was
convenient to group the analysis of “unsuccessful” psychotherapies under combined headings, as
these sessions were often marked by what was absent—for example, the absence of significant
therapist questioning and other requests for information—or displayed a certain repetitiveness of
sequential structure, both characteristics reducing the sheer quantity or length of the analysis of
these sampled sessions.
As the reader will see, the patients who remained in therapy—whose therapies were
deemed “successful”—responded in different ways to different first pair part (FPP) actions, over
time. They also had a tendency to evidence shifts—often within the span of just a few minutes—
in how they understood some matter or issue, in response to my repeated attempts to modify
their understandings. The upshot was that these sessions, which bore out the validity of
distinguishing between classes of actions—I have in mind, in particular, the distinction between
enquiry sequences and elaboration, or interpretative, sequences (Bercelli, Rossano, & Viaro,
2013; Vehviläinen, 2003)—required greater care and more discussion, so as to mark and
describe those sequences in which there was relatively high patient alignment and where there
was low alignment.
Table 2, below, provides a snapshot of the four patients involved in this study—divided
according to their categorization as “successful” or “unsuccessful,” from the perspective of the
outcome of their treatments—including basic demographic information and the differential
lengths of their treatments. As noted, Adam’s and Keith’s sessions are usually discussed in their
own sections, while Monty’s and Jon’s sessions are analyzed together under shared headings.
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Table 2

"Successful"
135 sessions
Keith: White, male, 30s

112 sessions

Adam: non-White,
male, 30s
"Unsuccessful"
Monty: White, male,
30s

40 sessions
7 sessions

Jon: White, male, 70s

Beginning psychotherapy: Adam
Adam had failed to show up for his previous two psychotherapy appointments, and when
he eventually attended what would be his sixth session, I was keen to topicalize his absences—
his absences suggesting a weak therapeutic alliance that, left unaddressed, might lead to a
negative therapeutic outcome (Hilsenroth, Cromer, & Ackerman, 2012). Prior to the extract that
appears below, Adam had appealed to “oversleeping” as the reason for missing his appointments,
and on each occasion that I reintroduced the matter, he tended to quickly, in a stepwise fashion,
migrate to other topics of conversation, such as his difficult financial situation. At the time of
the treatment, my clinical orientation was heavily influenced by a relational theory of therapeutic
action that pinpoints the therapist-patient relationship as the site of primary importance for
working through pathogenic psychological patterns (Pizer, 2018). Following a psychoanalytic
heuristic that reads possible (relational) meaning into patient behaviors that impinge on the
therapeutic frame—behaviors like being late to or missing an appointment (Aron, 2018)—I saw
in Adam’s absences something potentially fertile: an opportunity for getting him to reformulate
his understanding of his behavior from something unintentional and beyond his control to
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something founded on thoughts and feelings—an opportunity for getting him to increase his
“mentalization” around what had occurred during those mornings when he had merely—
ostensibly—‘overslept’ (Allen, 2006; Bateman & Fonagy, 2006). As I reasoned, it was
important to not let Adam ‘off the hook,’ as something important bearing on the therapeutic
relationship might be nestled in the apparent happenstance of his absenteeism, and if so, working
over this material could—according to the theoretical view of my then clinical orientation—
promote therapeutic change in Adam. I persisted, therefore, in returning to the topic, as I do in
line 1 of the following extract, this time attempting to deepen his “oversleeping” account by
inquiring into its possible link with the topic of his finances:
Extract 1 [Adam, S06, 30:35]
(Pa= patient, Th= therapist.)
01 Th:

You think that (1.0) your financial situation might've (.6)

02

↑factored ↑into: oversleeping:?

03

(2.6)

04 Pa:

It's: it (.9) o:nly indirect(ly)

05

(.3)

06 Pa:

like (d) the-the- thing: that (2.2) I get preoccupied (.)

07

like thisspecially cause my lady worries so hard

08

and then I already ha:ve like (.) my own worries on my

09

plate a:nd (.5) I want to make us both happy

10

(.4)

11 Pa:

and that (.8) drives me (.3) to: (2.3)

12

focus: harder on what I'm doing

13

(.7)

14 Pa:

it's wunathe few (.3) work harder motivators that I still

15

have=that I still respond to

16

(.6)

17 Pa:

u:m

18

(1.8)

19

the consequence of that is that (.2) I'm n:ot (1.6)

20

{hhhhhh::/(.8)}
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21

(1.8)

22

I'm not ma:naging those feelings °ver(y) I° =jus sorta

23

overwhelming me en=I'm using it to work.

By inquiring again into the matter of the Adam’s “oversleeping,” my question at line 1
re-topicalizes his recent absences and works to solicit an account. It is constructed as a yes/no
interrogative (Raymond, 2003), which, despite its positive polarity and preference for a “yes”
response, downgrades claims to epistemic access through its interrogative design and its use of
an epistemic marker (“[Do] you think...”) and a conditional modal (“might”) (Ekberg &
LeCouteur, 2014). A long inter-turn silence of 2.6 seconds follows, strongly suggesting a
forthcoming dispreferred second pair part response (Schegloff, 2007). Adam’s response at line 4
begins with a hitch (“It’s: it”) and is then abandoned, and he then delivers a non-type-conforming
(i.e., his response does not answer “yes” or “no” to the Y/N interrogative), rejecting response—
what amounts to a highly dispreferred response. I decline uptake at the transition-relevance
place at line 5, and Adam proceeds to give what would appear to be, by dint of its turn-initiation
particle “like,” an elaboration (Muntigl & Zabala, 2008) or account for his just-prior response. It
is a peculiar account, however, for a number of reasons. The first attempt to elaborate his
response, beginning at line 6, contains perturbations and is finally abandoned (“like (d) the-thething: that”), and after a long intra-turn silence of 2.2 seconds, he gives an account that has no
clear relevance to the terms (“financial situation,” “oversleeping”) or agenda (i.e., getting Adam
to reflect on something that might be causing him to oversleep) of my question at line 1. He
elaborates his rejection of my question by explaining that he “get[s] preoccupied,” and none of
his subsequent elaborations or extensions of his turn appear to dovetail with the scope of the
original question. He gives, that is, what Stivers and Hayashi (2010) have termed a
“transformative answer”—in this case, a transformative answer that evades not only the language
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of the original question but its very presupposition that something is “factored” into his
oversleeping. At lines 10, 13, 16, and 18, I decline uptake of Adam’s talk, which causes him to
elaborate his response further; but as he does so, he develops what amounts to an explanation for
why he has been working so hard, not why he has been oversleeping. Stivers and Hayashi
(2010) have suggested that answers such as these, which eschew the terms and the focus of a
Y/N interrogative, are disaligning, disaffiliative, and, therefore, highly resistant.
At lines 22-23, Adam introduces into his explanation of why he has been working so hard
a reference to the “feelings” that are “overwhelming” him. Leading up to this, we see a long
intra-turn silence of 1.6 seconds (line 19), followed by a long exhale (line 20) lasting nearly a
second and another long pause (line 21), at which point he repeats the phrasal unit “I’m not” and
continues his turn. These design features lend his talk a palpable atmosphere of emotion,
augmenting the lexical description of his feelings that he then proceeds to give. As he does so,
an interesting phenomenon occurs. He reports that he is “not ma:naging those feelings °ver(y) I°
=jus sorta overwhelming me en=I'm using it to work.” It seems clear that he was on his way
towards saying, “I’m not managing those feeling very well,” but he drops the word “well”; and
what is more, this lexical excision takes place just as the volume of his voice becomes
momentarily quiet. Taking my cue from research by Schegloff (2003) into a phenomenon he
describes as the “surfacing of the suppressed,” it appears that Adam’s intended use of the word
“well” is deleted only to reappear covertly four words later, hidden in the lexical unit
“overwhelming” (i.e., over + well +ming). It is clear from the long pauses in his turn, his long
outbreath, and the modulation of the volume of his voice that Adam has not only been managing
difficult feelings in his daily life but that they are evoked in the process of talking about them.
Schegloff (2003) suggests that the phenomenon of lexical suppression (and subsequent
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surfacing) can be analytically grounded in interactional terms—that is, in terms of what is
occurring at a given moment in a spate of talk-in-interaction. In this instance, it would seem that
the suppression of the word “well” is triggered in a context in which certain “overwhelming”
emotions are nearing explicit expression. The fact that Adam drops the volume of his voice
noticeably at the moment of suppression would seem to buttress this hypothesis, reduced volume
being a common prosodic feature of crying (Hepburn & Potter, 2007). It appears, then, that
Adam not only suppresses a word at line 22 but works to suppress the outpouring of some
underlying emotion—emotion that nonetheless creeps into his talk via long pauses, a sigh, a
partial repeat, and lowered volume.
At this juncture, the pursuit of the topic of Adam’s missed sessions is overshadowed by
the unexpected appearance of his description and display of strong emotion. In most
psychodynamic and psychoanalytic theories of therapeutic change, patient exposure to and
expression of defended-against emotions is given special prominence (Shedler, 2012;
McCullough & Magill, 2009; Maroda, 2010; Solomon & Lynn, 2002; Fosha, 2002), and at the
time of this session, I too ascribed to an affect-focused theory of psychological change. I
proceeded, therefore, to inquire into the nature of the feelings alluded to by Adam:
Extract 2 [Adam, S06]
22

I'm not ma:naging those feelings °ver(y) I° =jus sorta

23

overwhelming me en=I'm using it to work.

24

(.6)

25 Th:

Which feelings:?

26

(.4)

27 Pa:

U::m: (5.7)

28

min-imally concern

29

(.6)

30 Pa:

u:m: but (.) it's (1.8) hhhhh (.9)

31

I guess a li:ttle bit uh guilt. (.4) >hh .hh< ((laughing))
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32

(.7)

33 Pa:

like it's a: (.6) cause I want to be (n) the position

34

where I can directly help my partner

35

(.6)

36 Th:

uhhhh:

37 Pa:

and I can't

38

w-well I uh euh uh (.3) uh tch

39

like two days ago there was (.4) no news that I- that I cou:ld

40

°becuz (I:)/(like)° (3.1)

41

bec'z I have to- I have to finish this: (.7) this graduation

42

track cuz it’s (.) thee best track I can take (.3)

43

to lo:ng term help

44

(.8)

45 Pa:

uu:m: (.9)

46

but but it is: (.8) uuh a little lacking in (the) as far

47

as short term help goes

48

(.8)

49 Pa:

an=by a little I mean £completely lacking£

50

(.3)

51 Pa:

in (.4) short term help

52

so: (.) and it's not a (.7) >it's not a< solace to her.

53

(1.1)

54 Pa:

right she has these issu:es and she: (.5)

55 ?

Uuuhhh:

56 Th:

She=h's issues (.) no:w you're saying it- it-it- there's no

57 Pa:

[well it's: ] (.) it's:=

58 Th:

[(

59 Pa:

=ueeuhhhh .hhh (.6) ueeuhhh yeah she's ↑still feeling it

60

cause I don't- I'm not ↓working yet.

61

I have ↓promise of work (.) [I have (.) I'm ↓contracted to work

) ( )

]

62 Th:

[huhh:

63 Pa:

.hh (.3) um: (1.8)

64

but there's still notta paycheck that I can apply:

65

towards (.7) actual things in the house.
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In line 25, following Adam’s revelation that he struggles with certain difficult feelings, I
ask an “ancillary” (Heritage, 2011) or “contingent” question (Bercelli, Rossano, & Viaro,
2013)—“Which feelings?”—which functions to shift the topic away from the matter he has been
discussing (i.e., concerning what motivates him to work) and towards the topic of his feelings.
Heritage (2011) has found that such ancillary questions decline an opportunity to empathize with
a speaker; and so too, here, I pass over a possibly emerging moment in which I might have
affiliated with his stance, driven by the more pressing interactional task of generating more
information about his feelings. After a significant pause of 5.7 seconds at line 27, he responds
that he feels “min-imally concern.” I suspect that even from a lay, non-clinical perspective, such
a description for what Adam has already denoted as “overwhelming” feelings is hearable as
unelaborated, if not resistant; and so I decline uptake at the possible completion of his turn,
putting pressure on him—so to speak—to continue talking. Adam’s subsequent elaboration is
rife with hesitation: he produces a “sequential” conjunctional (“um”) followed by a syntactic
conjunctional (“but”), indicating his “pro-tem” speakership as one that is available to have
another party—namely, myself—jump in and start up a new turn (Jefferson, 1983); he
intersperses his utterance with several long pauses; he emits a long outbreath, heard as a sigh;
and he downgrades his eventual description of his feelings with qualifiers (“I guess a li:tle bit uh
guilt”). After a pause, he then produces a brief spate of laughter (line 31), an instance of what
Jefferson (1984) has termed “troubles-resistant” laughter—an attempt to display that his trouble
is not so serious as all that. The overall effect of the design of his utterance is to cast his guilt
feelings as something embarrassing, something he does not want to claim complete ownership
of, something not to be given too much attention.
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When I again decline to respond (line 32), Adam expands his turn and describes his guilt
as situated in his desire to “help [his] partner” (line 34). Across several transition-relevance
places (lines 44, 48, 50, 53), where I withhold from speaking, he goes on to explain that while
the best way to help his partner in the “long term” is to graduate from school, this activity offers
her no help in the “short term.” At line 49, he produces an extension to his just-prior turn
(concerning the lack of short-term help he provides), recasting it in the most absolute of ways,
through the use of an extreme case formulation (Pomerantz, 1986): “an=by a little I mean
£completely lacking£”. It bears the prosodic marks of a ‘smiley’ voice, and hence it displays
some resistance to taking up a true troubles-teller position. However, its strongly upgraded
construction points to a movement towards expressing his emotional stance in a strong and nonhesitant way: the help he is providing his partner, that is, is “completely” lacking. His inability
to help in the short term is “not a solace to” (line 52) her, and “she has these issues” (line 54). At
line 56, I make an attempt to formulate (Antaki, 2008) some portion of Adam’s talk, my initial
focus being on Adam’s partner and her “issues” (which remain somewhat vague). He curtails
the formulation by speaking in overlap with me (line 57), his initial turn-constructional unit—
which he eventually abandons—beginning with the particle “well,” which in some environments
alerts to an upcoming response that will be in some way disaffiliative, disaligned, or rejecting
(Schegloff & Lerner, 2009). When he restarts his turn (line 59), however, he responds with an
extended agreement (Bercelli, Rossano, & Viaro, 2008), going on to explain that his partner’s
feelings are due to his not yet having a “paycheck” to contribute to household expenses.
We can take a pause at this moment and note some general features of the talk-ininteraction between Adam and myself. In extract 1, Adam resists the constraints (both the terms
and agenda) of my question, but when I withhold from speaking, his talk begins to display
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emerging signs of emotionality and he readily calls out—by naming them (viz., “overwhelming”
feelings)—the day-to-day presence of strong feelings, thereby demonstrating his implicit
cooperativeness with the larger agenda of the therapy process, such as a willingness to reflect
genuinely on, and be open to feelings associated with, ongoing and past life events. We might
say, however, that his cooperativeness is ambivalent. He seems to pull back from experiencing
some emerging in vivo affect associated with the description of his feelings, this occurring in
connection with the suppression of a word at a moment of heightened emotionality; and more
generally, in both extracts, he utilizes practices that downplay, mitigate, or obscure his emotional
experience: he uses bland, imprecise, or generic language to describe his feelings (cf. “concern”);
he shows resistance to occupying a troubles-recipient role by engaging in laughter; and he
downgrades the claimed intensity of his emotions through the use of qualifiers. When prompted
to specify his feelings further, however, and when I withhold from taking the conversational
floor, he progressively upgrades his descriptions of what he is feeling (from “concern” to “I
guess a little bit of guilt”), and his account for why he is feeling this way becomes increasingly
granular as he continues speaking. There is a clear trajectory, especially in extract 2, of
moving—however fitfully—from a vague account of feeling “concern” to one that names “guilt”
and contextualizes it in his not contributing to the financial welfare of his primary relationship.
The next extract continues on from extract 2, and again, across the extended sequence, we find
Adam showing initial resistance to and then, progressively, alignment with the interactional
preferences projected by my actions-in-talk.
Extract 3 [Adam, S06]
64 Pa:

but there's still notta paycheck that I can apply:

65

towards (.7) actual things in the house.

66 Th:

so you're feeling guilt.
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67

(.6)

68 Th:

you're saying. you- you feel guilt.

69 Pa:

H[HHHhhhh

70 Th:

(.)

[about that

71 Pa:

I: (4.9)yea:h.

72

(1.2)

73 Pa:

(n)yeah.

74

(.5)

75 Pa:

because it has: (1.9) Hhhhhhhh

76

(3.6) hhhhh: (2.0)

77

because ideally speaking (.) I: sh- I should have

78

been done yea:rs ago.

79

(.5)

80 Pa:

>.h=.h< ((laughter))

81

(.4)

82 Th:

hmmmm:

83 Pa:

but (eh)- (.3) like I shouldn't still be: the unemployed one.

84

(.5)

85 Pa:

who's still jus' workin on his bachelor's

86 Th:

Hmm:

87

(.9)

88 Pa:

u:mm:

89

(2.4)

90 Pa:

and (2.6) (f)or the most part I can be: pretty chill about it

91

but when things are extra tight on her end (.6) I: (1.5)

92

I: bear (1.5) personal responsibility for not being able to (2.2)

93

light (.4) to immediately lighten that load (.9)

94

cause that is not a situation that I(h) (.7) I want for my family.

95

(.6)

96 Pa:

like at all.

97

(.3)

98 Pa:

like I (.5) .hh I('m) (.4) .hh (.4) hhhh

99

even (.) even if it was something I was: initially↑ o.k. with¿ (.)

100

like just as a (.3) pragmatic “this is just something we have to

101

go through” (.6) you know because of (.3) how the- the nature of

102

the beast

102

103

(.2)

104 Th: hmmm
105 Pa: umm: (.8) I'm really fuck£ing tired of £ it .hhhh
106

i:t (1.8) it's (.) it's an exhausting situation to still be in:

At line 66, I retopicalize the matter of Adam’s guilt by formulating only that: “so you're
feeling guilt.” True to formulations generally (Antaki, 2008), this one proposes—using the turninitial particle “so”—a reading of the ‘gist’ of what the patient has been saying, while passing
over much of what he has said and simultaneously introducing a surreptitious transformation of
his talk. This particular formulation is extreme in some ways, however, as it highlights
something the patient alluded to over 30 lines previously—and then, only in mitigated form (“I
guess a li:ttle bit uh guilt”). In effect, I imply that everything the patient has been saying since
his brief reference to guilt has been an elaboration and contextualization of that feeling, and I
also transform his utterance from a downgraded (“a li:ttle bit uh guilt”) to an upgraded (“feeling
guilt”) one. Another, more subtle, transformation also occurs: While Adam had originally
externalized or objectified his guilt by referring to it in terms of “those feelings” (line 22), my
formulation casts his guilt as something he’s “feeling”—something that he has, not something
out there. Interestingly, the change of perspective I introduce is diametrically opposite to the one
that has been analyzed in the therapy sessions of the Norwegian psychiatrist Tom Anderson,
whose use of a practice called “unusual questions” relocates a patient’s emotional experience
outside of him or herself, as though it were an object (Smoliak, Le Couteur, & Quinn-Nilas,
2018).
Following my formulation, it becomes immediately evident that Adam is having trouble
agreeing with my reading—indeed, the lapse of .6 seconds suggests a possible, forthcoming
dispreferred response (Sidnell, 2010). Perhaps sensing this, I produce an extension (“you’re
saying.”) to the original formulation, underlining the epistemic grounding of my formulation in
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the patient’s own talk, and then I immediately follow this with what is ostensibly a repetition of
the formulation (“you- you feel guilt.”). In fact, a partial change has occurred from the first to
the second formulation. In the first, I construct my utterance using the present continuous tense,
depicting Adam’s experience of guilt as something ongoing across time—perhaps even
extending into the future—while in the second, I employ the present simple tense, seemingly
mollifying the earlier proposal and suggesting a more general truth about Adam’s proclivity to
feeling guilt. Adam produces a long sigh, at line 69, in overlap with a tag to the second
formulation, utters the first word of what will be an abandoned turn-constructional unit, and then
drops into silence for 4.9 seconds. When he finally responds, it is with a minimal agreement
token (“yea:h”, line 71), which, together with his previous silence and the one that follows his
minimal agreement, strongly suggests incipient disagreement (with the formulation) (Pomerantz,
1984a). He produces one more agreement token at line 73 and drops again into silence; and it is
only after this pause that he opts to expand his response with an enhancement (Muntigl &
Zabala, 2008). Though designed with long sighs (lines 75-76), unusually long intra-turn pauses,
self-initiated self-repair (“because it has...because ideally speaking”), and hitches (“I: sh- I
should”), in this turn he explains that his guilt stems from feeling that he should have completed
his graduation “years ago.” After a pause, he then produces what is an instance of troublesresistant laughter (line 80) (Jefferson, 1984). Altogether, this expansion is designed in a
remarkably similar fashion to his initial description of experiencing guilt. I reproduce these
small extracts below for comparison:
Extract 2a [Adam, S06]
30 Pa:

u:m: but (.) it's (1.8) hhhhh (.9)

31

I guess a li:ttle bit uh guilt. (.4) >hh .hh< ((laughing))

32

(.7)
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Extract 3a [Adam, S06]
75 Pa:

because it has: (1.9) Hhhhhhhh

76

(3.6) hhhhh: (2.0)

77

because ideally speaking (.) I: sh- I should have

78

been done yea:rs ago.

79

(.5)

80 Pa:

>.h=.h< ((laughter))

81

(.4)

In both instances, a [incomplete TCU + pause + sigh + pause + TCU + pause + troublesresistant laughter] turn design is evidenced. The pauses and sighs that precede the complete
TCU would appear to be markers of the patient’s hesitation (Weiste, Voutilainen, & Peräkylä,
2016; Voutilainen, Peräkylä, & Ruusuvuori, 2011), while the troubles-resistant laughter that
follows the TCU suggests evasion from the interactional role assigned to someone with a
‘trouble’ to tell. The picture that emerges is of something articulated that is worked up to with
cautiousness and then hastily brushed away as non-serious, suggesting some special charge or
emotional trouble associated with these articulations.
After the silence that follows his laughter, I produce a continuer (“hmmmm:”, line 82),
acknowledging receipt of the patient’s talk and displaying my anticipation that the patient has
more to say (Goodwin, 1986; Schegloff, 1981). He jumps into an elaboration of his prior turn,
and after I produce one more continuer (line 86), he begins to show difficulties with continuing
his talk. A silence of nearly 1 second ensues; he produces a stand-alone, stretched “u:mm:” (line
88) that is followed by a long silence of 2.4 seconds, the design—[conjunctional + break]—
suggesting a “trail-off” and the patient’s readiness and availability to drop out of his turn-at-talk
(Jefferson, 1983); and he follows this up with another trail-off—composed as a stand-alone
conjunction (“and”, line 90) and a post-conjunctional silence of 2.6 seconds—which strongly
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displays his inclination to receive uptake from me (Jefferson, 1983). Therapists’ use of silence
in psychodynamic and psychoanalytic treatment approaches has been described in their various
traditions as both essential to the analytic process (Lacan, 1936/2006; Levy et al., 2012) and,
when excessive, potentially harmful (Gabbard, 1999). When Adam eventually resumes his turn
(line 90), my silence proves to be effective in producing further on-topic talk, engendering not
only progressively detailed accounts of his guilt but also progressively heightened displays of
emotion. In his elaboration (lines 90-94), he reports bearing “personal responsibility” for not
being able to “lighten [his partner’s] load,” formatting his utterance with several long intra-turn
pauses, self-repair (“to light...to immediately lighten”), and hitches (e.g., “I:...I:”). In line 94, he
bemoans that being unable to financially assist his partner “is not a situation that I(h) (.7) I want
for my family”, and then, after a brief gap, he extends his utterance to transform it into an
extreme case formulation (Pomerantz, 1986): It is not a situation that he wants for his family
“like at all” (line 96). Already, a certain trend is evidenced in Adam’s elaborations as I continue
to withhold from speaking, moving from a troubles-resistant account of his guilt that emphasizes
his employment status to a halting one that formulates his absolute opposition to, and sense of
“personal responsibility” for, his partner being in a “tight” situation. This trend continues
through the remainder of extract 3, with Adam eventually assessing the situation he finds himself
in as one he’s “really fuck£ing tired of £ it .hhhh i:t (1.8) it's (.) it's an exhausting situation to still
be in:” (lines 105-106).
The trajectory of Adam’s talk in extract 3 can be seen to move from being resistant and
parsimonious to emotionally upgraded and detailed. He begins by responding to my
formulation—and this after a very long pause that projects disagreement—with the most minimal
of agreements; he proceeds with a troubles-resistant account that relays what he would prefer his
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situation look like (“ideally speaking I should have been done years ago”); he then provides an
elaboration—designed as an extreme case formulation—that uses lexical items expressive of his
feelings (e.g., “not a situation that I want for my family like at all”); and he culminates with a
very strong display of his emotional stance (“I’m really fucking tired of it”), which, while still
slightly troubles-resistant—since it is delivered in a ‘smiley’ voice—is upgraded relative to his
earlier troubles-resistant laughter. That is, in the broadest terms, while he initially takes up my
formulation displaying signs of resistance, my silence at transition-relevance places draws forth
from him displays of his emotional stance that are progressively more forceful. This was the
same general trajectory evidenced across extracts 1 and 2, where strong, initial resistance to the
preference organizations of a Y/N interrogative gave way to a downgraded, troubles-resistant
description of his guilt and then, in turn, an upgraded account—constructed with an extreme case
formulation—concerning his failure to financially assist his partner.
The last segment of talk to be analyzed from this session comes 20 lines after the
conclusion of extract 3. I provide it as an example of how Adam responded, in the earlier
sessions of his psychotherapy, to my conclusions or interpretations.
Extract 4 [Adam, S06]
126 Th: and what- what I'm hea:ring you say right now is you're getting
127

ti:red of this (.8) these relationships where you rely on others

128

to help contain (.7) feelings of guilt and give you guidance and

129

you're saying, I'm- I'm- just ti:red of this (.4)

130

I need ta do it on my o:wn (.5)

131

a[nd (.2) r:ecently (.4)

132 Pa:

[Hhhhhh

133 Th: you've hadda ssspoo:- moment an experience of unstuckness
134

(.5)

135 Pa: oh yeah
136

(.2)
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137 Th: You're guiding yourself.
138

(.3)

139 Pa: Hhhhhh. hhhhhhhh (.2) uumm: (5.1)
140

more like I'm I':m (.6) consoling myself

141

(.2)

142

enough to (.5) remain (.8) actively productive on my project (.)

143

without (.9) getting too frustrated and (.8) and like i=I: it i

144

increases my stick-to-itevness ((hyphens aid readability, here))

145

.hhh (.) uh through the frustration an' through the (2.0)

146

hhhoah (3.5)

147

through being so stumped.

148

(1.6)

149 Th: you were able to con- console yourself befo:re you were getting
150

consoled (.5) by others.

151 Pa: Ahh (.) no::
152

(.9)

153 Pa: no I wasn't I- it just (.5) led to: (.3) abysmal
154

prod(h)uctivit(h)yhh£ .hhh

155

um (1.4) yeah like I would still try to console myself.

156

(.6)

157 Pa: but it was: (.6) a lot less effective.

At line 126, I am already multiple lines into a rather long interpretation that makes
reference to material from previous sessions—this being a common design feature of
interpretations (Vehviläinen, 2003; Bercelli, Rossano, & Viaro, 2013). The thrust of the
interpretation (lines 126-130) is designed with recycled words used by Adam in his previous
elaborations (viz., “tired,” “guilt”), though it is highly disjunctive with Adam’s articulated
understanding of feeling guilty and tired as a result of being unable to financially support his
partner. Instead, I propose that he is tired of relying on others to manage his guilt—the
implication being that he may be tired of relying on his partner but also, perhaps, myself, this
being a possible link back to the topic of Adam’s missed sessions. I conclude the interpretation
by attributing to him, in the form of direct reported speech (Holt, 2000), frustration with his
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situation and a desire to do something about it, on his own: “you're saying, I'm- I'm- just ti:red of
this (.4) I need ta do it on my o:wn” (lines 129-130). When he doesn’t immediately respond to
what is, admittedly, a highly suspect interpretation (it has almost no foundation, from what I can
gather, in Adam’s own talk or any other jointly produced conclusions), I extend the
interpretation. I remind him, on the basis of material from earlier in the session (not included in
the reproduced extracts), that he has reported feeling “an experience of unstuckness” (line 133).
He produces a delayed, oh-prefaced, minimal agreement (“oh yeah”), which works to embody
the independence—and perhaps even primacy—of his knowledge on this matter (Heritage,
2002). At line 137, I pursue an expansion of Adam’s agreement by reformulating a part of the
earlier interpretation, saying, “You’re guiding yourself,” eliding the part of the interpretation that
focused on guilt feelings and reliance on others. Adam’s subsequent disagreement (line 140) is
presaged by inter-turn silence and a long sigh, but I would also argue that he sought to stave off
this outcome through his “trail off”—accomplished through the sequential conjunctional “um”
and the long pause that followed it (Jefferson, 1983). He had, in other words, angled for speaker
transition, which, only when it fails to occur during the long 5-second silence at line 139,
culminates in his disagreement: “more like I'm I':m (.6) consoling myself.” Following the
elaboration of his disagreement, I try a new angle and make the optimistic interpretation—again
ungrounded in what the patient has said to this point and also, notably, without the use of modal
auxiliaries (e.g., “maybe”) that would serve to soften its epistemic claims (Weiste, Voutilainen,
& Peräkylä, 2016)—that the patient was “able to con- console yourself befo:re you were getting
consoled (.5) by others.” This time, Adam doesn’t hesitate to immediately disagree (line 151,
“Ahh (.) no::”) and, after a pause, repeats his disagreement. But interestingly—given, as I have
indicated, the poverty of the interpretation—the patient proceeds to elaborate his disagreement
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with laughter particles and a smiley voice and, after a pause in line 155, downgrades his
disagreement: “yeah like I would still try to console myself. (.6) but it was: (.6) a lot less
effective.” While still a disagreement, prefacing it with an agreement token (“yeah”) weakens it
(Pomerantz, 1984a), and as I hear it, the interpolation of laughter in the prior turn has a similar
effect.
Bearing in mind that the interpretations in extract 4 suffer from inexactitude—they are,
that is, based on a paucity of enquiry outcomes, such as descriptions of experience provided by
the patient (Bercelli, Rossano, & Viaro, 2013; Voutilainen, Peräkylä, & Ruusuvuori, 2010)—and
were therefore unlikely to solicit agreement, it is notable that the patient displays hesitation to
disagree (line 139) and, when he does provide a strong disagreement in response to a second
interpretation, retreats from it. Whether this reflects the patient’s orientation to the action-type
preference of interpretations—i.e., agreement—is unclear. In any case, we may remark from a
clinical perspective that it bodes well for the therapy that it is Adam himself who, here, makes
moves to accommodate the perspective opened up by my interpretation. His initial disaffiliative
response to my interpretation amounted to a rupture in alliance (Muntigl, & Horvath, 2016), and
his subsequent downgrade of his disagreement—in the absence of any actions taken by me—
suggests a striving for affiliation.

Summarizing the phenomena observed in this spate of talk-in-interaction from an early
session with Adam, a general pattern is observed that appears to repeat and also tends in a
positive direction—not so dissimilar, to employ an analogy, to a healthy share of stock that tends
positive over time, despite recurring dips and rises in market price. In extract 1, in response to a
question, he initially rejects the constraints and agenda of the question, displaying thereby
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disaffiliation and resistance; but as he continues, he describes “overwhelming” feelings and his
prosody shifts in a way that, however slight, displays emotion. In extract 2, which continues on
from the earlier extract, we again see Adam respond to a question in a resistant way, providing
an unelaborated response and subsequently describing his feelings with qualifiers and markers of
hesitation; but as he continues, he progressively upgrades his description of his emotions, though
he resists, let us say, “owning” those emotions through his use of troubles-resistant laughter.
Finally, in extract 3, Adam and I repeat what has become a pattern of interaction between us: he
initially responds to my formulation with minimal agreement, but he goes on to provide an
enhancement of his turn and eventually upgrades his description of his emotional stance (though
still with some evidence of troubles-resistance). A cycle is evident in these extracts, very
roughly coextensive with the length of a single extended sequence (e.g., question-answer,
formulation-agreement), moving from resistance to affiliation and display of emotion.

Beginning psychotherapy: Keith
The next extracts examined come from the second session—from a treatment lasting
about 130 sessions—with a patient I am calling “Keith.” It was hastily scheduled, only a day
after our first meeting, after he called in requesting an emergency appointment for what turned
out to be a crisis in his romantic relationship. He had had an outburst while speaking to his
girlfriend on the phone, triggered by her announcement that she would be going on a trip without
him. At the time of our session, he was worried the relationship was on its last leg. Extract 5
picks up about seventeen minutes into the session, as I prepare for and deliver an interpretation
that references not only his romantic troubles but also a pivotal event from his adolescence that
entailed the breakdown of a dear friendship.
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Extract 5 [Keith, S02]
1 Th:

The reason I'm asking abou:t (.4) letters versus ↑phone calls

2

is (.3) um >I'm thinking about< (.) what you said to::

3

umm I'm=sorry I forgot her name, your girlfriend¿ i[s

4 Pa:

[1NAME

5 Th:

1NAME (.) thank you (.7)

6

you told 1NAME (.3) don't even bother calling me.

7

I'm (.5) that word (.3) stuck out to me. said >don't even bother<

8

calling me >when you got angry at her<

9

°(and) (um)

10

about letters versus phone calls here,

11 Pa:

oaka(y)-

12 Th:

umm (.4) tci so: (1.0) there's- there's a ↑pattern ↑here it

13

↑sounds ↑like a ↑little bit¿

14

so: (.7) 2NAME leaves¿ (.2) allava sudden,(.3)

15 Pa:

(°yeah°)

16 Th:

um there's some confusion <ab't what's ha:ppened bec'z parents

17

aren't (.4) communicating a lo:t¿

18

(.5)

19 Th:

and he's suddenly out of your life.

20

fortunately he comes back an he (moved in with) his friend

21

(.8)

22 Th:

um

23

(.4)

24 ?

(hu)

25 Th:

with 2NAME though, he went to the hospital an (1.1) he:

26

didn't come back quite the same person >or something happened<

27

(.4)

28 Pa:

Hm hmm

29

(2.0)

30 Th:

in ↑your- in ↑your ↓experience (.) when- when people go awa:y,

31

(1.9) this is a- (2.4) this a sensitive moment=this is a

32

sensitive time. things don't always turn out (.7) we:ll.

33

(.9)

34 Pa:

>hm hm<

35

(2.3)

(I was) thinking ( )° (1.1) HEnce all the questions
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36 Th:

>We're on the same page wi(°th°) (.2) all of that,<

37 Pa:

>h=hm<=

38 Th:

=°hm°

39

(2.4)

I begin to lay the groundwork for the interpretation with an account for an earlier inquiry
sequence (not included in the transcript), which concerned the recent mode of communication
with his girlfriend (viz., a phone conversation) and the mode of communication during the
breakdown of an erstwhile friendship (viz., written letters). As I begin to do so, I interrupt the
action underway with a “word search” (line 3), as I enlist Keith to recall the name of his
girlfriend (this search, together with Keith’s response, forms what Schegloff (2007) terms an
“incidental sequence”); and following this, I continue my account by referencing, using direct
reported speech (Holt, 2000), a part of Keith’s narrative about the incident with his girlfriend:
“you told 1NAME (.3) don't even bother calling me” (line 6). The use of direct reported speech,
here, appears to serve the purpose—through its effect of enhancing the granularity of tellings
(Heritage, 2011)—of drawing Keith into a sort of scene that I depict as noteworthy, something
that, as I say in line 7, “stuck out to me.” Repeating the direct reported speech (lines 7-8) adds to
this effect. As described by Vehviläinen (2003), a practice like this, which selects out parts of
the patient’s talk and presents them as part of a “puzzle,” often precedes a (psychoanalytic)
interpretation, setting up a sort of “enigma” that the interpretation will solve.
After Keith provides a receipt of this initial account (line 11), I introduce explicitly the
idea that the things Keith has been talking about—e.g., his phone call with his girlfriend, his
letter-writing to his past friend, his saying don’t even bother calling me—are accountable,
hanging together in a yet-to-be-explained unity: “there's- there's a ↑pattern ↑here it ↑sounds ↑like
a ↑little bit¿” (lines 12-13). Note that this prefatory component of the interpretation is structured
with questioning intonation, a hitch (“there’s- there’s”), an epistemic marker (“it sounds like”),
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and a qualifier (“a little bit”), collectively working to downgrade claimed epistemic access and
primacy (in keeping with the design of many interpretations—Bercelli, Rossano, & Viaro, 2013;
Vehviläinen, 2003). Building up the interpretation in this way, with practices that introduce it as
provisional and hypothetical (Weiste, Voutilainen, & Peräkylä, 2016), lowers the risk of it
appearing to lay claim over a territory of knowledge that is the patient’s own; and in turn, it
minimizes the probability of Adam disagreeing with the interpretation outright, which is one way
that patient resistance is realized in psychotherapy (Muntigl, 2013).
In lines 14-26, I provide an enhancement (Muntigl & Zabala, 2008) of my turn, marked
with the turn-initial particle “so.” I introduce the name of his erstwhile friend (“2Name” in the
transcript, to distinguish it from the “1Name” of his girlfriend) and recount a part of the story,
told to me by Keith in our first session, of the dissolution of his friendship. By doing so, I imply
that something about what happened in this relationship shares something in common with his
recent interaction with his girlfriend, strengthening the case for a “pattern” in what is going on.
During this segment of the talk-in-interaction, Keith displays modest alignment with the activity
underway, providing one softly spoken receipt at line 15 but forgoing at least two other
opportunities (lines 18 and 21) to promote the sequence (such as by responding with
continuers—Stivers, Mondada, & Steensig, 2011). At line 27, a pause ensues, which the
transcript shows as marking the boundary of the buildup of the accountable. Keith receipts my
talk with a continuer (Goodwin, 1986), and after a pause of two seconds, during which Keith
declines to take up the interpretation himself, I propose one: in your experience, when people go
away, this is a sensitive moment, things don’t always turn out well (lines 30-32). Briefly, this
interpretation proposes that Keith’s historical experience of a friendship falling apart after the
friend briefly departed for health reasons (“he’s suddenly out of your life,” “he went to the
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hospital and didn’t come back quite the same person”) has made him wary of people “going
away.” The interpretation is just a stone’s throw away from proposing that this explains Keith’s
distress at the idea of his girlfriend going on a trip without him; but I withhold this inference, for
the time being, in light of a technical preference, in certain psychoanalytic and psychodynamic
approaches, for the patient to make the interpretation himself (Fink, 2014b). A long pause of .9
seconds follows and Keith responds with a mere acknowledgement token (“hm hm”, line 34)
(Jefferson, 2002). This is significant, as an interpretation makes conditionally relevant a
(dis)confirmation (Vehviläinen, 2003) or (dis)agreement (Peräkylä, 2011), and so his response,
similar to “I don’t know” responses (Jager et al., 2016), seems to amount to a “non-answer” by
failing to promote the action sequence of the interpretation.
After a significant period of silence (line 35), I make a request for confirmation of the
interpretation (as Heritage, 2012, points out, a declarative by a speaker in K- position tends to
function as a request for confirmation). In light of its sequential positioning after a non-answer
from Keith, it seems to work to elicit expansion from him (Muntigl & Zabala, 2008, on
confirmation elicitors as other-initiations of expansion), but as the extract shows, this initially
fails, Keith producing yet another acknowledgement token (line 37).
Extract 6 follows on from this point, and we see me try a different tack of engaging him
in the “puzzle” of his emotional reaction to his girlfriend. At line 40, I ask a Wh-question that
invites Keith to engage in a “possible interpretation” of how his sensitivity to people going away
might apply to his girlfriend (Hutchby, 2010).
Extract 6 [Keith, S02]
40 Th:

↑Whadayou think the link is with (.4) 1NAME.

41

(.6)

42 ?

(um)
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43 Th:

Le's jus' stick with this one instance for >(

)( this Friday)

44

even though it's a general (

45

(.7)

46 Pa:

We:ll (.) I think (1.8) it'ss:hh (1.1)

47

parsh(y)=because I- I lo:ve her I: (.) I really feel

48

strongly about where'ar relationship's going an:(d)

49

I don't wanna lose her:.

50

(.9)

51 Th:

(°hm:°)

52

(.2)

53 Pa:

you kno:w (.) maybe part of it (.) you kno:w (3.0)

54

I mean: (.2) e#(h)# (.6) I- I- there have been some other

55

kindav (.7) points to (.3) at least what's going on

56

right ↑↓no:w

57

(.8)

58 Pa:

uuh(m)

59

(.7)

60 Pa:

it might be kindav (.9) HHu (.4) adding- to all of this¿

61

(.6)

62 Pa:

u:m

63

(1.0)

64 Pa:

one of which being thet (1.5) kin(d)a how this trip transpired

65

just (1.6) to me didn't (.2) sit well.

66

(.9)

67 Pa:

you know >it was one of those< "I'm goin t' my best frie:nd's

68

a:::::n:d I don't" (.3) eh- °eh-° e- this is not necessarily

69

what she said or h(o)- what she meant but kinduv the: (.3)

70

the way I felt.

71

(.2)

72 Pa:

.hhh was the (.7) "I'm goin'a my best frie:nd's a::nd

73

>I'M Not Gonna Ask you< be- (.3) cuz

74

and I'm gonna do what ↑I wannado<"

75 Th:

Hmmm

76

(.6)

)<
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>this is my life

When he doesn’t immediately respond (line 41), I take another turn-at-talk and produce
an utterance (“Let’s just stick with this one instance...”) that has some of the design features (e.g.,
imperative mood) of a demand action-type (Muntigl & Zabala, 2008). It is, after all, redundant
to instruct Keith to “stick with this one instance,” there having been no implication in the justprior question of exploring another “instance,” and so we are inclined to discount an analysis of
the turn as primarily modifying or qualifying the question. Instead, it seems to me that the turn is
primarily working to pursue uptake by Keith. Just as increments (e.g., extensions of a speaker’s
immediately prior turn) often appear in situations where there are problems with recipient uptake
(Ford, Fox, & Thompson, 2002), my injunction occurs in an environment where Keith has not
immediately responded to my question.
Keith’s response at line 46 begins with features that suggest it will be a dispreferred
response—specifically, an inter-turn gap (line 45) (Sidnell, 2010) and a turn-initial “well”
(Schegloff & Lerner, (2009). After two significantly long intra-utterance pauses, he responds to
my invitation/question by describing his love for his girlfriend and his fear of losing her. Recall
that my question had targeted the link between Keith’s sensitivity to people going away and his
recent interaction with his girlfriend. The question contains a specific agenda or
presupposition—that his fight with his girlfriend is linked to his sensitivity to people going
away—and it also contains key terms, such as “going away” (on question agenda and terms, I
refer the reader to Stivers & Hayashi, 2010). Keith’s response mostly elides the terms of my
question (though his use of “lose” is conceptually linked to “going away”), and it ostensibly
ignores the agenda of the question. This first part of his response, then, has features of
disalignment and disaffiliation.
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After I decline uptake, producing a low-volume continuer at line 51, he continues his
turn-at-talk and initially seems to adopt—after showing signs of struggle and hesitation (lines 5354)—a significant facet of my question’s agenda. He states that “there have been some other
kind of points to at least what’s going on right now” that “might be kind of adding to all of this.”
That is, his utterance appears to reflect a (qualified) taking up of the question’s assumption of a
“link,” leaving unsaid for the moment what that link might be. The continuation of his talk,
however—after a full second of silence, what Jefferson (1988) calls the “standard maximum
tolerance” of silence—reveals that the link he perceives is not with the one contained in the
interpretation. If he sees a link to what transpired with his girlfriend, it is with the way she
behaved, which he vividly reports (lines 67-74) in a kind of reenactment of how he “felt” or
perceived her actions:: “It was one of those, ‘I’m going to my best friend’s....I’m going to my
best friend’s and I’m not gonna ask you, because this is my life and I’m gonna do what I wanna
do!’”
By this point, Keith appears to have moved into a different interactional project
altogether and is no longer responding to the interpretation. He has initiated a “troubles-telling”
(Jefferson, 2015). It proceeds over the course of the next 111 lines and is perhaps most
remarkable for the absence of recipient (i.e., therapist) affiliation at innumerable transitionrelevance places. I repeatedly decline speaker transition during inter-turn gaps of more than a
second, and otherwise I produce only a few scattered continuers. What I want to focus on here,
however, is how Keith’s telling eventually circles back, in an unexpected way, to descriptions
that mirror the interpretation I produced earlier in the interaction (beginning in line 30, extract 5)
and how the talk-in-interaction unfolds from there. To do justice to this, it is necessary to pull
out several lines from Keith’s troubles-telling, which will help situate my eventual response

118

when his telling reproduces the gist of the original interpretation. Extract 7 shows these lines, as
well as Keith’s chance return to the content of the earlier interpretation.
Extract 7 [Keith, S02]
139

(.2)

140 Pa: cause letting her mother take her=n:: just=kin'a cast
141

aside the fact that I (.7) offered to take her:

142

(1.3)

143 Pa: and (.5) I swear that >she and I hadda conversation about<
144

me picking her ↑↓up

...
163 Pa: and it's like (2.4) kinduv feel like (.3) she's kinduv
164

j's shovin' me aside because: (.6) >you know<

165

(1.2)

166 Pa: with (.) you know this whole trip j's like (1.9)
167

you know (.) I'm not gonna get to see her:

168

I'd like to maybe >↑take ↑her to the airport¿<

169

>maybe pick her ↑up from the ↑airport<

170

yet (.4) she j's kinduv shoves me aside: and:

...
189

(1.1)

190 Pa: and so I mean (.6) on top of the=n- the normal (1.7)
191

maybe: a better word actually th't (.2) j's crossed my mind

192

is anxiety about someone leaving

193

(.4)

194 Th: °Hm°
195

(.3)

196 Pa: you know
197

(1.1)

198 Pa: on top of that I get (.3) you know these two s- in199

.hh- i::=you know

200

(.3)

201 Pa: things that just kind of make ge- ma:ke (m')=feel she's
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202

kind of (j's) (.8) shoving me asi:de an: (1.2) an all tha:t.

203

(.4)

Something we notice in Keith’s troubles-telling is a repeat, or a variation of a repeat,
of a certain lexical phrase: “shoving me aside” (see the bolded portions of the above extract).
We have no less than four instances of Keith describing his sense of being shoved or cast aside
by his girlfriend. In the midst of these descriptions, we also notice his return to the gist of the
interpretation I made over 160 lines earlier in the interaction. That interpretation had concerned
Keith’s experience that, when people go away, this is a sensitive moment...Things don’t always
turn out well. Echoing this, at lines 192-193, Keith makes an assessment of his anxiety about
someone leaving, but he displays this assessment as arising from himself, from his own “mind.”
This is a potentially fruitful moment, as Keith has unwittingly given expression to a core part of
the abandoned interpretation, and it simply remains to get him to connect his anxiety about
someone leaving to anxiety about his girlfriend leaving. In the extract below, we see a renewed
interpretation, this time leveraging the phenomenon of Keith’s lexical phrase, “shoved aside,”
that had recurred during his troubles-telling.
Extract 8 [Keith, S02]
190 Pa: and so I mean (.6) on top of the=n- the normal (1.7)
191

maybe: a better word actually th't (.2) j's crossed my mind

192

is anxiety about someone leaving

193

(.4)

194 Th: °Hm°
195

(.3)

196 Pa: you know
197

(1.1)

198 Pa: on top of that I get (.3) you know these two s- in199

.hh- i::=you know

200

(.3)

201 Pa: things that just kind of make ge- ma:ke (m')=feel she's
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202

kind of (j's) (.8) shoving me asi:de an: (1.2) an all tha:t.

203

(.4)

204 Th: (°hmm°)
205

(1.5)

206 Th: and an(d) (.8) shoving you aside
207

(.7)

208 Th: you're worried
209

(.2)

210 Th: permanently.
211

(.9)

212 Pa: [°Hm°
213 Th: [Your worried she might not come back
214

(2.0)

215 Pa: or: come back an: not wanna have anything to do with me
216

(.5)

217 Pa: .h (.) caussse I I:-she- (.4) I don't think she=would (.6)
218

leave and not come back unless something (.4) were to happen

219

thet (.8) th't (.3) beyond her contro:l

220

(.6)

The beginning of the interpretation (line 206) is designed as an extension of Keith’s turn
(note the turn-initial conjunction “and”), a not unusual turn design for interpretations (Antaki,
2008); and, as previously remarked, it recycles Keith’s use of the lexical phrase “shoved aside.”
Together, these practices work to claim a close adherence to Keith’s talk and understanding
(Vehviläinen, 2003; Weiste, Voutilainen, & Peräkylä, 2016). But ultimately a new, therapistdriven understanding is expressed, and it is this that marks the turn as doing an interpretation: the
TCU of “shoving you aside”—which, alone, might have been received as a mirroring repeat
(Muntigl, Knight, Watkins, Horvath, & Angus, 2013)—is twice extended, yielding an
interpretation—shoving you aside, you’re worried, permanently (lines 206-210)—that goes
beyond what appears in Keith’s talk. A question me might pause to consider is the timing of this
interpretation. After all, the “shoving me aside” phrasal unit had already appeared multiple times
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in earlier segments of the interaction. What appears to explain the delivery of the interpretation
at this specific juncture is Keith’s recent description of “anxiety about someone leaving” (line
192), which provides convincing “evidential grounding” to justify the perspective that Keith is
anxious about his girlfriend leaving (Weiste, Voutilainen, & Peräkylä, 2016). When Keith again
uses his hallmark phrase (“shoved aside”), offering a resource by which to anchor the
interpretation, it is then that we see its delivery.
Returning to the interpretation sequence, we note that the interpretation doesn’t
immediately receive uptake, and after a pause of nearly one second, I repeat a modified version
of the interpretation in overlap with Keith (lines 212-213): You’re worried she might not come
back. The lexical item “worried” is retained, but it is reformulated in a way that approximates
the basis of the interpretation in extract 5, which had asserted that, In your experience, when
people go away...things don’t always turn out well (lines 30-32). What the original interpretation
had been angling at, with its follow-up question of, What do you think the link is with Name, is
now fully articulated.
Two seconds elapse before speaker transition. Keith’s response amounts to a
disagreement, a disagreement with the literal reading of the interpretation that he is worried his
girlfriend will not come back from her trip. This is made clear, for instance, by the enhancement
of his TCU-in-progress beginning in line 217, where he provides an account for his
disagreement. What is most interesting to me about his response, however, is his initial turn-attalk: Or come back and not wanna have anything to do with me (line 215). The utterance is
designed as an extension of my interpretation, elliptically tied to the component “you’re worried
she might.” In effect, Keith displays some level of modified agreement with the interpretation—
even if the overall action-type of the utterance is a disagreement—by elliptically retaining the
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understanding that he is worried about something his girlfriend might do. His disagreement is
therefore a weak one (Pomerantz, 1984a). What’s more, the alternate understanding he displays
of being worried that, she might come back and not wanna have anything to do with me, seems to
match very closely my earlier interpretation: shoving you aside, you’re worried, permanently
(lines 206-210). We might say, non-analytically, that Keith and I are on the same page, even
while, in interactional terms, Keith disagrees with me.

Analyzing the overall trajectory of this representative talk-in-interaction from an early
session with Keith, we observe in Keith’s talk a movement from very low alignment, very low
affiliation, and strong resistance—indeed, a tendency to provide responses that are not
conditionally relevant—to low alignment and weak resistance. Throughout this conversation,
Keith evidences resistance against advancing the activities embodied in my FPPs (first pair
parts), but this resistance noticeably slackens as the interaction unfolds. As we saw, Keith
responded to my first interpretation with a mere acknowledgment token, which indicated very
high disalignment and resistance; and subsequent attempts to elicit expansion were similarly met
with responses (viz., an acknowledgment token, as well as a response that eschewed the terms
and agenda of a question) that indicated high disalignment, high disaffiliation, and strong
resistance. By the end of the analyzed segment, however, Keith responded to an interpretation
with a conditionally relevant response that, while doing disagreement (and therefore manifesting
disalignment), was designed as a weak disagreement—and indeed, from an another level of
(content) analysis, Keith could be understood to agree with the substance of my interpretation.
Looked at in its entire unfolding then, in broad brushstrokes, Keith demonstrated a subtle
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tendency to move, over time, in the direction of reduced disalignment/resistance in response to
my interpretations.

Beginning psychotherapy: Extracts from “unsuccessful” treatments
The extracts I analyze, here, from the early sessions of two “unsuccessful” treatments—
that is, treatments that ultimately terminated without patient notification and/or mutual
agreement—are noticeable different. In one, a man tells stories from his youth, while I ask
various questions, check my understandings, and otherwise align with his telling. In another, the
patient in question describes the pattern of his depressed mood over the previou s week, while I
remain silent. There are undoubtedly many ways that a treatment can go wrong and lead to early
termination, and short of analyzing every session of these two unsuccessful therapies, we cannot
be sure what interactional factor ultimately “broke the camel’s back.” I propose that we can
nonetheless assume that, whatever variable it was that ultimately tipped the scales, there are
interactional trends (or, as I will suggest in this section, an absence of trends) that preceded the
dissolution of the therapies. Towards this aim, we turn to two extracts from the early sessions
with “Jon” and “Monty.”

The following interaction with “Jon” takes place during our first meeting. He had just
been transferred to me from another therapist who was leaving the area, and prior to the extract
that appears below, I had been inquiring into his treatment with this other therapist and what
brought him to therapy. Jon had explained that he found it useful to use therapy to reflect on his
childhood and upbringing, and before long, he had begun to do just that with me, recalling major
episodes from his childhood in a country abroad. Where the extract picks up, I respond to his
telling-in-progress with an understanding check, a form of other-initiation of repair that proposes
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an understanding of what the other speaker has said and that makes relevant (dis)confirmation
(Heritage, 1984); Sidnell, 2010).
Extract 9 [Jon, S01]
Jon, S01, 05:57-06:51
1 Th:

£so- hyu- he's travelin'=arou:n yu- d-£ yu=went to

2

COUNTRY-NAME and all these places

3 Pa:

[>#right#<]

4 Th:

[

5 Pa:

>#right#<

6 Th:

lookin over (.2) your siblings

7 Pa:

>right<

8

(.3)

9 Th:

°°hmm°°↑

10 Pa:

m: mother was there (.) but uuh

11

(1.7)

12 Pa:

.hhh she was the:re and someti(m)e she wasn't there.

13

she was: sh:e she liked ta (.3) she liked ta drink(hh)

14

(2.2)

15 Th:

and she- (.2) not at ho:me she was- (.2) goin ↑out

16

and drinking?

17

(1.0)

18 Pa:

>°#yeah#°<

19 Th:

but she wasn't there? (.)

20 Pa:

>°yeah°<

21

(2.5)

22 Pa:

I made sure they got up an: (.2) had lunches an:

23

things like that

24

(1.2)

25 Pa:

summertime made sure they (1.0) (°.hhh°)

26 Th:

>°hm°<

27

(.5)

28 Pa:

gettin'n (.) didn' get in people's wa:y

29

(1.5)

30 Th:

>hm<

a n

] you'r:e still in NAME county
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31

(.3)

32 Th:

°hm¿°

33

(.2)

34 Pa:

so they refused to run='n we=hea- we ran all over

35

(.7)

36 Pa:

place in COUNTRY-NAME cause we=hadda big uh (.7)

37

housing i(t)- housing area¿

38 Th:

hmm↓

39 Pa:

t.hhh #and when you (kids)/(t'gets) all over'i(t) (.8)

40

all over the place here (mate'en:):, #

41

(1.9)

42 Pa:

°.hhhh°

In the beginning of this extract, I produce three candidate understandings (lines 1-6),
back to back, designed as extensions of the first candidate understanding; and without any delay,
Jon produces in each case a quickly spoken “right,” confirming the understanding. Jon continues
his telling and, as he begins to describe his mother’s problematic drinking behavior (line 13), he
abandons his initial TCU (“she was:”), produces a hitch (“sh:e she”), and repeats the phrasal unit
“she liked ta,” which he completes as “she liked ta drink.” When Jon falls into silence for 2.2
seconds, it appears that he is oriented to the relevancy of a response, which, in line 15, comes in
the form of another candidate understanding. After he responds with a confirmation, I produce
yet another (lines 15-16), which again he confirms; and after an inter-turn silence of 2.5 seconds,
Jon proceeds to continue his telling, which I align with through the remainder of the extract,
producing continuers at various transition-relevance places (lines 26, 30, 32, 38).
The extract—which is representative of the session as a whole—is in many ways
unremarkable. I am aligned with Jon throughout his telling, and though my multiple
understanding checks might appear, on the surface, excessive, they are associated with affiliation
(Kupetz, 2014) and don’t appear to disrupt Jon’s telling. If there is anything remarkable in the
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extract, as compared to those of the patients who experienced “success” in psychotherapy, it is
the absence of changes in affiliation, alignment, or displays of emotion. There is clear alignment
throughout the extract, but it does not change: every understanding check receives the same
confirmation. Now we might ask, is this absence of changes due to some fault of the patient’s?
We can undoubtedly reject this hypothesis, because we notice that a certain type of interactional
work is missing in the conversation. If this were an ordinary conversation, nothing would be
amiss with the fact that I am merely aligned with the speaker’s telling. Psychotherapy
conversations, on the other hand, are associated with actions that challenge (Voutilainen &
Peräkylä, 2016), interpret (Voutilainen, Peräkylä, & Ruusuvuori, 2010), draw conclusions
(Weiste, Voutilainen, & Peräkylä, 2016), and transform the patient’s talk (Antaki, 2008),
amongst other things. It is precisely in the absence of this kind of interactional work that I
understand the absence, in the extract, of changes in affiliation, alignment, and emotional
display. It has been suggested that the “modification of [experience] is arguably the central task
of psychotherapy” (Voutilainen, Peräkylä, & Ruusuvuori, 2010, p. 102), and what could better
explain the sorts of epistemic battles, tugs-of-war of understanding, shifting landscape of
alignment, and ebbs and flow of emotion than attempts to transform experience, which is to say
the patient’s talk? This is how, I suggest, we can understand the lack of tension and movement
around issues of understanding, alignment, and affiliation in my interaction with Jon.
The next extract comes from session two with “Monty,” who, as his descriptions of his
experience evidence, is struggling with depression. If the analysis of my interaction with Jon
revealed a dearth of actions that shape the patient’s talk, this is even more pronounced in the
following segment, since I do not speak until line 48. Something else we notice in this
interaction is a lack of empathic responses (Heritage, 2011) and “recognizing” responses
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(Voutilainen, Peräkylä, & Ruusuvuori, 2010), which work to display an understanding of the
speaker’s experience and validate his affective stance. While empathic moments do not appear
to be ubiquitous in the “successful” psychotherapy cases in my dataset, their absence is
noticeable in this particular extract, where, over the course of 46 lines, Monty uses rich
emotional lexis (see the bolded words) to describe the highs and lows of his week but does not
receive uptake at least 13 transition-relevance places (see, in particular, lines 2, 7, 18, 29, and
36).
Extract 10 [Monty, S02]
1 Pa:

we:ll last week stunk.

2

(.6)

3 Pa:

uuhh:

4

(3.4)

5 Pa:

I=mean °it=was° (

6

ma:d about that stereo fer like days an days an days.

7

(1.8)

8 Pa:

an then I guess I jus kinda (.4) said whatever an got over it.

9

(1.2)

10 Pa:

then I kinda: (.9) quit dreamin fer a couple da:ys (.)

11

I forgo:t (.) I'm

12

(.3)

13 Pa:

but I forgot it (.) >°was gonna rush today forgot my book bag°<

14

(1.0)

15 Pa:

uum

16

(2.6)

17 Pa:

(j's) pretty much jus wakin up (1.6) miserable.

18

(1.4)

19 Pa:

an then:: maybe (.6) Tuesday or Wednesday (2.2)

20

I had that dream, (.) an I woke up- (.5)

21

jus happy that I had a dream that I could (.5) do:

22

somethin' about (be)cause I'd bee:n like (1.0)

23

trying ta- be- very detailed about

24

(1.3)

) >I was< (.) >ma(t)-< (.6)

s- (

) need a long(er) journal
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25 Pa:

so I pretty much wake up (1.1) an the::n (.9) drink coffee

26

>an I'm inna decent mood for a whi:le<

27

(1.5)

28 Pa:

an then try ta (.8) stew.

29

(2.0)

30 Pa:

whatever

31

(.5)

32 Pa:

random things occur during the day

33

(.8)

34 Pa:

an the::n (2.6) (corre-) (I) pretty much start gettin (1.6)

35

s- depressed

36

(1.3)

37 Pa:

around midday.

38

(.4)

39 Pa:

which is(n't )(like) when my mom's coming home¿

40

(3.0)

41 Pa:

um:

42

(3.4)

43 Pa:

an then (.3) I jus pretty much stay miserable until I- (1.6)

44

finally (.5) >figure out something ta do for the rest of

45

the night that< (1.1) makes me kinda (.9) forget

46

that=em (.4) ↑upset

47

(3.9)

48 Th:

c'n ya tell me bout the dream?

49

(.3)

50 Th:

°that you had¿°

51

(1.9)

If we analyze this segment as an example of a troubles-telling (Jefferson, 2015),
beginning with an announcement of the trouble at line 1, I am completely disaligned as a
troubles recipient. In everyday talk, a troubles announcement will usually receive at least a
receipt (such as a news receipt (Maynard, 1997)) that elicits continuation of the troubles talk, but
such a response is studiously missing, as are any expressions of affiliation when he nonetheless
exposits his trouble. Still more evidence of missed empathic moments comes in the form of my
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eventual response at line 48, Can you tell me about the dream, which, as an ancillary question,
works to decline affiliation and shift the topical heart of the conversation (Heritage, 2011). If we
recall the “two phases” of talk-in-interaction that typify psychotherapeutic talk (see section titled
“Two interactional projects...”), there is an absence here of “affective talk” (Voutilainen &
Peräkylä, 2016) and “emotion-centered” actions (Voutilainen, Peräkylä, & Ruusuvuori, 2010).
These actions prepare for—by acquiring information, reshaping the patient’s talk, and
establishing this material as accountable (i.e., a “puzzle)—an interpretation (Vehviläinen, 2003),
challenge, or other action that presents a new understanding of the patient’s experience. Had I
responded in a way in keeping with this trajectory, I might have, for example, formulated or
highlighted that portion of his talk (lines 34-39) that suggests a link between his depression and
the locale of his mother (I pretty much start getting depressed around midday. Which is(n’t)
when my mom’s coming home).
Looking at both extracts, from Jon and Marty, the talk-in-interaction reveals a
commonality despite their many differences at the level of lexical choice, speaker transition,
recipient alignment, and action sequence. In both cases, I do not perform actions associated with
what Vehviläinen (2003) calls the “interpretative trajectory.” That is, I do not engage in the kind
of work that reshapes patient talk, prompts patients to consider connections between different
spheres of their experience, and presents new perspectives on their displayed understandings.
What results is an absence of the sort of push and pull, at the level of social cooperativeness and
its main levels of alignment and affiliation (Stivers, Mondada, & Steensig, 2011), that typifies
the sessions with Adam and Keith. This absence occurs because there is, so to speak, nothing to
disagree with, nothing to take issue with: the therapist has not attempted to reorder the patient’s
account, request information that might challenge the patient’s narrative, or refashion his talk. It
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is this that seems to explain the unexceptional and steady quality of the transcripts from these
sessions.

Psychotherapy over time: Middle and later sessions with Adam
This extract comes from session 56, about the halfway point in the overall treatment.
Adam has arrived 13 minutes late to his session, and, though I am at a loss to connect it with
anything that occurs in our interaction, he appears wearing sunglasses, which he keeps on for the
whole session and which neither of us comments on. After greeting one another, Adam produces
a series of five sighs (omitted in the transcript), interspersed with long silences (ranging from 1.4
to 4.2 seconds), and then proceeds with an announcement: he still doesn’t know whether his PhD
dissertation will be accepted for approval.
Extract 11 [Adam, S56]
1 Pa:

I'::m still waiting to hear back from th(e)m

2

(1.2)

3 Pa:

.hhh

4

(.6)

5 Pa:

um

6

(2.0)

7 Th:

your project. (.)

8 Pa:

yeah.=

9 Th:

=your- degree.

10

(.5)

11 Pa:

°°hm mm°°

12

(.7)

13 Pa:

°.hhh°

14

(.7)

15 Pa:

<that's been a-> (.8) <that's been ve:ry> difficult.

16

(2.4)

17 Pa:

that continues to be (.2) very difficult.

18

(.6)
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19 Pa:

<and not something I'm handling terribly well.>

20

(1.8)

21 Th:

°hm°

22

(.7)

23 Pa:

I don't think (1.4) um (.2) hhhh

24

(1.9)

25 Th:

°you're handling it uh::° (2.6) °not well: meaning:°

26

(1.2)

27 Th:

°stuff is getting stirred up (I) guess°

28

(2.0)

29 Pa:

um (.9) most acutely (.2) it's that I:: (.7) am not sleeping.

30

(.8)

31 Pa:

like (.) at all.

32

(1.2)

33 Pa:

like I c'n (.2) I c'n pass out, (.3)

34

I can('t) (1.1) (ste-)

35

but like (.) every night (.) is: (.6) like an anxiety night.

36

(1.0)

37 Pa:

I'm s- so revved up.

38

(.2)

39 Pa:

and I: (2.0) Hhhhh I feel tired but I don't feel like( )

40

sleeping('s) (thet) goo:d.

After initially declining uptake, I produce two candidate understandings, both of which
he confirms (lines 7-11), and he then produces an assessment of his current situation as “very
difficult” (line 15). After 2.4 seconds of lack of uptake, Adam produces an amended repeat of
the prior assessment—the situation is something “that continues to be very difficult”—and he
then extends his assessment. The design of his turn suggests he is pursuing uptake by me, which
I eventually do, though in the form of a continuer (“hm”, line 21) that signals my stance that he
should continue talking (Schegloff, 1981). He begins a new TCU (“I don’t think...um...”), but
after he lapses into a long silence (line 24), I self-select for speaker transition and produce a
“TCU-initial prompt” (Muntigl & Zabala, 2008) that is designed as a reformulation of Adam’s
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TCU followed by an increment initiator (Lerner, 2004): You’re handling it not well, meaning...?
When he doesn’t immediately respond to my pursuit of expansion, I complete the projected
response myself, appending it with an epistemic marker (“I guess”) that downgrades my claim to
knowledge: Stuff is getting stirred up I guess (line 27). With this extension, the turn
retrospectively assumes the action-type of a kind of assessment. Adam proceeds to respond both
to the assessment, which he agrees with (“um...most acutely”), and the expansion elicitor. It is in
response to the expansion elicitor that he explains that he is having trouble sleeping, and as he
continues his turn, he describes every night being an “anxiety night...I’m so revved up” (lines 3537). In doing so, he upgrades his earlier lexical expression of his emotions from “very difficult”
to “anxiety” and “revved up.”
The transcript continues, and after a significant inter-turn gap of 4.1 seconds, the
production of the sequential conjunctional um, and another inter-turn gap, all suggesting that
Adam is inclined to drop out from his turn-at-talk, I produce a formulation (line 46): at least part
of you doesn’t even want to sleep.
Extract 12 [Adam, S56]
41

(1.2)

42 Pa:

thing to do::?

43

(4.1)

44 Pa:

auh.

45

(1.7)

46 Th:

>at least part of you doesn't even wanna t'sleep<

47

(.5)

48 Pa:

°yeah° (.)

49 Th:

hm (.)

50 Pa:

.hh uh wel- (4.2)

51

Hhhh (.2) because I'll take nervous energy a:s energy,

52

then I'll be like "↑No::: you have all this energy ta

53

do other things with↓"
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54

(.7)

55 Pa:

"°it's not sleep time. it couldn't be sleep time.°"

56

(3.8)

57 Th:

°°hm°° (.)

58 Pa:

and then (1.0) >an=then=it'll=be like< (.2)

59

four in the morning. (.) five in the morning.

Adam initially responds with minimal agreement to the formulation (“yeah”, line 48).
After I produce a continuer, Adam begins a well-prefaced response (line 50), suggesting that his
upcoming utterance may be dispreferred or in some other way “nonstraightforward” (Schegloff
& Lerner, 2009). That Adam may take some issue with the formulation is not surprising, as it
introduces a transformation of Adam’s talk: whereas he had indicated that he is too anxious and
too revved up to feel like sleeping, I formulate his position as not wanting to sleep. When, after a
long pause of 4.2 seconds, he continues his turn, it is to produce an extended agreement,
designed as an enhancement of his original response. While agreeing, he reintroduces his
position that his troubles with sleeping are related to anxiety—what he describes as “nervous
energy” in his extended response. He experiences this anxiety as “energy,” and in a vivid
reenactment of his inner speech, he utilizes direct reported speech, an exaggerated intonational
contour, and a steep drop in volume to depict how this energy disinclines him to sleep: Then I’ll
be like, ‘No, you have all this energy to do other things with. It’s not sleep time’ (lines 52-55).
The last extract I examine from this session shows Adam responding to an interpretation.
Context is required for appreciating its construction, however, as it draws on Adam’s talk from a
variety of places in the conversation to reach its conclusion. Beginning with lines 81-94, we take
note that Adam displays an understanding of his “under-slept” condition—which he compares to
being like a “zombie—as a form of “defense,” a way of “pushing out the feelings.” Later, at line
109, I produce a declarative question with rising intonation (Thompson & McCabe, 2016) that
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requests confirmation of its inference that, “feeling zombie-like is a defense against anxiety.” He
initially confirms this understanding, but after a pause of 3.1 seconds, he qualifies his
confirmation so that it applies to “generalized nervousness,” instead of “anxiety” (lines 111-114).
Taken as a whole, what we have is a series of agreed upon understandings, scattered across the
conversation thus far, that permit certain inferences. Working backwards, Adam and I have
collaboratively determined that feeling zombie-like is a defense against anxiety / generalized
nervousness; Adam has connected being under-slept with being like a zombie; and in the
beginning of the session, Adam has reported that he is handling his project/degree in a not
terribly well way, that is, by not sleeping. Through substitution, we can infer that not sleeping is
a defense against anxiety; and bearing in mind that not sleeping is a way that Adam is handling
his degree, we reach the conclusion that Adam’s sleep problem is the common denominator
between his degree and his feelings of anxiety. The interpretation that appears across lines 304309 takes this inference one step further, interpreting a relationship between his degree and his
anxious feelings.
Extract 13 [Adam, S56]
81 Pa:

I'Ad spoken before ho:w I spe:nd (.2) °uh-° uh: (1.1)

82

°a while ago.° °how I'd spent a lot of time° (.9)

83

really underslept. an sort of (.2) as a zombie?

84

(.5)

85 Pa:

where like I'm (.6) not fully rested, not fu:lly myself.

86

(.8)

87 Pa:

it's (2.2) uuh especially clear that that is (.) a: (4.2)

88

<°that° that is a defense.

89

(.4)

90 Pa:

for me.

91

(1.0)

92 Th:

°hm°

93

(2.9)
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94 Pa:

that i:s (.) a wa:y of: (.8) pushing out the feelings.

...
107 Pa: um
108

(2.4)

109 Th: feeling zombie=like is a defense against uh:: (.4) anxiety::¿
110

(.3)

111 Pa: yeah
112

(3.1)

113 Pa: or- I guess generalized nervousness? like £ I'm (.4)
114

I'm no doctor in that regard. £

115

(.2)

116 Pa: um
117

(.9)

...
300 Th: so we should probably look'et (.3) that anxiety then.
301

(1.6)

302 Th: that's the thing you're=uh- (.) avoi:ding,
303

(.6)

304 Th: there's something (1.2) frightening related to your project,
305

(1.1)

306 Th: related to getting (.) a degree:,
307

(.6)

308 Pa: >yeah<=
309 Th: =rather not think about,
310

(8.6)

311 Pa: Befo:re (.2) going directly inta- (.7)
312

°I can° sa:y=thet this is made (.6) wors:e (.)

313

with the discov:ery (.7) that (1.1)

314

the EVENT-NAME (.3) is Monday.

315

(1.0)

Leading up to the interpretation, I return the conversation to the topic of anxiety, and
after an inter-turn gap where Adam declines uptake, I produce a pro-termed formulation (line
302) that proposes that Adam is avoiding anxiety (that’s [anxiety’s] the thing you’re avoiding). I
will not linger on this formulation, as it becomes quickly embedded in the interpretation that
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follows it, but we should note that it introduces a deletion of part of the collaboratively achieved
understanding that feeling zombie-like is a defense against anxiety. By eliding talk about
zombie-like and the related topic of not sleeping, the formulation prepares the way for the
interpretation, which, across lines 304-306, connects anxiety to getting a degree: “there's
something (1.2) frightening related to your project, (1.1) related to getting (.) a degree:,”. Adam
responds with an agreement token, onto which I latch an extension of the interpretation—
“=rather not think about,”—that adds the understanding that Adam is avoiding thinking about
something related to earning his PhD. At this point, Adam falls into a long, 8-second silence.
As if to confirm the interpretation itself and its proposition that Adam would “rather not think
about” the matter, he responds by producing an account for why he will not be answering the
question (before going directly into [that]...). From there, he launches into a telling on a new
topic.
When considering the quality of talk-in-interaction in the session as a whole, Adam
shows a tendency to respond to “enquiry sequence” (Bercelli, Rossano, & Viaro, 2013), or “first
phase,” actions—these include, in the extracts analyzed, a TCU-initial prompt, an assessment,
and a formulation—with extended agreement and/or expansion. Across these action sequences,
Adam also exhibits a tendency to move in the direction of heightened display and/or description
of his affective stance. This was the case, for example, in his response to a formulation: in
addition to doing an extended agreement, this response dramatically displayed his emotional
stance through a reenactment of his inner monologue. It was also evidenced early on in the
session when, over the course of several sequences, he upgraded his lexical descriptions of his
emotions.
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In the analysis of a single case of an interpretation sequence, however, Adam responds
with an [agreement token + non-answer]. Voutilainen, Peräkylä, and Ruusuvuori (2011)
describe this same pattern (viz., agreement followed by withdrawal) in a longitudinal,
conversation analytic case study, and they also find that this pattern is most associated with the
middle to later phases of a long therapy. It appears that, while Adam is strongly aligned with
activities that only partially modify his talk, he resists elaborating on interpretations that more
fundamentally challenge his understanding of his experience—at least at this point in the
therapy.

We move onto one last session with Adam, session 82, representing roughly the ¾ mark
of the overall treatment length. Where we pick up, Adam is engaging in a stepwise shift to a
new topic and a new activity sequence: a troubles-telling (Jefferson, 2015; Jefferson & Lee,
1992). The announcement of the troubles comes at line 7, where he reveals that he has been the
victim of identity theft.
Extract 14 [Adam, S82]
1 Pa:

°one task in particular that I'm not doing.°

2

(.8)

3 Pa:

<an that's following up on my> Police report.

4

(1.0)

5 Pa:

cuz um:

6

(.6)

7 Pa:

my identity has been ↓stolen.

8

(.3)

9 Th:

hMm

10

(.3)

11 Pa:

Or: (.) or: someone has (.7)

12

or there's been a- a- a mix=up (.)

13

but it still looks like a- a (stilemma hit).
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14

(1.1)

15 Pa:

um

16

(.5)

17 Pa:

there's someone in STATE-NAME:, (1.1)

18

with: (.) uh who's used my name an my social.

19

(1.1)

20 Pa:

an- uh- to have a driver's license

21

an has gotten that license suspended.

22

(1.2)

23 Pa:

an currently that suspension's on my record.

24

(.6)

25

And that suspension keeps me from getting a STATE-NAME license.

26

(.9)

27 Th:

{((shallow head shake)/(1.1)}

28

(.4)

29 Pa:

uh even though I've never been in STATE-NAME.

My response—a continuer (line 9)—is a disaffiliative one in this sequential environment; and
while aligned to the action of a telling, it fails to align me as a troubles recipient (Jefferson, 2015,
cites as examples of aligning responses, “Oh really,” “Nah: no::,” and “Oh:: sh:i:t”). It appears
that Adam is oriented to the misfittedness of my response, because after redoing the
announcement (lines 11-12) and characterizing the situation as a “dilemma,” he halts his turn and
an inter-turn gap of 1.1 seconds elapses. It would seem that Adam awaits a more aligned
response; but when this fails to materialize, he moves into the “exposition” phase of the troublestelling sequence (Jefferson, 2015), describing some of the details of what has happened and how
it has impacted him. At line 27, in the midst of his telling, this receives a partial response as I
produce a head shake that displays access to the event and works to affiliate with Adam’s stance
(Stivers, 2008).
His troubles-telling continues from here (much of which is omitted for the purposes of
this analysis), as he describes government forms he filed and others that he still needs to submit.
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At various points in the telling, he displays his affective stance towards the event. In extract 15,
for example, he uses the practice of constructing a list, together with employing lexical phrases
that evoke the vastness of what remains to be done (see the bolded words in extract 15, below),
to display an affective stance of being hassled or burdened by the event. These practices appear
to be synergistic, as the list construction gives syntactic embodiment to what he describes
lexically as something extensive, that he must “deal with.”
Extract 15 [Adam, S82]
34 Pa:

make sure I- I deliver a whole package of things

35

to the STATE-NAME fraud department, (.5)

36

an the:n: deal with (.) a whole bunch of other

37

companies on my: end,

38

() with credit reports an: (.8)

39

things like that, (2.4)

As his troubles-telling progresses, Adam describes a “barrier” that he has run into in the
process of resolving the fraud case. He needs to contact a certain government person by email,
but for a reason he leaves unspecified, he is unable to, requiring him to make a phone call.
Extract 16 picks up at this point, where he elaborates on the issue of this phone call.
Extract 16 [Adam, S82]
78

so I need to call em again to see::

79

°you know° they'll let down whatever the barrier is

80

like they said they would (.3)

81

ah but that requires me to call during business hours. (.)

82

°an I haven't been doing that°.

83

(.8)

84 Pa:

°um°

85

(.8)

86 Th:

You Haven't been=you've Chosen not to.

86

(.3)

87 Pa:

aHHh (.) Hhh
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88

(2.3)

89 Pa:

kind of?

90

(.6)

91 Pa:

u:m

92

(3.2)

93 Pa:

u#h# hhh

94

(.8)

95 Pa:

a-=an That's Why like the- the sleep (.6)

96

<fuzz brain thing> (.3) kicks in. (.)

97

like it ma- makes the hours of (.4) eight (.2) to eight (.2)

98

jus sort of=a (.6) not really doing a whole lot?

99

(.7)

100 Th: ~y=know=I ca-=uner-~ s- y=don't wanna do it. (.)
101

°yur-° (.2) you're in a sleepy:

102

(1.4)

103 Pa: yeah (.)
104

but >i- it feels like the kinda thing I really need

105

to be< all of me to do: (.6)

106

a:nd (.5) I- I have I:'ve (1.4) been having some trouble

107

making (.6) #uh# (.3) like (1.0) °uh° (.9) a fully competent

108

PATIENT-NAME (.6) be awake (.2) during those hours.

109

(.8)

110 Pa: um

Two things are of note in Adam’s talk leading up to my declarative at line 86. First, he
says about the phone call that, “I haven’t been doing that” (line 82), which he delivers in a quiet
voice. Back at line 1, as Adam was transitioning into the troubles-telling sequence, he had also
referenced a matter that he wasn’t doing, and that utterance was also spoken softly: “One task in
particular that I’m not doing...” As I hear it, these repeated formulations of “not doing”
something, delivered in a quiet voice, suggest a stance of self-reproach or regret. Second, Adam
specifies that he needs to call “during business hours,” a qualification that, were we not familiar
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with Adam’s complaints of staying up through the night and sleeping during the day, would
seem redundant. This reference to “business hours” will later serve as a resource for Adam.
When I respond, it is with a turn that is designed grammatically as a declarative. What it
is doing, however, is not abundantly clear. Were we to assume that I am speaking from a K+
position—as someone who knows something about Adam—the utterance would function as an
informing (Heritage, 2012). If, on the other hand, I am speaking from a K- position, it is a
declarative question in search of confirmation (Heritage, 2012), or perhaps even a formulation
(Thompson & McCabe, 2016). In the absence of epistemic markers, much depends on how we
hear the utterance. Sequential analysis is, of course, the method we turn to for any determination
of the action-type of an utterance, and in this case, Adam’s response (“kind of?”)—which
suggests his epistemic authority in determining the rightness or wrongness of my display of
understanding—leads us to view the action at line 86 as a request for confirmation. And what
understanding is it that I am requesting Adam to confirm? It is the understanding that, when
Adam says he hasn’t been calling, this is equivalent to saying that he has chosen not to call:
“You Haven't been=you've Chosen not to.” Just as I did back in session 56, where I
reformulated Adam’s troubles with sleeping as not wanting to sleep (extract 12, line 46), here I
propose for Adam’s confirmation the understanding that he has agency and made a decision not
to call.
His response (line 89), which appears amid sighs, long pauses, and other signs of
hesitation, is equivocal, but I am inclined to characterize it as doing weak disconfirmation. What
supports, in part, this ascription is what Adam says when he continues his telling. Though not
designed as an account for his disconfirmation, its reference to sleep kicking in during the hours
8 to 8 (an allusion to “business hours”) renders a perspective of some outside force—namely,
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sleep—prohibiting him from making the necessary call. The understanding of Adam choosing to
not call is effectively disconfirmed.
At line 100, after Adam displays this understanding, I produce an “empathy display”
constructed with the mental verbal phrase, “I can understand” (Kupetz, 2014):
100 Th: ~y=know=I ca-=uner-~ s- y=don't wanna do it. (.)
101

°yur-° (.2) you're in a sleepy:

Though it merely claims understanding and is designed to be highly affiliative, it implicitly
challenges Adam’s portrayal of why he hasn’t called, reintroducing, through the lexical phrase
“you don’t want to do it,” the perspective that he is set against calling, not a victim of
circumstances. While seeming to mirror Adam’s understanding that his failure to make the call
is related to sleep (“you’re in a sleepy”), it implicitly privileges desire, choice, or want.
In line 103, Adam responds with an acknowledgement token, followed by a continuation
of his troubles-telling. He does not take up the understanding of “not wanting” to call that I had
covertly woven into my empathy display, and he instead describes his struggle to be alert and
awake during the day. While he passes over the perspective I had offered, we do notice a change
in the quality of Adam’s troubles-telling. For the first time in this transcript, he gives expression
to his troubles using first-person pronouns—he, we might say, begins to “occupy” his troubles
and describe them in terms of their effect on him:
106

a:nd (.5) I- I have I:'ve (1.4) been having some trouble

107

making (.6) #uh# (.3) like (1.0) °uh° (.9) a fully competent

108

PATIENT-NAME (.6) be awake (.2) during those hours.

In keeping with Jefferson’s (2015) depiction of the troubles-telling sequence moving through an
“affiliation” and “affiliation response” segment, my affiliative empathy display at line 100 seems
to trigger a shift in Adam’s troubles-telling—a shift towards “emotionally heightened talk,
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‘letting go’ and/or turning to or confiding in the troubles recipient” (Jefferson, 2015, p. 42). This
remains a subtle effect in lines 106-108 but becomes more apparent as the conversation
continues, Adam’s talk becoming progressively more expressive. In line 113 (see below), he
upgrades his emotional lexis, describing his stance as “nervous,” and in line 117, he employs
both increased volume and an extreme case formulation design (Pomerantz, 1986) to heighten
his emotional stance.
Extract 17 [Adam, S82]
109

(.8)

110 Pa: um
111

(3.7)

112 Pa: >because I don't< >I- I don't (.) yea:h.<
113

you know I'm- I'm nervous to call them (.5)

114

'f=I'm not at full capacity.

115

(.8)

116 Pa: um: (.6)
117

I'm Nervous to Call Them: at All:.

118

(.7)

At the same time that Adam is giving vent to his emotional experience, he also
formulates a new understanding of why he hasn’t made the call to resolve his fraud case: “I’m
nervous to call them...I’m nervous to call them at all” (lines 113, 117). If we engage in a brief
retrospective, the conversation has progressed up to this point from Adam remarking—without
explanation—that he hasn’t been making the necessary phone call (line 82); me suggesting the
understanding that he has chosen not to call (line 86); Adam disconfirming this understanding
and offering in its place the view that he doesn’t call because he is asleep (lines 89-98); me
displaying the understanding that Adam does not want to call, albeit because he is sleepy (lines
100-101); and Adam merely receipting my talk, without giving any indication of having taken up
the understanding (line 103). By line 113, however, in the environment of a troubles-telling
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“affiliation response,” Adam suddenly formulates the viewpoint that he is nervous to call. While
it is not delivered as a conditionally relevant response to one of my actions, and therefore comes
across as arising as a spontaneous insight, there are indications that his utterance, and the
understanding it displays, is responsive to what has come before it. Specifically, we note his
abandoned TCU at line 112, which comes just prior to his first articulation of the phrase, “you
know, I’m nervous to call them.” Comparing this partial-TCU with my empathy display at line
100, his repetition of the phrase, “I don’t,” mirrors the “you don’t” design of my earlier
utterance. There is also the fascinating phenomenon of the lexical item, “yeah,” that comes after
the abandonment of his TCU. Though I can only speculate, it would appear that Adam had in
mind the utterance I produced at line 100 when he began his TCU at line 112. It is as if he went
to reproduce this utterance, abandoned it, and then, reflecting on the understanding it contained,
produced a “yeah” token as a form of confirmation or agreement with it. Why he didn’t then go
on to complete the TCU is, however, unclear to me.
100 Th: ~y=know=I ca-=uner-~ s- y=don't wanna do it. (.)

...
112 Pa: >because I don't< >I- I don't (.) yea:h.<
113

you know I'm- I'm nervous to call them (.5)

Reviewing these segments from a troubles-telling sequence in one of Adam’s later
sessions, we note a pattern of changes over the course of the talk-in-interaction. In this session,
there are two orders that are witness to shifts or changes over time: the emotional order and what
I am calling the “cognitive order.” In the case of the former, we observe that Adam reserves
explicit expressions of his affective stance until much later in the interaction, while during the
announcement and exposition phases of the troubles-telling his affective stance is relatively
muted. Conversation analysis assumes that outcomes like these are interactional in nature, and in
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keeping with this assumption, we notice a related change, over time, at the level of my affiliative
involvement with Adam’s telling: I fail to align as a troubles recipient during the announcement
phase; I produce a more affiliative head shake during the exposition phase; and I make a highly
affiliative empathy display just before he launches into an emotionally heightened segment of
talk.
The cognitive order refers to how events and experiences are understood, and in this
session, a particular understanding regarding the meaning of Adam’s failure to make a phone call
underwent significant changes. My involvement in advancing the understanding that Adam
would eventually adopt appears to have been crucial, both because of the work I do to frame his
failure to call in psychological terms—as a choice and, later, as something he does not want to
do—and because of my persistence in returning to this understanding when Adam resists it,
presenting in its place the alternative understanding that he doesn’t call because he is asleep.
The understanding that Adam eventually adopts—that he doesn’t call because he is nervous—
represents a significant change from his original position of—if I may call it this—“nonunderstanding,” and as I demonstrate in the analysis, the vehicle for this change process is our
talk-in-interaction.

Psychotherapy over time: Middle and later sessions with Keith
We return to Keith and a session that takes places at about the midpoint of his overall
therapy. At the beginning of the session, he launched into an assessment (omitted from the
transcript) of the weather and the annoyance he felt at how it will one day “snow” and then
“melt,” back and forth —one of those apparent buffer topics that sometimes mark the first
minute or so of a psychotherapy session. A clinical, especially psychoanalytic, sensibility,
however, often treats these first remarks by a patient as significant; and in my experience, it is
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not unusual for opening comments, however quotidian they might appear to be, to serve as the
starting point for the construction of a hypothesis about ‘what the patient is really saying.’ Later
interpretations that make use of a patient’s opening utterances are not unusual, and an example of
this occurs in this session.
Where we pick up, 32 minutes into the session, no such interpretation is yet in sight.
Keith is transitioning into a new topic, which concerns the question of his “purpose” in life (line
6), what he is “supposed to be doing” (line 7):
Extract 18 [Keith, S67]
1 Pa:

cuz that was something on Sunday that I was like (1.2)

2

I was actually questioning:.

3

(.6)

4 Pa:

ss- >°ee(he-he) not in some ways.< (.)

5

I was (.3) questioning (.6)

6

what my purpose is an:: where we'r- (2.3)

7

I'm supposed to be an what I'm supposed to be doing.

8

(1.6)

9 Pa:

°you know°

10

(1.4)

11 Pa:

an I mean it's Happened in church. so it's like (2.9)

12

you know so even if=i's=just like

13

okay w:he:re am I su(pp)osed to be going with my life.

14

(.8)

15 Pa:

cuz: (.8) It doesn't seem like it's going anywhere. (.)

16

>.hh<

17

(.9)

18 Pa:

or at least not in the right direction.

19

(1.6)

20 Pa:

an (1.1) I- I jus don't know that answer.

21

(1.6)

22 Th:

when you were younger::, (.) a teenager::, (.)

23

it wass (.) very clear:: (.)

24

maybe even planned for you?
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25

(.8)

26 Pa:

HMMmm: (.9) it seemed more clear.

27

we'll jj:ust put it th(h)a(h)t w(h)ay. (.)

28 Th:

°hm°

29 Pa:

I w(h)on't say that it truly was more clea(h)(h)r

30

(1.2)

Keith appears to seek topicalization of this new topic at various transition-relevance
places, pausing for longer or slightly less than the “standard maximum” of 1 second (Jefferson,
1988) at lines 8, 10, 14, 17, 19, and 21. As a strategy to encourage uptake or recipiency, Keith
produces a number of extensions to his turn, each one rearticulating his questioning of the
direction of his life and providing another transition-relevance place where I may respond.
Speaker transition finally occurs at line 22, and I produce an ancillary question that declines
empathic affiliation (Heritage, 2011) and requests confirmation of my understanding that Keith
had a very clear sense of his direction in life when he was a teenager. Employing laughter
particles—a practice that, here, may display a stance of the amusingness, and therefore
inaccuracy, of my suggestion—he responds that his sense of direction seemed more clear but was
not truly more clear (lines 26, 29), which effectively disconfirms my proposed understanding.
I follow his turn with an extension designed with a turn-initial epistemic modal
(“maybe”) (line 31, see below), the extension working to claim understanding of Keith’s talk,
display intersubjectivity, and speak from within his same vantage point (Vehviläinen, 2003;
Antaki, 2008): “maybe even the illusion of clarity.” The turn design as an extension is also
affiliative (Antaki, 2008), and the inclusion of the epistemic modal downgrades my claim to
knowledge (Ekberg & LeCouteur, 2014). Given its sequential positioning after Keith’s negative
reply to my previous display of understanding, this utterance works to re-affiliate with the patient
and seems to constitute an instance of “active retreating” (Muntigl et al., 2013).
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Extract 19 [Keith, S67]
29 Pa:

I w(h)on't say that it truly was more clea(h)(h)r

30

(1.2)

31 Th:

maybe even the illusion of clarity.

32

(.2)

33 Pa:

Yeah.

34

(.2)

35 Th:

an- an- no::w it'ss (.8) the veil's dropped (.)

36

an you're not really su:re

37

(.5)

38 Pa:

>hm mm<

39

(.6)

40 Pa:

I mean it seems like any time I start to see: (.6)

41

things clearly an:, (.9)

42

an all: (.) it jus seems like something happens an::: (2.8)

43

messes it all up.

44

(1.0)

45 Pa:

°you know°

46

(1.1)

47 Pa:

takes away all that clarity.

48

(2.4)

Keith confirms (line 33), without elaboration, the understanding displayed in the extension, and I
then produce another extension (lines 35-36)—this time an extension of my own turn—which
seems to work to create a transition-relevance place for Keith to produce an elaboration to his
response (Peräkylä, 2011 describes this same phenomenon at work in interpretations). This
elaboration does indeed come. In lines 40-47, he produces an extended confirmation of the
understandings contained in my previous turns, repeating the use of the lexical item “clarity” (as
well as a variation of this word—“clearly”) to show how his turn is connected to mine (Drew,
2013).
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As the conversation continues, we see a return to talk about the rapid cycling of weather,
which first occurred at the beginning of the session. This time, though, it occurs as part of a
practice of tying it, in an embedded way (Bercelli, Rossano, & Viaro, 2013), into the larger
action of a reinterpretation (Bercelli, Rossano, & Viaro, 2008). The reinterpretation begins at
line 49:
Extract 20 [Keith, S67]
47 Pa:

takes away all that clarity.

48

(2.4)

49 Th:

you getss: you- you get the thing you want,

50

you get the good ti:mes, an then it's disrupted.

51

(.2)

52 Th:

sort of like (.4) the way the snowstorms (.2)

53

have been with climate change (.2)

54

YOu GEt THE GOOd THIng, You get Montrea:l,

55

you get a-=some snow but then it's melted.

56

then you get the snow an (then) it's melted.

57

(.4)

58 Pa:

[>H m

59 Th:

[(An) You W]ant Jus (.)

60

You Wanna One Good Dump of Snow, a good life (.4)

61

that doesn't Change:.

62

(.4)

63 Pa:

↑>Hm Mm:<

64

(.9)

65 Pa:

>Hm mm<

66

(.4)

67 Pa:

↓ mm: wiTh wITh reGARd to the Other I mEan I UNDerstA:nd:.

68

you know: (.) there's gotta be summer an spring you know: (.9)

69

so it can't be snow all the time:.

70

(.4)

71 Pa:

I'm happy wi(dn) (.5) you know with the changes this season.

72

(.7)

73 Pa:

°you know°

m m<]
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74

(.9)

75 Pa:

now yes I don't like when: (.) it's: a=hundred deGrees

76

outside an: (.7) (n'the)=middle of the ↑SUmmer↓(.)

77

#but# (2.3) I can't (.4) be too picky.=HeHhhh::

78 Th:

°hm°

79

(.3)

80

eh <you know

81

(.5)

82 Pa:

it jus would be nice ta (.4) °you know° (.2)

83

have win'er when it's win(t)er:=an:

84

spring when it's spring:=an

85

summer when it's summEr:=an (.8)

86

Fall when it's F(H)A(H)LL:.

87

(1.3)

The reinterpretation introduces a new significance to Keith’s perspective. It begins by
transforming Keith’s earlier description—viz., seeing things clearing and then something
happens and messes it all up (lines 40-43)—in terms of getting the thing you want, the good
times, and then it’s disrupted (lines 49-50). It then utilizes a metaphor to compare this cycling of
fortune to the recent weather (lines 52-56): one day it’s snowing and Keith gets the “good thing,”
and before long the snow has melted. The metaphor is tightly packed, such that a “good thing” is
compared to snow, as well as Montreal—a place about which Keith had earlier reported a
positive experience and that is also associated with snow—in a relatively compact utterance:
“YOu GEt THE GOOd THIng, You get Montrea:l, you get a-=some snow but then it's melted”
(lines 54-55). In overlap with Keith’s receipt at line 58, I extend the reinterpretation and
conclude that, just as Keith wants it to snow and stay that way, he wants “one good dump of
snow, a good life, that doesn’t change” (lines 60-61).
At the beginning of this transcript, Keith had articulated his sense of directionlessness in
life. What followed was a sequence of interaction that led to Keith reshaping this understanding:
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sometimes he starts to see (his direction in life), but then something happens to disrupt it. With
the arrival of the reinterpretation, a significant transformation of this understanding has been
introduced. Keith’s concern with direction and purpose have been dropped, and in their place,
the reinterpretation offers the understanding that Keith experiences getting the things he wants
and then watching them melt away, leaving him yearning for a good life that remains fixed.
Before looking at Keith’s response, note that everything that has proceeded up to this
point has been an interactional achievement of the first order. The reinterpretation, which rests
on a perspective of changing life circumstances, is only possible because Keith had, in the prior
turn, introduced a temporal understanding of things seen clearly followed by something messing
it all up. This understanding in turn relied on a dimension of time that was only implicit in my
earlier extensions of his talk: “maybe even the illusion of clarity...and now, it’s, the veil’s
dropped” (lines 31, 35). Similarly, Keith’s description, in lines 40-47, of seeing things clearly
and then having that clarity taken away employs the lexical item “clarity” from my earlier
extension, which in turn was based on Keith’s use of the word “clear” in the preceding turn (line
29). What is evidenced here is a reciprocal and collaborative process of building on possibilities
from the preceding speaker’s turn, shaping and transforming understandings along the way.
Let us now look at how Keith responds to the reinterpretation. At first, he produces
continuers (lines 63, 65), signaling his anticipation that I am not yet done interpreting. When I
decline to continue my turn-at-talk, he responds to only one facet of the reinterpretation—and
what is more, to that part of the reinterpretation that serves only as a vehicle or metaphor for the
heart of its claim. He signals his intention to address only part of my talk with the proterm
“other,” which refers to the topic of his complaints about the weather: “with regard to the other, I
mean I understand...” (line 67). In doing so, he evades the agenda of the reinterpretation, which,
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as Stivers and Hayashi (2010) have shown in their work on “transformative answers” to Y/N
interrogatives, is highly resistant. He proceeds to disagree with the possible implication—a
rather dubious one, it seems to me—that he wishes it would snow all the time. In his extended
disagreement, he explains that he knows that “it can’t be snow all the time.” His wish is that the
weather would be consistent with the season (lines 82-86).
Having had my reinterpretation of Keith’s desire for “a good life that doesn’t change”
avoided entirely, I try a different approach and proceed to interpret Keith’s desire for “reliable
consistency,” this time providing strong “evidential grounding” (Weiste, Voutilainen, &
Peräkylä, 2016) for its justification. The interpretation begins at line 88.
Extract 21 [Keith, S67]
87

(1.3)

88 Th:

I wonder:: (.6)

89

tryin'a find some language to describe this thing you wa:nt.

90

I wonder if the wo:rd like- reliable consistency gets at it.

91

cuz (.) I- I know with wo:rk like with NAME (.8)

92

there hasn't been consistency.

93

you were describing this: the weather not being consistent. (.)

94

an (.3) with (.6) these women (.5)

95

it wasn't (.5) as lo:ng (.6)

96

may'e as consistent an clear as you'd like.

97

<an right now you're feeling like you don't have (.)

98

a lot of purpose.

99

(.2)

100 Th: feeling like there's not a lot of clarity.
101

(.9)

102 Pa: hm mm
103

(1.0)

104 Pa: °hm:°
105

(1.0)

106 Pa: mmm:
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107

(.9)

108 Pa: one of the things that I: (1.9)
109

I'm thinking about tr- uh: going after,

110

I just don't know how successful I’ll be::, (.8)

111

specially knowing my track record with (.5) success in g(h)eneral

112

(1.1)

113 Pa: you know,
114

(.9)

115 Pa: i:s:: (.8) seeing if I can (1.0)
116

get myself back to duty with the Coast Guard an: (.7)

117

try getting stationed somewhere like in NAME

118

or somewhere where I can (.9)

119

you know help ou:t, (1.4)

120

the community outside of: (1.6)

121

you know the base an all that stuff an: (.8)

122

you know

123

(1.1)

This interpretation, unlike the previous reinterpretation, signals with its turn-initial
phrase, “I wonder,” both that it stems from my own (and therefore limited) point of view and that
it is speculative in nature (Bercelli, Rossano, & Viaro, 2008), avoiding the risk of being seen to
usurp Keith’s epistemic primacy. Constituting part of the agenda of the question is the
assumption that Keith “wants” something, and in line 89, I appear to be either accounting for the
“language” I will use to describe this “want” or engaging in a kind of “doing thinking” action as
the naming of Keith’s “want” is withheld. When I articulate that Keith wants “reliable
consistency,” I proceed to enhance my turn with four instances that support the interpretation,
appealing to my epistemic access to support the strength of the relevancy of the examples (lines
91-100): For the first example, “I- I know” that there hasn’t been consistency in one of Keith’s
friendships (line 91); in the case of inconsistent weather, it is knowable because Keith himself
“was describing this” (line 93); and regarding Keith’s lack of purpose and clarity (it is unclear
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how this item supports the understanding displayed in the interpretation), it is publically
available, happening “right now” (line 97).
Keith produces a number of continuers, interspersed with the standard maximum of 1
second of silence, projecting a dispreferred response (Sidnell, 2010). His response (lines 108122), which amounts to a non-answer (Jager et al., 2016), is even more resistant than his reply to
the earlier reinterpretation. In neither agreeing or disagreeing with the interpretation, his
response is not conditionally relevant; and by leaving unaddressed both the agenda of the
interpretation and its terms, he displays high disalignment (Stivers & Hayashi, 2010). In reading
the transcript, one has the impression that Keith is responding to a question from an invisible
interlocutor—so off topic does Keith’s response, which describes his intention to rejoin the Coast
Guard and “help out the community,” seem to be. On closer inspection, it appears that Keith
latches on to the end of the interpretation—viz., “and right now you’re feeling like you don’t
have a lot of purpose...not a lot of clarity” (97-100)—and produces his turn as an on-topic
response to the issue of purpose. However, were the interpretation to have consisted of nothing
but this quoted utterance, Keith’s response would still have failed to align with the relevance of
an (dis)agreement. Keith’s resistance to the interpretation is unmistakable, therefore.
Moving to an overview of this segment of conversation from session 67 with Keith, we
notice that the affiliative “shape” or trajectory of Keith’s talk moves in the direction of affiliation
during the enquiry phase and becomes strongly resistant and disaffiliative during the
interpretative phase—a pattern that was also evidenced in the analysis of a session from the
halfway point in Adam’s therapy (see, above, “Psychotherapy over time: middle and later
sessions with Adam”). Starting from the beginning of the transcript, Keith initially disconfirmed
an ancillary question (which was itself disaffiliative in an environment of topic pursuit), but
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thereafter he responded to an extension with minimal confirmation and, when I later continued
my turn, with extended confirmation. When I went on to produce a reinterpretation, however,
Adam evaded its agenda and responded with an extended disagreement to a minor facet of its
displayed understanding, demonstrating, thereby, high resistance overall to the reinterpretation.
Following this, I produced an interpretation that drew on Keith’s talk from multiple earlier
sequences, and Keith responded with a non-answer, the most resistant response he produced in
this transcript.
Something to note is that designing interpretations with strong evidential grounding (i.e.,
“evidence” to support the interpretation) and downgraded epistemic access did not appear to
impact their reception. The interpretation that utilized both of these practices received the most
resistant and disaffiliative response of all the actions I produced in this interaction, suggesting,
perhaps, a generalized tendency by Keith to resist attempts to modify, by transforming, his
experience/talk—at least during this session. I don’t believe that we can rule out the possibility
that truth is a veritable dimension in human psychology and that my interpretations—however
well grounded in Keith’s talk—simply missed the point, thereby eliciting resistance. Or, to shift
perspectives slightly, the Freudian/Lacanian theory may be correct that “resistance is inversely
proportional to one's distance from the repressed centre” (Lacan & Miller, 1975/1991, p. 22),
implying that resistance is stoked precisely when our interpretations bring the patient close to his
or her repressed truth. For now, I must leave these questions in abeyance as we move on to see
how a conversation with Keith proceeded in a later session, paying particular attention to how he
takes up interpretations at this more advanced point of his therapy.
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The following brief extracts come from session 105 with Keith, approximately ¾ of the
way into his treatment. They cover a single exchange with Keith and give an example of a
typical interpretation-response sequence from this session. Leading up to the first extract, Keith
has been discussing the remodeling of his workplace. In earlier sessions, he had expressed
furiousness at the untidiness of the building—extension cords lying around, clutter that impeded
movement, fire hazards, and so on—and where extract 22 begins, Keith is describing the new
and improved workplace.
Extract 22 [Keith, S105]
1 Pa:

so um=I mean i#(tl)#- eventually it'll be nice.

2

an they're (.3) they're coming along with the basement=

3

=↑I: ↓didn't go down there yesterday (.6)

4

u:m: (.2) to see if they made any progress but (.8)

5

it's gonna be r(hh)ealy n(hh)ice when they get it done.

6

(.2)

7 Pa:

.h sounds like there's gonna be a storage roo:m

8

or at least an area for sto:rage, (.5)

9 Th:

°>wow<°
((nod))

10

(.3)

11 Pa:

u:m: (.) >an I mean<

12

it's- it's gonna be r::eally nice when it's done.

13

(.2)

14 Th:

°°very good°°
((

nod

))

15

(.2)

16 Pa:

um: so=it's (.3)

17

It's a WElcome change.

18

(.2)

19 Pa:

um

20

(1.0)

21 Pa:

so: (.3)
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His affective stance towards the changes being made to the building where he works is
patent excitement. Both his lexical ascriptions (“nice,” line 1; “really nice,” line 5; “really nice,”
line 12; “welcome change,” line 17), prosody (see the ‘breathiness’, similar to laughter particles,
in line 5), elongated words (line 12), and raised volume (line 17) display an irrepressible
happiness about the remodeling. For my part, I respond with minimal assessments (“wow”, line
9; “very good,” line 14) (Goodwin, 1986), delivered with nods (lines 9, 14) (Stivers, 2008), that
affiliate with his stance and promote the activity of his talk. Notably, these assessments are
uttered very quietly, suggesting a display of affective stance that is in some way asymmetrical
with Keith’s and his flagrant excitement. I am, unfortunately, at a loss to explain this
phenomenon and can only flag it as an area for possible research.
Jefferson (1978) has shown that storytellings often end with an assessment; and while
Keith’s talk does not constitute such an activity, a series of assessments in his turn-at-talk begin
to appear, and with increasing frequency (lines 5, 12, 17), at places that mark the possible
completion of his turn, suggesting that his activity has reached its terminus and he is looking for
uptake. This becomes more apparent in lines 19-21, where Keith appears to be struggling to
continue his turn: “um (1.0) so: (.3)”.
It is at this juncture that I produce an interpretation (beginning at line 22). This is a
somewhat unusual interpretation compared to those I have analyzed so far, since it appears in the
absence of “enquiry phase” activity, such as formulations, extensions, and requests for
information (Bercelli, Rossano, & Viaro, 2013). It comes out of the blue, as it were.
Extract 23 [Keith, S105]
21 Pa:

so: (.3)

22 Th:

I'm thinking=Ahh: #uh:# (.7)

23

th- °th-° (.4) things that we talk about a lot (.2)

24

are things like (.3) you: (.2) um: (.2)
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25

feeling that your ssafe hasn't been (.5) really respected,

26

I'm thinking like by your mother:

27

in your ↑roo:m a:nd↓ (.)

28

problems around feeling like your fff- your-

29

you are acknowledged and recognized

30

like when your (.3) mom starts talkin about herself

31

or dad and mo:m are ignoring you while you're

32

playing a game of (.) >°eh- eh-°< a card game¿

33

(.5)

34 Th:

an todAY you're talking about (.6)

35

a- a ti- a- ninstance where you're feeling actually like

36

you've been hea:rd¿=you and your crew've been hea:rd (.4)

37

you're not the red=headed stepchild this time?

38

(.2)

39 Pa:

>Hm mm< (.)

40 Th:

you hactually ha:ve space:, (.2)

41

there isn't clutter everywhere:,

42

the extension cords are retractable:, (.4)

43 Pa:

>Hm mm< (.)

44 Th:

°I:° (.7)

45

I jus think given (.2) >things that we talk about

46

this feels

47

Today feels sortuv like< (.)

48

like a little mini success.

49

like (.2) this this feels good. (.)

50 Pa:

oh yeah.

51

(.2)

52 Pa:

yeah. (.) oh it's (.3) it's nice.

53

I mean (1.2) you know the fact that (.5)

54

>Uh=Mean TheeUh< the (other) thing=tht's really nice is we

55

actually now have a tv- have TV:.

56

(.6)

((Keith proceeds to talk at length on the topic of having a TV. ))

The first thing we notice is the interpretation’s turn-initial phrase, “I’m thinking,” which
marks the forthcoming talk as arising from my own perspective and understanding (Bercelli,
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Rossano, & Viaro, 2008)—it does not claim to summarize an understanding held by the patient
(Bercelli, Rossano, & Viaro, 2013). The interpretation initially appears to be topically disjointed
from Keith’s talk about workplace remodeling, as it links—in the format of a kind of list, under
the heading of “things that we talk about a lot” (line 23)—disparate sequences of talk from
distant sessions. The topics and previously established understandings that it ties together
include Keith’s feeling that his mother does not respect his personal property (lines 25-27);
feeling unacknowledged and unrecognized when his mother talks about herself (lines 28-30); and
feeling ignored by his parents when the family plays card games (lines 31-32). A pause occurs at
this point (line 33), which marks the boundary of the interpretation’s “evidential grounding”
(Weiste, Voutilainen, & Peräkylä, 2016)—in the case of this interpretation, we might better
describe this grounding as a “context” for establishing a contrast (more on this below)—and
creates a slot for Keith to display recipiency. When Keith doesn’t respond, I move into the core
understanding that the interpretation will advance.
The turn continues by establishing a contrast between what Keith has talked about in past
sessions and what he is talking about today (line 34). I interpret Keith’s experience of the
change at work in terms of “feeling heard” (line 36), and repeating a phrase Keith had used in
past sessions to describe how others made him feel, I propose that he is not feeling, for once, like
“the red-headed stepchild” (line 37). He receipts what I have said so far, and, accounting for my
view that he has felt “heard,” I continue the interpretation by specifying the concrete changes
that have taken place at work (lines 40-42)—changes that remedied problems that had been the
focus of his complaints in past sessions. After another receipt, I deliver the upshot of the
interpretation, which again is prefaced with an epistemic marker and again makes a comparison
between past and present topics: “I...I just think, given [the] things that we talk about, this feels
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today, feels sort of like a little mini success. Like this feels good” (lines 44-49). What I
foreground as a possible understanding is the view that his current experience of feeling heard
and not ignored (like a red-headed stepchild) is an achievement when viewed through the lens of
his historical experience of feeling disrespected, unacknowledged, unrecognized, and ignored.
At line 50, Keith responds with, “Oh yeah”—an oh-prefaced agreement token. While
doing agreement, the turn’s oh-preface conveys that Keith already holds the view that I
expressed (Heritage, 2002; Heritage & Raymond, 2005)—he already has epistemic access to the
understanding contained in my interpretation. He goes on to repeat his agreement with an ohprefaced assessment, doubling down on his independent access: “Oh, it’s nice” (line 52). Keith’s
working to assert the “decided” and already-held status of his knowledge is notable in itself; but
what truly stands out in his response is what comes next, in the subsequent elaboration of his
turn, which constitutes an action of extended agreement. He displays his understanding—and, in
turn, his understanding of the interpretation—that, indeed, the changes to his workplace are nice,
giving as an example of these nice changes the recent addition of a TV. The complex
perspective built up in the interpretation, with its reliance on temporality (i.e., how he has felt in
the past compared to how he feels today), its juxtaposition of contrasting experiences at home
and work, the centrality of its notion that Keith has had a “success,” and its terms of “feeling
heard,” “red-headed stepchild,” “respected,” “acknowledged,” “recognized,” and “ignored”—the
basic vision and terms of the interpretation—is passed over by Keith. In replying, “Oh, it’s
nice”, Keith repeats more or less the assessment he had made prior to the interpretation (“it’s
gonna be really nice”, lines 5 and 12), updating only its tense. Like “transformative answers”
(Stivers & Hayashi, 2010), Keith’s response—which eschews the understanding that constitutes
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the interpretation’s agenda and fails to take up any of the lexical items that constitute its terms—
is highly resistant.
In the example of a response to an interpretation that I have analyzed from this later
session in Keith’s psychotherapy, we have an interesting case of an utterance that is affiliative at
the level of action, combative in its display of epistemic stance, and disaffiliative and disaligning
with the understanding and lexical terms promoted by the interpretation. I am inclined to
describe this pattern as “complex resistance.” While basically resistant, Keith’s response
nonetheless shows alignment with the basic activity sequence of the interpretation and its
preference for agreement (over disagreement).

Psychotherapy over time: Middle and later sessions of “unsuccessful” treatments
The segment of conversation I will begin with comes from session 2 with Jon. I
unfortunately do not have access to recorded material from sessions at the midpoint of his
psychotherapy; but in view of the fact that he terminated treatment within 7 sessions, this session
comes close to representing a typical interaction from the middle of our handful of meetings.
Leading up to extract 24, which begins about 14 minutes into the session, Jon has been
enumerating the things that make him sad, and at line 1, he does a display of searching for
another example of things that evoke his depression. After a pause, I self-select for speaker
transition and produce a “highlighting formulation” (Peräkylä & Weiste, 2013) (lines 3 -8), an
empathic action that selects out some portion of his prior talk for emphasis and works to
demonstrate my understanding of his descriptions. He twice confirms the formulation (once in
overlap with me, at the possible completion of my turn at line 3), and he also produces an
extension of it (line 9), apparently in order to contrast his understanding that “neutrality” keeps
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him from entering a depression, whereas I had formulated the view that neutrality is how he gets
past his depression.
Extract 24 [Jon, S02]
1 Pa:

what else makes me sa:d

2

(.6)

3 Th:

you said this is how you get ↑past your sa:d ([doin’ this)

4 Pa:

[yes

5 Th:

(.) thinking ↓about

6

(.2)

7 Pa:

yes:

8 Th:

°(neutrality)°

9 Pa:

to keep me from going into depression.

10

(1.3)

11 Pa:

but this week ws- was hard.

12

(1.2)

13 Pa:

aho: (.) bad week.

14

(1.7)

15 Th:

what made it bad?

16

(.7)

17 Pa:

I dunno. I jus (.2) jus couldn't get over (1.4)

18

the pain: an everything an (.5)

19

an I don't see an end yet.

20

I don't see (.2) any (.9) thing: (2.2)

21

set up yet fer summer (.2)

22

>°you know what I'm saying°¿<

23

(2.2)

24 Pa:

um:

25

(1.9)

26 Th:

it's not set up yet

27

(.3)

28 Pa:

camping¿

29

(1.0)

30 Pa:

we got cre:ws that,

31

that's not til october an (that's=a) tss (.9)
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32

it's a lo:ng time away October.

33

(1.5)

((Jon proceeds to discuss vacation plans at length.))

At line 11, he transitions into a new activity sequence (note the turn-initial syntactic
conjunctional “but”), announcing—as part of a troubles-telling sequence (Jefferson, 2015)—that
his week has been “hard.” After a 1.2 second silence during which I fail to align with his
activity, he appends the description “bad week” (line 13), which is followed by another
disaligning gap. Rather than empathize with his telling, I produce a Wh-question that requests
information about his bad week (line 15). He provides, in part, a description of not having any
plans “set up yet” for the summer, and after he requests confirmation that I have understood
(“you know what I’m saying?”, line 22) and I fail to respond, he shows signs that he is available
for speaker transition (Jefferson, 1983) (lines 24-25). This occurs at line 26, where I produce a
declarative (“not set up yet”) that carries the action import of another request for information
(Heritage, 2012), and Jon proceeds to provide extensive descriptions of what still needs to be
done as part of his vacation plans.
At a later point, perhaps sensing that Jon and I had segued away from the important
discussion of his depression, I retopicalize his feelings of sadness by producing a “demand”
expansion elicitor (Muntigl & Zabala, 2008) (line 56): “when you say you’re sad, can you say a
little more about that?”
Extract 25 [Jon, S02]
56 Th:

when you say you're your- you- y' sa:d¿ (.)

57

>c'n- c'n you say a little (b) more<

58

(.7)

59 Th:

a[bout t]hat¿

60 Pa:
61

[sad]
(.8)
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62 Th:

how do you experience (.5)

63

how do you know that you're sad.

64

(7.9)

65 Pa:

it's breakin down on (me) (it's) sa:d¿

66

(cause I) can't figure out (.2) words to sa#y#.

67

(2.4)

68 Pa:

°#(I'm)/(um)#°

69

(1.9)

70 Pa:

<I dunno I jus feel trapped maybe.

71

(.6)

72 Th:

°hm:°

73

(4.1)

Jon repeats the lexical item “sad” (line 60) in overlap with my expansion elicitor, and when
speaker transition doesn’t occur within .8 seconds, I produce a request for information, designed
as a Wh-question: “How do you experience...how do you know that you’re sad?” I had
obviously intended the turn to be designed as a question of how Jon experiences his sadness, but
that TCU is self-repaired in favor of a question of how Jon knows that he is sad. When a long
inter-turn gap of 7.9 seconds follows, it is unclear whether the delay reflects resistance or,
perhaps, problems with understanding the question, which, in an unusual violation of everyday
assumptions about the transparency of one’s own emotions, asks Jon to account for the existence
of something—his sadness—that speakers normally treat as epistemically incontrovertible.
After the period of silence, Jon accounts for his sadness in terms of something breaking
down on him and feeling trapped (lines 65, 70). He marks his last description—“I dunno, I just
feel trapped maybe”—with markers of epistemic uncertainty, which displays that he has adopted
an epistemic stance of indirect access to his emotions. From a clinical perspective, we might say
that, in the course of the brief question-answer sequence spanning lines 63-70, the meaning of
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Jon’s sadness has become a problem for him, potentially setting the stage for a process of
investigation and meaning-making around his negative feelings.
When he doesn’t continue his talk after my continuer at line 72, I produce what might be
best described as a “relocating formulation” (Peräkylä & Weiste, 2013), proposing that his
feeling of being trapped is like his occasional experience of cabin fever, which he had earlier
described in the session.
Extract 26 [Jon, S02]
70 Pa:

<I dunno I jus feel trapped maybe.

71

(.6)

72 Th:

°hm:°

73

(4.1)

74 Th:

('ts) like when you're in the house an: (.2) ([you] get)

75 Pa:

[°ye°]

76 Th:

cabin fever (.)

77 Pa:

°°y(h)eah°° (.2)

78

but I normally get cabin fever.

79

(.6)

80 Pa:

I don't really get bo:red.

81

(.7)

82 Pa:

that I know of.

83

I don't wanna (.) be bored.

84

(1.5)

85 Pa:

got television, got t' computer, got all these things,

86

I got books, I got a bookcase, (.5)

87

about th- size of that wall there about this hi:gh hh

88

(.4)

89 Pa:

all kind of books an: (1.0)

90

an (.4) there's half of them I haven't read yet but (1.4)

91

daughter's gotta new tablet for christmas thet

92

I haven't opened one them books yet

93

(.2)

94 Pa:

#h-he (.2)
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95 Th:

°hm°

96

(.2)

97 Pa:

°(on) the° (.9) °tablet.°

98

(1.8)

99 Pa:

I read some: (1.3)

100

I like watchin: (3.7)

He initially responds to my formulation with a softly spoken agreement token (line 77), but in
the extension of his turn, he appears to invalidate (and thereby disagree with) the understanding I
had proposed: “but I normally get cabin fever” (line 78). I have returned to this utterance and its
surrounding talk innumerable times, and I must admit that it remains as impenetrable to me as
when I first read it. The contrastive, turn-initial “but” of the utterance would seem to project a
dispreferred, disagreeing response; but if this is the case, how does his description of normally
getting cabin fever disqualify the formulation that Jon’s feeling of being trapped is like his
experience of cabin fever? Does he, perhaps, see an asymmetry between the everyday
experience of cabin fever and the periodicity of his experience of depression / feeling trapped?
This remains unclear. In any case, ascribing disagreement to the action type of his response is
the most compelling inference, even if the grounds for his disagreement are opaque; and given
the fact that he disagrees with the formulation, we can characterize his response as a form of
resistance (Muntigl, 2013). If Jon had elaborated further, or if I had initiated repair on his talk,
perhaps light would have been shed on the reasons for his disagreement, but in line 80, he begins
a stepwise transition to a new topic and the issue of his depression recedes.
At a much later point in the conversation, a brief opportunity to retopicalize Jon’s
depression appears as he describes the book Catcher in the Rye and characterizes the main
character as “a young man that was more or less depressed—that went through depression” (lines
187-189). I make no moves to highlight, formulate, inquire into, or topicalize this clinically
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important topic of our earlier talk-in-interaction—this despite the affordances provided by
multiple transition-relevance places of more than 4 seconds in length (lines 202, 204). By line
205, Jon begins to describe other books that interest him, and the relevancy of on-topic talk about
depression starts to once again fade into the background.
Extract 27 [Jon, S02]
((Jon is describing the book Catcher in the Rye))
187 Pa: bout a young man that was: (3.6)
188

more or less depressed.

189

went through depression.

190

(1.5)

191 Pa: an how he dealt with it.
192

°°(you know)°°

193

(.2)

194 Pa: °°(so)(
195

)°°

(3.0)

196 Pa: °I can't remember the book now°.
197

(.7)

198 Pa: but (this) (.) mainly about (.2) his depression
199

an how he dealt with it.

200

(.2)

201 Pa: his life.
202

(4.4)

203 Pa: an it jus didn't.
204

(4.2)

205 Pa: trippy things like (.5) Clancy's.
206

(.6)

Reviewing all of the extracts analyzed from this session, there seems to be an overall
trend of the conversation moving towards the topic of depression and then withdrawing from it.
It is as if, when our talk-in-interaction reaches a certain point of proximity to the topic, a
repulsion effect—like two repelling magnets—launches the conversation towards some other
point of discussion. The degree of proximity to this sensitive topic varies at different points, but
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in all instances, our talk-in-interaction does not seem able to tolerate a prolonged discussion of
Jon’s depression; and in the absence of this, opportunities to trade understandings of it is
precluded. In the one case in which Jon constructs an understanding of his depression (viz.,
“feeling trapped”), my attempt to engage with him in modifying or widening that understanding
(by comparing it to his earlier description of “cabin fever”) is met with disagreement and a fairly
prompt transition to a new topic. In an earlier part of the conversation, requests for more more
information relating to Jon’s affective stance (e.g., “What made it [your week] bad?”) elicit
descriptions that slide towards “business-as-usual” talk, rather than engendering understandings
of his emotion. Lest we wonder whether Jon is a particularly recalcitrant patient, the transcript
demonstrates that I am just as liable to evade the topic when opportunities to topicalize it occur,
as evidenced in the last extract where Jon provides descriptions of a depressed character in a
book. Moreover, my analysis showed that my multiple requests for information in the extract
concerning Jon’s bad week were disaligned in a sequential environment of a troubles-telling.
The picture that emerges is of two interlocutors who are, to varying degrees, evasive in
sustaining discussion around Jon’s depression.

We turn now to Monty and examine his and my talk-in-interaction from session 20, what
was the exact midpoint of his 40 session-long treatment. Monty begins the session by
announcing the news that he has registered for college. After briefly discussing his wish to
enroll in more classes, he transitions into a troubles-telling. As he relates it, he had gone to print
out transcripts for his school at his local library when he discovered that there was a hold on his
library card. Either his mother or his brother, he says, used his library card and took a book out
and never returned it. As a consequence, he had been unable to print his transcripts. The first
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extract I examine from this session comes about a minute after this troubles-telling, following a
segment in which I had advised Monty to use the library at the university where we conducted
our sessions. In line 1, he produces an assessment of the trouble he had described earlier—“so
yeah, that’s just a general disconvenience this morning”—which works to signal the end of his
telling (Jefferson, 1978).
Extract 28 [Monty, S20]
1 Pa:

so yeah, that's jus a general disconvenience this morning.

2

(.8)

3 Th:

findin out thet (.4) your mother a' your brother (.) had (1.5)

4

used your pass

5

(.4)

6 Pa:

(hm)=(

7

(2.0)

8 Pa:

>(I)=don even know when that would've been<

9

bec'ss been expired (.2) like (.3)

10

thing's been expired for like eight months in the card.

11 Th:

hm:

12

(.5)

13 Pa:

.Stff

14

(1.2)

15 Pa:

hhh (.)

16 ?

so: is

17 Th:

eih- (.) irritation thou:gh¿ that was (.4) what you felt.

18

(1.0)

19 Pa:

it's ↑gone

20

(.5)

21 Pa:

>I mean=that was only an hour or two ago it seems to be go:ne now<

22

(.3)

23 Th:

°Hm°

24

(.2)

25 Pa:

it jus (.9) frustrating for a minute

26

(1.5)

27 Pa:

.sshhh

) (.2) di- didn't return the book,
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28

(2.0)

29 Pa:

Hhhhh

30

(1.8)

31 Pa:

I=don'kn(ow)

32

(2.0)

33 Pa:

>I=don'=know I jus feel °feel° like (°c'get°)< more

34

than (.8) NUMBER credits

35

(1.3)

Following the possible completion of his telling, I produce an extension of his turn that
functions as an understanding check (lines 3-4). He replies with a confirmation token and
elaborates that his mother or his brother failed to return the book. He continues his turn for a few
more lines, expressing his uncertainty about when the book was borrowed, and after he signals
his availability for speaker transition, I produce a formulation (line 17): “irritation though? that
was what you felt.” The formulation, with its dual rising and declarative intonation, seems to
negotiate a balance between asserting something that I have epistemic access to, on the basis of
Monty’s talk, and expressing tentativeness about the formulation of his affective stance. A
measure of epistemic downgrading is perhaps warranted, as the formulation introduces a
significant transformation of his earlier description of “general disconvenience” (line 1),
substituting for it “irritation.”
The “standard maximum tolerance” of 1 second of silence ensues before Monty responds,
indicating the possibility of a forthcoming disagreement (Pomerantz, 1984a). His response
implicitly agrees with the formulation, but at the same time, he evades its constraints, addressing
instead the absence of his irritation as of one or two hours ago (lines 19, 21). Like
“transformative answers” (Stivers & Hayashi, 2010), his response exhibits resistance—
specifically, resistance to the formulation’s focus on what he felt when he discovered that his
library card had been deactivated. After I produce a continuer (line 23), Monty continues his talk
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by specifying that “it [was] just frustrating for a minute,” qualifying the duration of the emotion
instead of enlarging on, say, the quality of the emotion or what made him feel that way.
Over the next 7 lines, a series of long inter-turn gaps appear as Monty breathes in and out
and, at line 31, displays his uncertainty of how to continue on-topic talk: “I don’t know”. Each
of these transition-relevance places is of significance for what does not occur in them,
representing an opening in which I might have, for instance, inquired into Monty’s irritation
further, formulated his talk again, or produced an extension; but given the lack of such an
initiated sequence, Monty unsurprisingly reverts to talking about an earlier topic (viz., getting
more credits at school). Like in our analysis of a midpoint session with Jon, focus on Monty’s
emotions—which is advocated in psychodynamic approaches to psychotherapy (Shedler, 2012;
McWilliams, 2018)—is lost, resulting from the interactional contributions of both Monty and
me.
About two minutes after this segment of conversation, Monty produces a description of
his anger while initiating closure of the topic-in-progress. It comes as part of an assessment and
summary of his week, which has been “decent” with the exception of his mother doing one or
two little things that makes him angry (lines 133-134) and the cold weather; and with his
utterance at line 144, “that’s about it,” he proposes closing the sequence (Schegloff, 2007). At
this moment, a number of therapist actions could occur, the most salient for the purposes of this
analysis being an action that draws out further talk on Monty’s anger, which had been largely
passed over previously. Beginning at line 149, I produce a highlighting formulation that receives
the account he has given of his week (Weiste, Voutilainen, & Peräkylä, 2016).
Extract 29 [Monty, S20]
131 Pa: decent week I guess
132

(1.6)
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133 Pa: still my mother does one 'r two=little things that (.)
134

makes me angry fer

135

(1.1)

136 Pa: (mo) out an I have to (.7)
137

eventually I (.4) (cen) caught up in something else

138

an I get over it

139

(.5)

140 Th: °hm°↓
141

(.5)

142 Pa: °#hm#°
143

(.9)

144 Pa: cold is (.2) killing me but- (.9) theyt 'bout it. (.)
145

tch

146

(.2)

147 Pa: .snff
148

(.3)

149 Th: on the who:le though a good week
150

(.6)

151 Th: just a fe:w (.7) kind(a) punctuated (.6) experiences of anger
152

(.8)

153 Th: with your mother
154 ?

Tch (.)

155 Pa: yeah,
156

(1.2)

157 Pa: Tch
158

(2.0)

159 Pa: Hhhh
160

(.4)

161 Pa: so it been (.) decent
162

(2.7)

In merely receiving Monty’s account, the highlighting formulation joins in reproducing
the understanding that his anger is an exception to an otherwise good week and one that needn’t
receive much attention. Specifically, I mirror his understanding by qualifying his episodes of
anger as being numerically insignificant: Where he describes “one or two little things” that made
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him angry (line 133), I describe “just a few” instances of getting angry. The lexical item “just”
in my formulation also stands out, as it diminishes the significance of the description of
experiences of anger that follow it, just as Monty’s account—“and I get over it” (line 138)—
glosses over the impact of his anger.
My formulation receives confirmation at line 155, and after a series of intern-turn gaps
during which neither Monty or I self-select to speak, Monty produces another summarizing
assessment of his week, which proposes topic closure. Thus, the opportunity to initiate and
sustain discussion about Monty’s anger is once again missed and, along with it, the work of
deepening and ultimately changing his understanding of it.
In summary, in this session both client and therapist display resistance to the work of
making Monty’s anger accountable. In the first instance we looked at, Monty agreed in effect to
my formulation of his irritation but resisted the formulation’s constraints by characterizing his
anger as “gone now” and therefore a non-issue. A series of transition-relevance places followed
that would have permitted me to pursue talk about his anger, but I declined these opportunities,
displaying, we might say, my own form of resistance. At a later point in the conversation,
Monty referenced his anger, characterizing it as a response to “little things” and, thereby, not
accountable. When I produced a highlighting formulation that also referenced his anger, I am
seen to collude in his understanding that his anger is an anomaly, not something worth sustained
on-topic talk. What we see in this session, then, is a tendency for both therapist and patient to
avoid sustained and meaningful enquiry around a problematic affect, and because this fails to
occur, the possibility of moving into a stage that would entail the modification of the patient’s
understanding of his affect is foreclosed.
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The next session I will examine comes again from Monty, but this time at a much later
point in the overall treatment—session 29. The transcript from which I will cite excerpts of our
talk-in-interaction is overlong, and I am forced to winnow the conversation down to a few telling
extracts that capture the overall quality of our interaction. At the point where I will begin,
Monty and I have been engaged in a series of question-answer and formulation-(dis)agreement
sequences in which I have sought to bring out “enquiry outcomes” (Bercelli, Rossano, & Viaro,
2013) and other understandings that will prepare for later interpretations. The focus of our talk
has been a certain troubling affect, which Monty originally describes as a “hyperactive” feeling,
but which, in the course of our treatment of it, is lexicalized as a “panic-like feeling,” “sort of
confused,” “less orderly,” and once again “panicking.” Initially, Monty had situated this feeling
in the context of doing “prolonged reading”; but at the point where we will pick up, he describes
“panicking” in class while taking notes of the lecture.
Extract 30 [Monty, S29]
1 Th:

it's two seconds

2

but for that two seconds you're panicking about:_

3

(2.3)

4 Pa:

Uh:: (.5) I dunno. (.)

5

I'm not-

6

note taking an stuff in real time. (.)

7 Th:

Hm

8

(1.5)

9 Pa:

my lab (.2) i dunno.

10

(.9)

11 Pa:

my lab partner's kinda passive too. (.)

12

so we (.) kinduv (1.0) js don't (.5) particularly (.)

13

we don't (.) not get along but (.7)

14

an am >tryi'=I don' wan' him to think that I'm the idiot that

15

can't< (.4) even keep his papers in order.

16

(.4)

I'd like ta (.9) be able to keep up like
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17 Pa:

let alone you know do (.3) la- lab work.

18

(1.1)

19 Th:

°°hm:°°

20

(1.3)

21 Th:

worried that your:: (.7) your: (.2)

22

lab partner might think you're dumb.

23

(3.8)

24 Pa:

Yeah=h

25

(.2)

26 Pa:

uhh

27

(2.7)

28 Pa:

dumb (.) in kinduv'a< (.3) I dunno ditsy (.) sense.

29

(.7)

30 Th:

°auh=hh°

31

(1.0)

32 Th:

scattered.

33 Pa:

at (.) bu'yeah (.) razzled I guess.

34

(.3)

35 Pa:

scattermind. scatterbrained. yeah

36

(1.3)

37 Th:

°hm:°

38

(1.3)

At lines 1-2, I design my turn as a TCU-initial prompt (Muntigl & Zabala, 2008), a
“specific expansion elicitor,” which projects further talk about the cause of Monty’s panic. He
suggests that it is due to his trouble keeping up with notes in class, but he progressively fleshes
out a much more nuanced account of not wanting his lab partner to think that he is an idiot that
he can’t keep his papers in order (lines 14-15). I summarize this talk with a formulation,
depicting his worry that his lab partner will think he is dumb (lines 21-22). Monty responds with
an agreement token, and then, after a pause of 2.7 seconds, he repairs part of the formulation’s
lexical design: “dumb in kind of a, I don’t know, ditsy sense” (line 28). This [agreement +
repair] response pattern repeats again, when, after I propose the lexical item “scattered” as an
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equivalent meaning to “ditsy,” he responds, “yeah, razzled I guess...Scatterbrained” (lines 3235).
The conversation proceeds and after a few lines in which neither of us self-selects for the
next turn (lines omitted from extract), I produce another formulation, this time summarizing his
fear of judgment and depicting it as something he has felt before (lines 43-45). Over the course
of several lines, I pursue uptake when he doesn’t respond. My tag question in line 47 seeks to
elicit a response (Heritage, 2012), and I follow it with a request for confirmation (lines 47-48),
an extension of the request for confirmation (line 50), and another request for confirmation (line
52), all of which work to create new slots in which Monty might respond. His response comes at
line 54 and bears the same hallmarks as his response to a formulation in session 20: He produces
an agreement token and then departs from the constraints of the formulation and qualifies his
fear of judgment as “not horrible” (line 54). By eschewing the focus of the formulation, Monty
thereby displays resistance (see, on a related phenomenon, Stivers & Hayashi, 2010).
Extract 31 [Monty, S29]
43 Th:

so (.2) noticing (.) fear of judgement,

44

which is something (.9) u:m you were experiencing

45

last time you were at SCHOOL-NAME.

46

(.4)

47 Th:

right? you're noticing it (1.0)

48

come back again?

49

(.2)

50 Th:

a little bit?

51

(.7)

52 Th:

you don't wanna appear (.2) ditsy¿

53

(2.2)

54 Pa:

Yeah (.) it's not (1.0) horrible.

55

(.6)

56 Th:

>hm mm<
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57 Pa:

°#but you know#°

58

(3.6)

Following his resistant response to my formulation of his fear of judgment, I try a new
tack and reinterpret (Bercelli, Rossano, & Viaro, 2013) his anxiety through the lens of the
information he had supplied in a previous part of our conversation, a portion of which I
reproduce here:
((Monty talking about answering homework questions))
Pa:

an I'm still like paranoid that- it's- not- just- aclear=cut answer¿ (.) that it's some sortuv trick question:

The reinterpretation begins at line 59. Reusing lexical items from Monty’s prior talk, it presents
the understanding that, just as Monty gets anxious about “getting it right” when he answers
homework questions, he gets anxious in class—these two things having in common his desire to
“[do] well in school” and “in the class.”
Extract 32 [Monty, S29]
57 Pa:

°#but you know#°

58

(3.6)

59 Th:

You have a Lot invested in: (.2) doing well in school this time.

60

so you're noticing yourself (.2) getting

61

anxious about getting it right, (.2)

62

you wanna make sure that (.7) they're no:t (.2)

63

you've really understood the question,

64

it's not a trick question,=that you're getting it ri:ght_

65

(.5)

66 Th:

if you miss even a few seconds of the lecture you're (.2)

67

concerned an anxious because it's important to you

68

an you wanna (.2) do well in the class?

69

(1.3)

70 ?

°°hm mm°°

71

(6.3)

72 Pa:

°#eh=mhhh°
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73

(.4)

74 Pa:

°yeah°

75

(.2)

76 Pa:

°but° (.) um:

77

(6.6)

78 Pa:

°yeah° (.) I dunno.

79

(.2)

80 Pa:

s'jus

81

(4.3)

82 Pa:

I dunno.

83

(.2)

84 Pa:

it's #aggravating not being# uh: (.7)

85

so (.) as orderly as I'd like.

86

(.5)

87 Th:

hmm

88 Pa:

#euh:#

89

(2.3)

His response to the reinterpretation begins with a series of “hm mm’s” and “mmm’s”,
displaying hesitancy and projecting disagreement (Pomerantz, 1984a). He follows them with an
agreement token (line 74); the conjunctional “but” (line 76); a long 6.6 second pause (line 77);
an agreement token followed by a “I don’t know response,” a type of non-answer (Jager et al.,
2016) (line 78); another long pause (line 81); and another non-answer “I don’t know” response
(line 82). When he produces talk at line 84 (“it’s aggravating not being...as orderly as I’d like”),
it is no longer clearly connected to the reinterpretation; and were we assume it represents a
continuation of his response, it would constitute a non-answer. In sum, Monty’s reply to the
reinterpretation is a highly resistant and disaligning one.
We will look at one more interpretation, which comes about 10 lines after the previous
extract. Leading up to it, Monty remarks that it’s like he has has lost whatever gene he had that
made him quick and able to do things in his mind (omitted from the extract). After I produce a
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continuer and Monty declines speaker transition (lines 99-100), I propose an interpretation that
attempts (again) to introduce—in contrast to Monty’s quasi-biological rendering of his problems
with “[doing] things in [his] mind...quickly”—a psychological explanation for his problems. The
interpretation, which begins at line 101, is marked as coming from my own perspective (“what
I’m hearing...”, line 110) and revolves around the key terms “high stakes environment,”
“anxiety,” “doing well,” “new,” and “scattered.” Though difficult to summarize, the
interpretation more or less advances the following understanding: Monty is feeling “scattered,”
and having problems with “concentration,” because he is “anxious,” which has a “disorganizing
effect”; and he is anxious, in turn, because he is in a “new,” “high stakes” environment and
wants “to do well.”
Extract 33 [Monty, S29]
99 Th:

hmm

100

(1.1)

101 Th: this is=a new environment for you.
102

this is (.6) can we call it=a high stakes environment for you?

103

(.4)

104 Th: it's important¿
105

(2.4)

106 Th: °°hm¿°°
107

(2.5)

108 Th: °u:m:°
109

(1.2)

110 Th: what I'M HEaring (.2) is that (.7) up until now:: (.2)
111

you've been in fairly ss- (.) uh what feel like very ssafe

112

environments, and so your (.) <normal orderly self> (.5)

113

is able to: (.4) be as (.2) you know.

114

as orderly as it is:, (.2)

115

this is=a high stakes environment, (.5)

116

an you’re more anxious (.) than normal because (.3)

117

it's important to you to do well, (.5)
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118

an anxiety has=a (.3) disorganizing effect on us.

119

it's harder to concentrate when you're nervous.

120

(.6)

121 Th: an °↑your° (.3) getting back into it, (.4) it's ne:w, (.3)
122

there's an adjustment period, (.3) but you're noticing (.3)

123

insightfully that it's having an effect on: (.6)

124

au:m: (.7) getting to school on time=you're rushing::,

125

you're noticing that you're (.3) pr- (.8)

126

you'll get scattered (.2) a few seconds, (1.8)

127 Pa: it started even: (1.0) like (.2) within a day=or- (.2)
128

I think I got this prescription (1.7) last (.4)

129

d- well on monday:¿

130

(.2)

131

Hmm (.)

132 Pa: wh'n- when I saw him.
133

(1.0)

134 Pa: °um° so it started even before school started. (.)

Monty’s response to the interpretation, which begins at line 127, works as an extended
disagreement. He contradicts my understanding that his being “scattered” (his proterm “it”, in
line 127, refers to “scattered” in the previous line) is connected to being in a new environment,
claiming that this feeling only began after he started a new medication and that he began the
medication before starting school. Depicted schematically, his response displays the following
understanding:
new medication  scattered (mind)
His disagreement appears to be with this view:
starting school  scattered (mind)
My interpretation offered this understanding:
desire to do well in a “high stakes” environment  anxious  scattered (mind)
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These schemas allow us to see more clearly what Monty’s response does not respond to, what he
leaves unaddressed. Granting that his understanding of why he is scattered is valid—and,
indeed, a few lines later in the conversation, I endorse his perspective—he nonetheless displays
unmistakable resistance to, and disalignment with, the larger agenda and terms of the
interpretation.
Reviewing our talk-in-interaction from this session, Monty responds with various degrees
of resistance to all of my actions: from the extreme, where Monty responded with a “I don’t
know” non-answer to a reinterpretation, to the relatively mild, when he repeatedly repaired the
terms of my formulations. In this session, we did not see the pattern that has been true for the
patients whose therapies were “successful,” for the patients who, at this same point in their
treatments, tend to align and affiliate with enquiry sequence actions, such as formulations and
extensions, and disalign with interpretations. Even in those cases where Monty’s response to a
formulation included an agreement token, the elaboration of his turn entailed diversions from the
focus of the formulation. Keeping in mind that we should not conflate Monty’s resistance to my
actions with being a resistant person—couldn’t it be the case, after all, that my understandings
were, in every instance, somehow off target?—it is descriptively true that, at this late point in his
psychotherapy, he takes issue with the bulk of my displayed understandings.

Ending Psychotherapy: Adam and Keith
Early in my last session with Adam—session 112—he initiated talk on what he had
gained by coming to therapy, and he pointed to the value of an interaction in which he could let
down his “persona” and explore his “inner squishees” (i.e., his feelings). As the conversation
continued, he moved into a discussion of his “melancholy,” something that I had heard very little
of in previous sessions and that was not part of his presenting complaint when he began
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psychotherapy. It was normal for Adam to give lexical expression to feelings in his sessions, but
he had a characteristic way of withholding prosodic and nonverbal signs of emotion, he tended to
laugh during troubles-tellings, and I had never once seen him cry. But during our discussion
about melancholy—an example of one of his “inner squishees” that he kept obscured behind a
“persona”—he began to display signs of rising, embodied emotion, and it culminated in an
expression of emotion and intimate expression of his inner life that was peerless to anything else
I had observed during his therapy. The first extract I examine begins at about the point Adam
was reaching this emotional high-water mark.
Extract 34 [Adam, S112]
1 Pa:

right like I I: (.2) it's (.3) .snhh (.9)

2

when I say I've been scarred (.2) um (.2) it's that (.)

3

i- it's made it really hard to let go.
((visibly on verge of tears during production of utterance))

4

(.7)

5 Pa:

of: {(2.9)/((appears to swallow back tears))} ~f~eeling bad(hhh).
((laughs at end of utterance))

6

(.3)

7 Pa:

.Hhh (.) um

8

(1.4)

9 Th:

°melancholy (.) feeling bad°.
(("melancholy" recycles word used by patient a few minutes prior))

10

(.3)

11 Pa:

yeah.

12

(.3)

13 Pa:

yeah. (.) which (.2) um

14

(2.4)

15 Pa:

yeah. >in- in part because< the the th'=very intimate (.3)

16

kid me (.5) is sad an alOne.

17

(.4)

18 Pa:

an:d (.4) the (.) the process of: (.3) of avoiding homelessness

19

an (.) finding work an tryin'a (.3) find my groo:ve. (.) per se.
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20

(.9)

21 Pa:

uh has la(b)- te- w=e:::eh:: has (.4) callbacks (.5)

22

to me feeling (.5)

23

w'l=no has (.2) Has me feeling (.) isolated an sad sometimes.

24

(.2)

25 Pa:

which calls back to (.2) my proFOund sense of feeling

26

sad an alone as a kid. so

27

(.3)

28 Pa:

those (.6) those form=a (.3) very (.5) sAd rAinbow(hhh).

29 Th:

°hmm:°

Where the extract begins, Adam is in the midst of a description in which he confides to
me that his past hurts have made it really hard to let go...of feeling bad. His sadness is palpable,
and he is forced to delay an extension of his turn (“of...”), at line 5, as he swallows back his tears.
He laughs slightly as he completes the articulation of the turn, manifesting some troublesresistance that does the job of communicating that, “although there is this trouble, it is not getting
the better of him; he is managing; he is in good spirits and in a position to take the trouble
lightly” (Jefferson, 1984, p. 351). I remain aligned as a troubles recipient and affiliate with his
sadness—rather than the affective stance associated with his laughter—producing a mirroring
repeat (Muntigl et al., 2013) (line 9), spoken in a soft voice to affiliate with his emotional stance
(Fitzgerald & Leudar, 2010). Adam confirms the understanding contained in my turn and
enhances it, explaining that he feels melancholy because the very intimate kid in him is sad and
alone (lines 15-16). He then adds a series of extensions to his turn (lines 18-26), which describe
how his historical brush with homelessness and his recent struggles to find work (which he had
overcome by this point in his treatment) cause him to feel isolated and sad sometimes, in turn
calling back to his profound sense of feeling sad as a child. He moves on to provide a summary
and upshot of his display of understanding: using the proterm “those” to index his two sadnesses,
he states that his present sadness—over his struggles, during the past few years, to avoid
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homelessness and find work—and his past sadness—when he was a child—form a very sad
rainbow (line 28). In providing this complex understanding of his sadness, which points to
childhood sadness as the factor that makes it “hard to let go” of the most immediate and
contemporary sources of his sadness, Adam articulates a psychological view of his melancholy
that only the very best interpretations can offer. Though I do not rule out the probability that our
earlier discussions—about his onetime experience of de facto homelessness, the emotional toll of
struggling to find work, and countless memories of his childhood—as well as the reshaping of
understandings that occurred during these discussions, laid the foundations for Adam’s new
perspective on his sadness, he nonetheless gets to it on his own. In this session, my role in the
construction of Adam’s newfound understanding is as an affiliative troubles recipient—nothing
more.
For the sake of condensing this very long segment of conversation, I have deleted many
lines of his subsequent talk, seeking to preserve only what is essential for understanding the
interaction and maintaining the integrity of the sequence structure. I skip over most of the next
30 lines of the conversation, therefore, with the exception of an utterance by Adam (lines 45 -46)
that will be later cited, in part, as direct reported speech. Leading up to my turn-at-talk at line
64, Adam gives descriptions of how things are better now and how it shows, both his wife and
his son liking him a whole lot more for being less grumpy. When I begin speaking, after a 1.9
second gap at a transition-relevance place, it is to initiate a “retro sequence” that portrays its
occasioning as responsive to Adam’s earlier talk (Schegloff, 2007). Specifically, I launch a
“noticing” that, while the beginning of a new sequence, is launched from second position and
treats something that had transpired in Adam’s talk about sadness—namely, the affective, felt
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dimension of his talk—as the first position “source” of its action (Schegloff, 2007; Muntigl &
Horvath, 2014).
Extract 35 [Adam, S112]
45 Pa:

but I'm working on it. I'm getting better. (.)

46

an- an it shows. an it shows.

...
61 Pa:

[again.]

62 Th:

[°yeah°]

63

(1.9)

64 Th:

I':m=eh- you know I'm I'm struck by ah: th- the level of

65

your sadness that I can fee:l_

66

(1.0)

67 Th:

>to be honest I feel like I'm feeling it almost

68

for the first time.<

69

like I- I- (.2) I've known conceptually how sad you are?

70

(.3)

71 Th:

but today is the first day I'm rea::lly kinda feelin it.

72

I can hear it in your voice, (.2) I- I'm kinda resonating_

73

I- I'm- I'm- (.4) .hhh

74

it's HEavy Anyways. I'm rea:lly ges- getting a sense for it.

75

(.5)

76 Th:

an:dum:

77

(1.7)

78 Th:

w:hen I hear you saying like "↑well I'm working on it.

79

I'm gonna try to be more optimistic. an='m not gonna

80

°l:°et myself (.) get do:wn" I think (.) um my reaction

81

is one of almost protection. (.)

82

for (.7) you::r (.) MElancholy.

83

I almost want t'protectively say >"no no no< (.3)

84

like- (.2) this- (.) part of PATIENT-NAME needs to

85

be: (.2) given a space to breathe.

86

becuz I rea:lly I (.4)

87

my intuition tells me >he doesn't get many opportunities

88

to speak.<”
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89

(.2)

90 Th:

“if ever.” (.)

Pa:

((has been smiling slightly during therapist's long utterance)

My noticing, which begins at line 64, topicalizes Adam’s earlier affective stance of
sadness (Muntigl & Horvath, 2014) and accounts for the noticing by appealing to how “I can
feel” it and how “I can hear it in your voice” (lines 65, 71-72). The positioning of the noticing
after Adam’s apparent retreat from on-topic talk about sadness to talk about things getting better
seems designed to shift the topic back to his feelings (Muntigl & Horvath, 2014). It also
affiliates with Adam’s sadness as something alive and felt in the present conversation, and it
formulates his sadness as his (cf., “your sadness”, line 65), in contrast, perhaps, to his earlier
description of the “intimate kid me [who] is sad and alone” (lines 15-16). We also notice that it
upgrades the description of sadness to something that is “heavy” (line 74).
Rather than wait for confirmation of my noticing, I launch a new action across lines 7690. I begin by portraying as direct reported speech (Holt, 2000) the description, by Adam,
“Well, I’m working on it—I’m gonna try to be more optimistic and not gonna let myself get
down” (lines 78-80), though only the utterance “I’m working on it” had been used by him (line
45). I then use this report as the basis for a challenge (Voutilainen & Peräkylä, 2016), designed
as direct reported speech of my inner “reaction” to how he intends to approach his “melancholy”:
“No no no, like this part of Adam needs to be given a space to breathe, because I really...my
intuition tells me he doesn’t get many opportunities to speak...if ever” (lines 83-90).
Adam’s response to my challenge begins with a receipt (“I hear that”, line 89) and an
assessment (“It’s so rough”, line 93), which, while disaligned with the terms and the overall
focus of my display of understanding (I did not characterize as “rough” the notion that Adam’s
melancholy doesn’t get many opportunities to speak—I suggested it “needs” to be given these
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opportunities), initially seems to function as an agreeing action. Starting in line 95, though,
Adam’s response clearly assumes the force of a disagreement.
Extract 36 [Adam, S112]
87

my intuition tells me >he doesn't get many opportunities

88

to speak.<”

89

(.2)

90 Th:

“if ever.” (.)

Pa:

((has been smiling slightly during therapist's long utterance)

89 Pa:

Uu::h(hhh) (1.8) I hear that.

90

(.5)

91 Pa:

i- i- (.) hhh

92

(.3)

93 Pa:

.hhh it's so: rough.

94

(.4)

95 Pa:

because inn:- in a wa:y (1.4) he does?

96

(1.0)

97 Pa:

u:m (.6) by like all the grumping: (an) grap-

98

like that's an expression of tha(t). (.)

99

.hh e- i- not in- in direct terms. but in

100

[the

(.3) like it's always leaking out s:omewh(h)ere.

101 Th: [°yeah°
102

(.5)

103 Pa: [ .Hhh] (.) Uh::
104 Th: [(£ £)]
105

(.4)

106 Th: derivative (.4) s:tuff.
107

(.8)

108 Pa: .Hhh (.2) yeah (.2) But it- it's hhh
109

(6.6)

110 Pa: .hh (.) it's a function of safety.
111

(1.5)

In the extension of his assessment, Adam disagrees with my understanding that his
melancholy doesn’t get many opportunities to speak: “he [the part of Adam that feels
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melancholy] does” (line 95). He continues his turn and accounts for his disagreement by
pointing to his grumpiness, which he characterizes as an indirect expression, or leaking out, of
his sadness. I then formulate his grumpiness in line 106 as “derivative stuff”, and Adam
responds with another disagreement, constructed as an [agreement token + disagreement] turn
(Pomerantz, 1984a): his grumpiness is “a function of safety” (line 110).
Turning to an overview of this segment of interaction from Adam’s last session of
psychotherapy, we come across a phenomenon that has not appeared in any of the other sessions
I have analyzed. Over the course of our talk-in-interaction, Adam is seen using my displays of
understanding as scaffolding to construct his own psychologically nuanced perspectives on his
sadness, regardless of whether his turns carry the social actions of agreement or disagreement.
It does not matter whether I am merely mirroring a few lexical items, challenging his
understanding, or formulating his talk—in each case, whether agreeing or disagreeing with me,
Adam arrives at an even more complex understanding of his sadness. In the most exemplary
case, Adam uses my mirroring repeat—“melancholy, feeling bad” (line 9)—as the jumping off
point for a sophisticated explanation of how his present struggles to “let go” of things that sadden
him is rooted in the sadness of his childhood. Other patients, at other points in the trajectory of
their psychotherapies, might have responded to my punctuation of their emotional lexis with
mere agreement tokens or further description of their feelings; but Adam uses this merest of
affiliative actions to produce an understanding of his sadness that rivals complex, therapistinitiated interpretations. Even when disagreeing with me, as when he rejects my understanding
of his grumpiness as derivative of his sadness, he does so to enrich his display of
understanding—in this case, moving beyond his previous account of grumpiness as an indirect
expression of sadness and characterizing it as “a function of safety” (relative to his sadness). To
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conclude, we may describe Adam’s contribution to our talk-in-interaction in this session as
frequently disaligning but always in the service of advancing a therapeutically meaningful
understanding of his troubles, using my perspectives and views as scaffolding for his
elaborations.

The next segment of talk-in-interaction I will analyze comes from Keith’s final session—
session 130—and focuses on an interpretation sequence that occurs about 30 minutes into our
conversation. Leading up to the interpretation, Keith has been talking about, amongst other
things, his cats, who who have gotten into a full on brawl almost every single night (lines 29-33).
He names as the main culprit his oldest cat, “Mama” (line 55). The extract below highlights the
salient utterances from his telling:
Extract 37 [Keith, S130]
12 Pa:

to say iss (.5) not been a good week is prump-

13

is probably an understatement. I mean it (.2)

14

prolly is closer to it's been hell.

...
22

my (.2) family an:: #ah:# it's jus bee:n

23

(1.3)

24

And The CATS.

25

(2.1)

26 Th:

°getting into places¿°

27

(1.4)

28 Pa

<a:mo:ng other things.>

29

I s- think that every (.) single (.) night

30

for the last week or two weeks (.5) they have gotten into

31

>not jus a little< (.) tsss >rAh=rAh< ((imitating cat fight))

32

(.9)

33 Pa:

I mean::=like (.5) full on braw:l almost.
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34

(.8)

35 Th:

t=↑huh

36

(.7)

37 Pa:

an °it's like=hh°

38

(1.7)

39 Pa:

an I'm jus- I'm getting fed up with it.

40

unfortunately (.3) I know the main (.)

41

eh=Uh: the main culprit.

...
54

Pa: but (.) I jus I don't know what to do. (.)

55

I mea:n (.5) it (.4) it's MAma.

56

it's the oldest ca:t.

57

(1.1)

Keith informs me, during this telling (omitted from the extract above), that he doesn’t
want to give Mama away to another family and also doesn’t want to “put her into a cage.” Later
in the conversation, preparing for the interpretation that is still about two and a half minutes
away, I produce a request for confirmation of this understanding. Keith replies with a
confirmation, and before continuing with further talk about his cats, he announces that he has
recalled “one of the big things that dad and I didn’t see eye to eye on” (line 123). He indicates
that he will “come back to that if I have time”, though in point of fact he never does return to the
topic. Nonetheless, it appears that some memory or story about his father has come to mind
precisely while discussing his cats, the significance of which will appear later when I deliver my
interpretation.
Extract 38 [Keith, S130]
110 Pa: I dunno. I=jist- it- (.3) <starting to> (2.1)
111

add to (.) the stress.

112 Th: huh
113

(.5)

114 Th: >(an)the options you're thinking about is< I mean
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115

>you can do the cage or you could give her away:.<

116

(.)

117 Th: those er: (.2)
118 Pa: i- (.3) that's unfortunately seeming like the: two119

only two options.=

120 Th: =hmm
121

(.9)

122 Pa: an now I know what it was123

one of the big things thet dad an I didn't see eye=t'eye on.

124
...

°>but I'll come back to that if I< (.2) #have time#.° (.)

His continues on-topic talk up until the point where extract 39 begins, where he produces
a summary of his stance towards the problem of his cats—“I just don’t know how to deal with it”
(line 161)—and proposes, thereby, the possible closing of the sequence (Schegloff, 2007).
Underscoring this analysis, his turn is followed by a series of inter-turn gaps (lines 162, 164,
166), reaching or exceeding the standard maximum tolerance for silence (Jefferson, 1988). At
this point, where Keith’s telling appears to be winding down, I produce an interpretation (lines
167-197).
Extract 39 [Keith, S130]
160 Pa: °an so it's like=hh° (.9) °
161

I- I jus- I don't know how ta deal with it.°

162

(.9)

163 Pa: you kno:w
164

(1.1)

165 Pa: an I mean
166

(2.1)

167 Th: I don't think this is gonna: (1.0)
168

magically solve anything but can I make kinduva w::ild

169

interpretation¿ (.) [migh]t be relevant¿

170 Pa:
171

[(

]

(.7)

172 Th: uum: (.3) I=m'n (.) you've got the fact that she's called ↓ma:ma.
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173

an you've already sortuv (.2) made a link to your parents.

174

(.5)

175 Th: u:m (.4) an (.2) the fact that you considered these two options¿
176

reminded me of something¿ you considered either putting her in a

177

ca:ge (.) or maybe giving her away:, (.4)

178

an I remember the time that you: tried to put yourSelf in a cage.

179

(.6)

180 Th: i.e. Jail_ (.) when you were fighting with (.5) your Own mama. (.)
181

right?

182

(.4)

183 Th: uum: (.) I wonder if (.) one of the things that's triggering about
184

the cats fighting is it reminds you: of your ↑parents fighting.

185

(.5)

186 Th: an how you ↑felt.
187

especially when you were younger that you only had

188

two ways to get away from your parents.

189

you could either (.5) °put yourself in a° cage:, (.5)

190

but that would be ↑terrible.

191

you know go to jail or something, (.5)

192

or run ↑away. which was terrible.

193

(.2)

194 Th: you felt (.3) like you feel now with your ↑cats (.3)
195

the=you had only two solutions an neither were real solutions. (.)

196

you felt (.5) stuck in this horrible situation with people

197

fighting.

198

(.7)

My interpretation—what is, rather, better described as a pre-interpretation, at lines 167169 (Schegloff, 2007)—is an interesting case of one of those social actions that labels itself
before its production. After projecting what will come after it with the label a “wild
interpretation,” my pre-interpretation segues into building up the “evidential grounding” (Weiste,
Voutilainen, & Peräkylä, 2016) or “puzzle” (Vehviläinen, 2003) of the interpretation. Utilizing a
list construction, I point out the following “facts”: (1) Keith’s cat is called “Mama” (172); (2)
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Keith has made a “link” between Mama and his parents (line 173); (3) Keith has considered the
two options of putting Mama “in a cage” or “maybe giving her away” (lines 175-177); and (4)
Keith once tried to put himself in a “cage, i.e., jail” when he was fighting with his own “mama”
(lines 178-180). (For the sake of anonymity, I won’t enlarge on the backstory of how Keith once
tried to put himself in jail.) I seek confirmation of the facts as I have laid them out with a tag
question—“right?” (line 181); but when a response isn’t immediately forthcoming, I move into
the delivery of the interpretation proper, designed with a turn-initial epistemic marker that
downgrades my epistemic access (“I wonder...”, line 183). I present the understanding that when
his cats fight, it reminds him of how he felt the time when his parents were fighting (lines 183187): he felt that he could either put himself in a cage, i.e., jail, or run away (lines 189-192)—
two solutions, which, just as with his cats, were not real solutions (lines 194-195). Hence, he felt
stuck (line 196).
Keith’s extended response is not clearly an agreement or a disagreement, and it responds
to a different understanding than the one displayed in the interpretation (extract 40, below).
Some authors (Weiste & Peräkylä, 2014) consider responses like Keith’s, with its epistemic
markers of uncertainty (“probably accurate”, line 201; “I guess I can kinda see that”, line 214),
as disagreements, but were I compelled to say one way or another, I would be more inclined to
see in Keith’s response a kind of conditional agreement—conditional, that is, on his epistemic
access, which he does not claim to have. On the other hand, if we read Keith’s talk in lines 215227 as an elaboration of his response to the interpretation (and it is not clear that this is the case),
I would characterize his action as disagreement, since those lines would then amount to a
contradiction of his received understanding that I have interpreted his emotions as “explosive.”
These considerations are perhaps besides the point, though, for just as a disagreement is usually
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disaligning (Sidnell, 2010), Keith’s response is disaligning by resisting the agenda and terms of
the interpretation (Stivers & Hayashi, 2010). He takes up and responds to the interpretation as
though it were forwarding the understanding that he sees his own emotions in his pets (lines 205214).
Extract 40 [Keith, S130]
199 Pa: >hm mm<
200

(1.4)

201 Pa: ↑m:-=ssounds probaly accurate.
202

(.2)

203 Th: °°hm:°°
204

(.8)

205 Pa: I mean (.6) I know that before you said th' sometimes pets (.3)
206

will: (.5)

207 Th: °°oh yeah.=h°°
208

(.2)

209 Pa: you know:: (1.3) hh I forget the w- (.3)
210

or I'm: drawing a blank on the right word.

211

(.3)

212 Pa: Exhibit the emotions of their owner:,=an: (.7)
213 Th: °<yeah>°=
214 Pa: =.hhhhh I guess I can kinda see tha:t.
215

I mean:: things have been extremely stressful prolly the las

216

two weeks en: (.8) I mean you had mention: (1.1)

217

u(h)m wh'n THERAPIST-NAME was here that (.) .hh (.) you know (.4)

218

about (.8) #u#h:m (2.1)

219

mm- My- mm- me not being as explosive an: (.6)

220

I think the meds h've (.2) definitely helped tha:t.=

221 Th: =>hmm<
222

(.4)

223 Pa: uu:m:
224

(1.0)

225 Pa: I- I would say that they've prolly helped me sleep,
226

they've helped me: (.7) keep my (.) emotions in: check an
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227

everything an (.)

228 Th: °hm°
229

(.6)

Reviewing this segment of talk-in-interaction, we arrive at the unexpected finding that
Keith—a patient that I have considered a priori, in this analysis, as having a “successful”
psychotherapy—does not respond to a major interpretation, at the terminus of his treatment, with
an aligning response. His response pattern to an interpretation is largely the same as his response
pattern in session 105, constituting what I termed “complex resistance.” He appears superficially
to promote the activity sequence of the interpretation, but a closer examination of his response
reveals resistance to the vision and related lexical choices of the interpretation.

Ending Psychotherapy: Extracts from “unsuccessful” treatments
I turn now to Jon and his penultimate session (session 6), which came not long before he
canceled what would have been his eighth session, failed to reschedule with the clinic office, and
did not return my phone calls. Jon, as I have pointed out before, seemed to prefer to use his
sessions to reminisce on his past, and while my clinical orientation—broadly psychodynamic at
the time—was favorably disposed to joining in this kind of talk, I also felt an obligation to attend
to his sadness, which he had evoked in other sessions and regarding which I gave special weight
in my clinical formulations of his presenting complaint. In the following excerpts, I track how
our talk collided around my pursuit of the topic of his sadness, building up in the process a
picture of Jon’s disaffiliation with my activity sequences and permitting some (qualitative)
generalizations about our talk-in-interaction.
Where I begin is about 9 minutes into the session. At line 1, I initiate an “itemized news
inquiry” (Button & Casey, 1985), designed as a Wh-question, that seeks to nominate “sadness”
as a topic for talk. It performs its news inquiry function, in part, by requesting to be brought up
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to date on the latest developments in his experience of sadness: “how’ve you been doing in terms
of feeling sad...you know, since we discussed” (lines 1-3). He delays responding for 4 seconds,
which strongly suggests an upcoming dispreferred response (Pomerantz, 1984a), and follows it
with a topic curtailing utterance that appears to have no relationship to the inquiry: “I’ve been
working” (line 5). A full 7.8 seconds elapses during which Jon does not elaborate his response
and I do not pursue a response that is better aligned with my question (Pomerantz, 1984b). We
might be tempted to read Jon’s response as displaying an understanding of the question that
might be rephrased as, “What have you been doing about your feeling sad”; but when Jon
continues his turn at lines 7-14, describing how the other “older people” he spends time with feel
the same way he does—i.e., they don’t want to be old, but they have to live with it—it appears
that Jon had accurately understood the question. In light of the long inter-turn gaps
accompanying his response and its significant departure from the terms and agenda of the
question, it seems justified to characterize it as highly resistant.
Extract 41 [Jon, S06]
1 Th:

how've you been doing in terms of feeling sad.

2

(.3)

3 Th:

(y'know) since we discussed.

4

(4.0)

5 Pa:

I've been workin.

6

(7.8)

7 Pa:

tch been aroun a lotta ol- (.2) older people_ (.6)

8

(n'their) seventies (.) eighties (.6) nineties (1.1)

9

°an uh:° (1.7) they feel the same way I do.

10

(.8)

11 Pa:

they don' wanna be o:ld, (.5)

12

but they hav'da live with it.

13

(1.2)

14 Pa:

they hurt, (.) (an) pains an everything.
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15

(2.5)

16 Pa:

but I been this way since I was (AGE).

17

(1.8)

18 Pa:

too soon.

19

(.2)

20 Pa:

an that's been (1.6) thirty Years: somethin like this.

21

(1.8)

22 Pa:

normally (y')don't get like this til (.) late fifties¿ sixties¿

23

(1.2)

24 Pa:

when you’re enda- end of your working: (.4) #°ah°#

25

(2.1)

26 Th:

for thirty years you've been feeling sad about your limitations.

27

(1.6)

28 Pa:

I've been hurtin, I've been (1.2) .hh been tryin ta exercise.

29

(.3)

30 Pa:

play racketba:ll:,=those things when I was on active duty¿ (.)

31 Th:

hmm

32

(.2)

Support for my analysis that Jon was resisting my inquiry at lines 1-3 comes in the form
of his response to my formulation at line 26. The talk that my formulation targets for summary
appears across lines 14-20, where Jon describes feeling physical pain for the past thirty years. I
formulate his talk as carrying the meaning, “For thirty years you’ve been feeling sad about your
limitations,” and Jon responds with a disagreement: He has been hurting for the past thirty years
(line 28). Just as Jon had elaborated his response to my inquiry about “feeling sad” with talk
about “hurt” and “pains,” here too he resists an understanding that focuses on being sad,
replacing that term with “hurt.”
Jon proceeds to transition step-wise into a story from his earlier years (omitted from
transcript). He describes how he used to ride his bicycle on a long paved track and how, one
day, he found himself face up on the ground with a broken collarbone. In his subsequent talk, he
elaborates on the progression, over the years, of his bodily troubles, and where extract 42 begins,
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after a long pause in his telling, I seek to retopicalize his sadness with a request for information
(lines 147-158). I ask him to describe his sadness to me, where he feels it, and what it’s like.
Perhaps recalling Jon’s non-relevant response to my earlier itemized news inquiry, I design this
request for information with a number of question words and frame as a relevant response one
that describes something from the spectrum of the “varieties of sadness” (line 154). This time
around, Jon produces a relevant reply rich in information: His sadness is like when you’re away
from your family and you miss them and you dwell on it too much (lines 160-164). He
culminates this description with an informing: “I miss my body” (line 169).
Extract 42 [Jon, S06]
144 Pa: some point where I get cramps in m' legs, (.)
145

cramps in m' bo:dy, (.3) mu- muscle spasms_

146

(6.4)

147 Th: >can I ask you a little more about< (.5) your (.3) feeling sad.
148

(.)

149 Th: c- could you ↑describe it to me.
150

(.4)

151 Th: ho- (.8) w- where you feel it.
152

(.7)

153 Th: an- an what it's like. (.)
154

y'kno'=there' different (.3) varieties of sadness.

155

I don' wanna take it fer (.2) [gra]nted.

156 Pa:
157

[ya]
(.2)

158 Th: that I know what you mean,
159

(6.5)

160 Pa: it's like when you're (.2) away from your family¿
161

(2.0)

162

an: (1.1) you miss them.

163

(1.1)

164 Pa: an: you dwell on it too much an you dus (.9)
165

Nothing nothing else matters. (.) you jus (.) thhh (1.0)
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166

well I've felt that (.) same type of (.9)

167

sadness: (.4) with my body.

168

(.2)

169 Pa: I miss my body.
170

(1.8)

171 Pa: I used to lift weights, I used to run, I (.) ride bicycles
172

I did (1.2) climbed, (.7) I climbed o:n (.3)

173

the mountain da NAME was.

174

(.7)

175 Pa: on the lower? (1.4) reaches_
176

(.2)

177 Th: huh
178

(.2)

179 Pa: i'was (.3) it wass- (.5) steep planed.
180

an every once in a while you had=ta (.2)

Something to note is that Jon’s informing that he misses his body concords with my
formulation that Jon had earlier disagreed with—that for thirty years he has been feeling sad
about his (physical) limitations. Buttressing this assumption, we see that Jon continues his turnat-talk with descriptions of the physical activities he used to do (lines 171-173), which connects
missing his body with the physical exercise he is no longer able to engage in. Perhaps the earlier
formulation had not been sufficiently grounded in Jon’s talk to compel agreement; but in any
case, it becomes clear that Jon holds—or arrives at—a similar understanding to the one I
displayed.
My particular involvement in this sequence of talk is notable, as well, for my failure to
produce actions that would have sustained the topic of missing his body. The key point at which
such an action could have occurred is line 170, where a nearly two-second transition-relevance
place appears. In the absence of my recipiency to his informing, Jon seamlessly transitions into a
telling that focuses on a mountain climbing experience, and in the process, an opportunity for
doing therapeutic work around the understanding of his sadness slips away.
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About a minute later in the conversation, however, I seek to move the topic back to his
sadness and his prior formulation of it (i.e., “I miss my body”) with a request for confirmation of
the understanding that Jon misses his body like a family member (line 211, below). He produces
a minimal confirmation in overlap with my utterance and proceeds with his telling. After a long
3.4 second pause that makes speaker transition relevant, I go on to produce an “alternative
question” (Hayano, 2013) (lines 220-221) that requests more information about missing his
body: in conjunction with rubbing the part of my body associated with the heart (broadly
connected with emotion in many cultures), followed by a gesture to my head (indexing
thoughts), I inquire into where in his body he experiences the feeling of “missing,” my gestures
indicating a preference for a response that takes up one of two areas of the body. Before he
responds, I redo the question and inquire—leveraging the fact that Jon had earlier described his
sadness in terms of missing his body—where in his body he feels his “sadness” (lines 223-225).
Extract 43 [Jon, S06]
209 Pa: tch I've climbed that before.
210

(.7)

211 Th: this is the body that you: (.2) you miss like a family member.
212

(.6)

213 Th: b[ody (that) climb mountains] (in) the MOUNTAIN-NAME.
214 Pa:
215

[right

(°

°) ]

(1.9)

216 Pa: ride bicycl=I used to ride bicycles for hours.
217

(1.9)

218 Pa: bicycle,
219

(3.4)

220 Th: an when you (.2) when you miss it? (.) dy- (.6)
221

you're missing it?

(.9)

missing it?

(places hand on own heart)) ((gestures to own head))
222

(.5)

223 Th: where're you feeling this.
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((rubs heart region with palm))
224

(2.5)

225 Th: sadness.
226

(1.1)

227 Pa: °right here°
228

(.8)

229 Th: ((touches back of own head with palm))
230 Pa: °°yeah°°
231

(1.2)

232 Pa: now what's this called back here.
233

(3.0)

234 Th: the::¿ (.3)
235 Pa: medulla.
236

(.6)

Jon’s response, which involves touching the back of his head, broadly aligns with the
constraints of the alternative question, but he introduces a shift in understanding that focuses on
the biomedical/physiological location of his sadness—“the medulla” (line 235)—and he fails to
take up the key term of “sadness.” Thus, my attempt to prompt expansion of Jon’s experience of
sadness, through a focus on his embodied experience of it, is effectively resisted.
A few lines later in the transcript, after I confirm that Jon gets headaches in the same
place where he has located his sadness, I try again to elicit expansion of his talk about sadness.
This time, I employ a demand type, specific expansion elicitor (Muntigl & Zabala, 2008),
designed as a Wh-question, that enjoins him to tell me the difference between a headache and
feeling sad (lines 259-264). My strategy appears to be to force Jon to distinguish between that
which is physical in nature and that which is emotional, thereby opening a path for on-topic talk
about the feeling of sadness.
Extract 44 [Jon, S06]
259 Th: You can tell the difference between a headache an (.) feeling sad?
260

is that right?
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261

(.3)

262

°°>right<°°

263

(.7)

264

what's the difference then.

265

(.6)

266 Pa: .hhh (.2) Hhhhhh
267

(3.2)

268 Pa: one (1.7) is the physical pain, (1.1)
269

well=there's the (.2) actual {(or)/(where)} nerves is

270

sending false signal_ (2.0) an the sadness is a: (.) emotion.

271

(.4)

272 Th: what I mean is umm: (.6) if the headache was like (.9)
273

I dunno a Du:ll (.3) Pain: (.2)

274 Pa: #°hm[m°#
275 Th:

[sadness:¿ (.) #uh# ha- how'da- how does it fee:l (.3)

276

differently.

277

>wha- wha- wha-< (.2) the the experience like.

278

(1.7)

279 Th: less pressure, more pressure, (.6)
280

more intense, less intense,

281

(11.5)

282 Pa: .hhh (.3) it's ↑less:.
283

(.6)

284 Pa: °less intense I think {(than)/(the)} sadness.°
285

(3.2)

286 Pa: pain is (severest).
287

(1.6)

288 Pa: °hhh:°
289

(1.9)

290 Pa: it's like getting my body too.=an it (.7) pains.
291

(1.6)

292 Pa: but (.) there's no: (.8) can't see any cause of the pain.
293

(.9)

294 Pa: other than the fact (1.3) the nerve's telling my body (1.1)
295

nerves is telling the (.2) brain (.8) that there's pain there.

296

(.5)
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In response to my demand expansion elicitor, Jon takes up a literal reading of my turn
and defines sadness as “a emotion” (line 270). This prompts me to repair his understanding of
my turn and reproduce it as a request for information about how sadness feels differently from
headaches (lines 272-277). A gap of 1.7 seconds ensues, and I offer alternatives that would be
relevant replies to the question: “less pressure, more pressure; more intense, less intense” (lines
279-280). What follows is the longest inter-turn silence in the transcript, lasting 11.5 seconds.
When Jon assumes speakership, he does so with an aligning response that describes sadness as
less intense than his pain (line 284), but his subsequent elaboration expands on his pain, not his
sadness. In this way he resists further talk on his sadness, and as the extract shows, he quickly
transitions back into a biomedical/physiological frame of understanding.
Taking stock of the extracts we have analyzed and the phenomena observed in them, Jon
displays high resistance in almost every instance in which I attempt to topicalize, formulate,
elicit, or expand his talk about sadness. Furthermore, his resistance to producing descriptions of,
or otherwise expanding on, his sadness appears in “enquiry sequences” (Bercelli, Rossano, &
Viaro, 2013)—which is to say that Jon almost universally resists the sort of ‘bread and butter’
actions—like requests for information and itemized news inquiries—that the patients with
“successful” treatments more frequently do not. While his responses often align with the most
basic premises of my questions—as when, for instance, he responds to an alternative question
about the location of his sadness by naming his “medulla” (made relevant by my gesturing to my
head)—in resisting what my questions aim to accomplish, he displays disaffiliation (Stivers &
Hayashi, 2010). We also note that Jon competes with my attempts to topicalize sadness by
overwhelming my emotion-based terms with talk about pain and bodily hurt, which he frames in
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a biomedical/physiological discourse. In this sense, we may say that Jon more generally resists
an emotional/psychological frame of talk.
In one instance in the transcript, we observed Jon produce a response to a request for
information that did affiliate and align with its prompt for descriptions of his sadness. In what
we might characterize as a compromise between, on the one hand, the preference—embodied in
my question—for a psychological rendering of his experience and, on the other hand, his
rootedness in a physiological frame of understanding, he describes his sadness as being like
missing his body, like when you’re away from your family and you miss them (extract 42, lines
160-169). In this one instance in which Jon clearly aligned with my therapeutic project, I decline
opportunities to produce actions that might further on-topic talk about sadness; and so it would
seem that I, too, am implicated in an overall resistance to the topic.

I move now to Monty and his last session—session 40—and examine a storytelling in
which he describes getting a new job at a sushi restaurant. It occurs about 8 minutes into the
session and is introduced with a temporal locator (after we were here last Friday, line 1)
(Jefferson, 1978). What is of especial importance in the telling is not the content of the story
itself but its possible completion points or boundaries, where the recipient of the story—myself,
in this case—is implicated in producing a response that segues the interlocutors back into turnby-turn talk (Jefferson, 1978). The most fitted responses that collaborate in exiting from a
storytelling are those that continue topically coherent talk, produce talk that is shown to be
“triggered” by the story, or engage in talk that displays how it is related to the story (Jefferson,
1978). What is not implicated at possible story completions is continuers, nods, and other
devices that display the recipient’s expectation that the story will continue, that it is somehow not
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complete. At the possible completion points of storytellings, such actions are potentially
disaligning and disaffiliative (Stivers, 2008).
In the extracts from a storytelling by Monty, it is precisely these sorts of disaligning
responses that I produce at multiple transition relevance, story completion places. These are
generally locations where Monty has produced an assessment or other formulation of the upshot
of his telling, which display his stance towards the events or persons described in it (Jefferson,
1978; Schegloff, 2007). Because the storytelling is long, I have condensed it and focused on
those sequential environments where Monty proposes closure of his story and talk by me is
implicated.
Extract 45 [Monty, S40]
1 Pa:

after:: (2.6) guess we were here las' friday.

2

(.9)

3 Pa:

(sa) (

4

I was hanging out with NAME (.) an we jus (1.9)

5

we happen jus t'go (.) into this sushi shop. (.)

6

which is kinda near my house_

7

(.8)

) (1.3)

...
16 Pa:

But (.) they were gettin=hh (.2) swamped an he said I (.)

17

you know (1.2) I needa: (1.2) t'hire a ↑couple. (.)

18

an I was like well I can start tomorrow.

19

(.6)

20 Th:

[hm]

21 Pa:

[s ]o (.) I started (.) the next day.=

22 Th:

=W(Hh)

23

(.3)

...
41 Pa:

°so (

)(

) (yet) but ° (.2) .sfhh (.3)
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42

worked a couple days.

43

(.9)

44 Pa:

°so° two or- (1.1)

45

°two° (.2) two days at the (.5) at sushi place_

46

(1.3)

47 Pa:

it's fine. (.) um

48

(.9)

49 Pa:

it's weird, (1.0) first (.2) >it's only- there's only like eight

50

or nine people that work there an it's all:< (.5)

...
58 Pa:

so it's (.) you know.

59

(.4)

60 Pa:

so i- (1.7) 's not hostile.

61

(1.0)

62 Pa:

°a-° at all. you know?=

63 Th:

=°hm:°

64 Pa:

.Snfhh (.4) um:

65

(1.2)

66 Pa:

so I guess that helps.

67

(.4)

68 Pa:

u:m:

69

(3.0)

70 Pa:

s-=um:

71

(2.3)

The first point at which Monty produces an upshot or possible conclusion of his story
comes at line 21, with a so-prefaced utterance that describes the result or endpoint of a series of
events leading up to it: “so I started the next day.” I go to respond in the next turn—what
appears to have been the beginning of a Wh-question—but abandon the TCU-in-progress; and
after a pause, Monty continues his telling, providing descriptions of the employment process, his
brother’s earlier attempt to get hired at the restaurant, and other details (omitted from the
extract).
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At a later point, Monty signals a renewed, possible completion of his story with a
summary of his telling (so, worked a couple days...so two days at the sushi place, lines 41-45)
and an assessment: “it’s fine” (line 47). The “standard maximum tolerance” for about 1 second
of silence ensues (Jefferson, 1988), and in the absence of recipiency to his story exit device, he
continues his telling. Shortly after, Monty produces another closure-implicative assessment of
his story, describing the workplace as “not hostile” (line 60). Following an inter-turn gap in
which I decline uptake, he extends his assessment (it’s not hostile...at all, line 62) and explicitly
selects me for next speaker with the tag, “you know?” I respond with a continuer, which in this
sequential position is highly disaligning and seems to leave Monty unsure how to proceed as he
trails off, punctuating the long silences that ensue with a series of “um’s” (lines 63-71).
This pattern repeats as Monty continues with his telling, adding new descriptions about
how his sense of “panic” when he began the job “quit” over time and how he is “enjoying the
work.” At line 80 (below), he uses an assessment of the disappearance of his anxiety (“it’s
good”) as a storytelling exit device, which fails to trigger topically coherent subsequent talk from
me; and again at lines 97-98, he summarizes his stance towards his experience of working at the
restaurant (so you know, it’s not stressful...), implicating a response from me that might transition
the talk-in-interaction out of the storytelling. I, however, respond with a continuer (line 100),
signaling my stance that he should continue talking (Schegloff, 1981). He does but only to
produce another story-completion assessment (“it’s weird”, line 102) that recycles the lexical
item “weird.” No response, however, is forthcoming from me (line 103).
Extract 45 [Monty, S40]
...
76 Pa:

Tuesday or Wednesday °or (somethin).° (.)

77

panic jus kinda (.) quit.
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78

(.9)

79 Th:

°°hm:°°

80 Pa:

it's good.

81

(.2)

82 Pa:

um:

83

(1.0)

84 Pa:

.snhh

85

(1.9)

86 Pa:

it's wei- it's uh: >>an- an uh:=only been there a couple'a days<<

87

but it's weird to like actually (1.4) enjoying the work.

...
97 Pa:

so I you know (.9) it's not stressfull even if it is (.3)

98

stressful (.) you know (.) peak hours or whatever.

99

(.6)

100 Th: hmm
101

(1.2)

102 Pa: so yeah=h i(t)=uh: (.7) been in turn you kin'a gets- it's weird.
103

(1.0)

104 Pa: get=o- (1.9)

Finally, at line 120, I make a move to do something other than encourage Monty’s telling,
from which he has sought on so many occasions to exit. I formulate (Antaki, 2008) his
preceding talk, proposing that there was a short span of time when he was waking up with panic,
and then that stopped (lines 120-122, below). He responds with minimal agreement and we
lapse into silence (lines 124-125), following which I produce a request for confirmation of a very
similar understanding, that when he had just been hired, there were a few days when he was
waking up feeling panicked (lines 126-128). In the elaboration of his response (lines 129-142),
he accounts for his agreement, but then a long silence appears in the conversation, at line 145,
and we seem to be at a standstill in terms of how to proceed. The formulations do not appear to
be in the service of preparing for an interpretation, only minimally transforming Monty’s talk,
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and no requests for information that might begin to build up a basis for an interpretation
materialize.
Extract 46 [Monty, S40]
...
118 Pa: u:m=hh
119

(.4)

120 Th: there=iz=a short span(a) time (.2) where you were (.4) just hired
121

with them when you were still waking up with panic. an then (.6)

122

an then for some reason a few days ago: (.) that stopped.

123

(3.2)

124 Pa: yeah, (.6) u:h
125

(5.0)

126 Th: on ↑Those days:? (.) when you (.) you- you had jus been hired an
127

there=were'a few days there where you were waking up an (.3)

128

feeling panicke[d? ( )]

129 Pa:

[I mean] on: Ss- (.3) on ↑Sunday: (.7) before going

130

in there fer the first #day I=('uess) still did.# (.)

131

on Monday: (.7) I guess (.) Monday an maybe Tuesday (.) I still

132

was.

133

(.4)

134 Th: °°huh°°
135

(.7)

136 Pa: umm
137

(.6)

138 Pa: Wednesday I worked. (.) an I (.) don't believe (1.0) I did, (.5)
139

yesterday er today I certainly didn't.

140

(.3)

141 Th: Hm=
142 Pa: =wake up that way.
143

(.2)

144 Pa: .snfff
145

(6.7)
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After this brief formulation-agreement sequence, Monty returns to his storytelling with
another signal of the possible completion of his telling, repeating the assessment he had made at
line 102: “it’s weird actually” (line 146). I decline speaker transition, and Monty continues his
telling through line 168, where he produces what will be his last summarization of his story,
displaying his stance towards his new job as a place that’s “not overbearing.” After I respond
with my umpteenth continuer and a long inter-turn silence, Monty explicitly formulates that his
telling is completed (“and that’s about it”, line 176), and when I again fail to produce a response
that might return us to turn-by-turn talk, he unilaterally ends the sequence by transitioning into
talk about one of his academic courses.
Extract 47 [Monty, S40]
146 Pa: you know (.3) uh: (1.6) yeah like I said it's: weird actually
147

(2.0)

...
168 Pa: it's=a:: (1.1) I dunno (.4) it's=a (1.4) conveniently (.5)
169

°ta° I guess enough (.5) stress slash work (.4) slash

170

responsibility that's it's not (.2) overbearing,

171

(.5)

172 Th: °°hmm°°
173

(4.6)

174 Pa: °°(I) 'unno°°
175

(6.0)

176 Pa: an that's about it.
177

(.3)

178 Pa: um
179

(2.4)

180 Pa: the one class (.4) one of (.) my poly=sci class is a=uh (1.3)
181

°it's unrelated but° (.5)

During the course of his storytelling, I count no less than nine failures to align to the
possible completion of his story! Had I produced a relevant action that would have transitioned
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the conversation into subsequent, topically related talk, Adam’s story might have spread across a
mere 21 lines of the transcript; but instead, it was made to struggle along for 176 lines. During
his telling, there is a marked absence of actions that might have shaped his talk and advanced
institutional—that is, psychotherapeutic—interests; and the dearth of affiliative responses to his
telling, relegated largely to a single formulation-response sequence, displayed a noticeable lack
of empathic involvement. Whereas, in our analysis of one of Jon’s last sessions, it was he who
seemed to resist my therapeutic activities at every turn, here the tables are turned, and I resist
aligning with Monty’s story and responding to it in a cooperative (and meaningful) way. We
may speculate that part of the trouble stemmed from the fact that Monty’s story centered on
something that had gone well in his life, rather than a trouble—what is so often the target of
psychotherapeutic actions. Even so, the opportunity to affiliate with Monty’s achievements and
reinforce them, such as through a compliment sequence (Jager et al., 2015), is remarkable in its
absence. One conclusion we arrive at from this analysis is that resistance in psychotherapy can
tilt strongly in the direction of the therapist’s activities, or lack thereof.

212

Discussion
Comparison of “successful” and “unsuccessful” psychotherapies
Taking stock first of the beginning sessions with the four patients considered in the
analysis, already a difference becomes apparent in the overall style or interactional quality of the
conversations. The sessions with patients whose therapies ultimately were “successful”
evidenced friction and subtle movement—whether around how we understood some important
matter being discussed (in the case of Keith) or around the display of emotion (in the case of
Adam). Keith and I, for instance, engaged around an understanding of what it means for him
when people go away that saw him initially resist my proposed understanding with vigor but, on
a second pass, led to him displaying weaker resistance and implicitly taking up the view I had
offered. Adam also resisted my questions and formulations when first produced (though he did
so in different ways, such as by producing minimal responses); but within the space of a single
sequence, he moved towards progressively heightened displays of emotion. With these patients,
a kind of rough collision would mark the reception of my questions and displayed
understandings, but then a slackening of resistance would follow that would be witness to shifts
in their perspectives and expressions of emotion.
With those patients whose therapies were “unsuccessful,” in contrast, this friction I have
referred to was absent. This appears to have been the product, in the case of Jon, of the omission
of actions on my part that might have challenged or subtly transformed how he understood his
life story, as he was relating it to me. In the case of Monty, the steady and unchanging quality of
his talk reflected not only the lack of therapist actions that might have sought to modify his
understanding of the cause of his depression—which would have most likely instigated a tug of
war around our competing perspectives—but also the absence of affiliation with his troubles-
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telling, which hampered the development of his displays of emotion. There was no struggle
around cognitive, or verbalized, understanding in these early sessions, nor was there deep
recognition and validation of emotional perspective. These twin omissions seem to have
contributed to a type of conversation that moves along without noticeable shifts in the levels of
our mutual affiliation and alignment—whether for the worse or better. Something else that is
apparent in these early sessions with Jon and Monty is a general absence of requests for
information and other ‘bread and butter’ actions (e.g., highlighting formulations, topic
nominations, prompts) that generate information that can be later used as the basis for advancing
new understandings of the patients’ dilemmas. In a manner of speaking, not much of anything
happens in the extracts analyzed from these early sessions. This is most salient in the case of
Monty, but even in my session with Jon, my routinized use of understanding checks does not
function to produce new and therapeutically relevant information.
In the mid sessions with Adam and Keith, the overwhelming pattern was a tendency for
the patients to respond to “enquiry sequence” actions—such as questions and summaries of their
talk—with extended (highly aligning) agreements, while in response to interpretations that offer
essentially competing views of their troubles they produced highly resistant non-answers,
extended disagreements, or evasions of the interpretation’s focus. In comparison to their
sessions from the beginning of their treatments, a major change noticed is their tendency to take
up those types of actions that request information or only minimally modify their talk and
understanding—the “enquiry sequence” actions—with unambiguous alignment and no trace of
resistance. No significant change in their pattern of response to interpretations, however, is
evidenced over these points in time.
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By comparison, Jon and Monty were—in their mid sessions—relatively aligned with my
questions (e.g., Wh-questions) but resisted my formulations, demonstrating thereby a more
complex response style to enquiry sequence actions. Interpretations were absent in the extracts
examined but actions (such as a relocating formulation) that do work similar to an interpretation
received disagreement. What was more striking, however, was what we might call a pattern of
topical resistance, where both patient and therapist displayed unwillingness to topically
nominate and/or expand on talk about a troubling emotion. In the case of Jon, he tended to avoid
talk about his sadness, just as I, in one instance, passed over an opportunity to topicalize sadness
when he produced descriptions of a book character as being depressed. With Monty, he too
resisted expansion of talk about his anger—describing it as “gone now”—and at a later point in
the conversation, I colluded with him in formulating his anger as, essentially, a non-issue.
Moving to the later sessions, Adam tended to respond to my displays of understanding—
as embodied in a request for confirmation and an empathy display—with weak resistance but,
over time, displayed shifts in his understanding than more approximated mine. That is,
beginning with his observation that he had not been making a necessary phone call, he
progressed to understanding it as due to problems with sleep and, later, as reflecting his anxiety
about making the call—a movement that I would characterize as a shift into a psychological
frame of understanding, which was the frame I had adopted when offering my own perspectives
on his dilemma. With Keith, we came across a phenomenon that I termed “complex resistance,”
whereby he agreed with an interpretation but displayed competition around its epistemic
ownership and resisted both its focus and the key terms used to construct it. Thus, compared to
the sessions at the early and mid points of their treatments, Adam and Keith exhibited a
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movement towards adopting and affiliating with the views contained in my interpretations,
though they did so equivocally and with some signs of resistance.
In an analysis of one of Monty’s later sessions, we came across a more resistant pattern
of response, overall. Responding to my interpretations, he produced a highly resistant and
disaligned extended disagreement, as well as a non-answer “I don’t know” response. His way of
taking up the partial modifications of his understanding contained in my formulations also
embodied resistance. Typically, he would respond to these formulations with an agreement
token followed by either an other-repair of its terms or an evasion of its focus. Thus, where
Monty responded to formulations with complex resistance, Keith—at this point in his
treatment—only replied in this way to interpretations, which carry more disparate and
asymmetric displays of understanding. The only types of actions that Monty did align with in
this session were actions—such as a TCU-initial prompt—that prompted him for more
information.
Finally, in Adam’s and Keith’s last sessions, we came across what were some of the most
complicated responses to my turns in all of the sessions analyzed. Adam not only aligned with a
mirroring repeat but used it as a prompt or jumping off point for the construction of a highly
complex account—indeed, I am tempted to use the word “interpretation”—of his sadness,
something that I have never come across before in such a sequential environment. In response to
my proposals for how to understand his sadness (whether embodied in a challenge or a
formulation), he produced disagreements, but he accounted for his disagreements by, again,
elaborating psychologically sophisticated descriptions of his sadness that exceeded my own.
Something analogous was not observed with Keith. While his response to my interpretation in
that session—a conditional agreement that was disaligning with the focus and terms of my
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interpretation—could be analytically grouped with Adam’s responses under the heading of
“complex resistance,” the design of his turn evidenced less alignment with the therapeutic project
initiated by my action.
In Jon’s last session, the major interactional theme that emerged from the analysis was
his resistance to on-topic talk about his sadness. He tended to align with the action preference of
my questions (viz., requests for information and an alternative question) but disaffiliated with
what the questions were trying to accomplish—namely, elicit descriptions of his sadness,
especially through a psychological frame of understanding. One example of an affiliative,
aligned response to a question about his sadness appears in the transcript, though in that case it
was I who failed to sustain on-topic talk, exhibiting my own disalignment/resistance. No
interpretations appeared in the extracts I analyzed, though I did formulate Jon’s talk in one
instance, which he responded to with a disagreement. In the case of Monty, we saw a situation
in which he was for all intents and purposes stuck in a storytelling that I repeatedly declined to
align with at its possible completions. In this instance, my resistance to moving the conversation
to subsequent, topically coherent talk was plain to see.
The three figures, below, summarize the different levels of alignment displayed in
patients’ responses to my actions over the course of their treatments. The figures provide a
snapshot of how cooperative the patients were, over time, when engaging in action sequences
that made relevant (1) the production of descriptions of their experience (this usually occurred in
the context of answering questions—see figure 1); (2) agreeing or disagreeing with a therapist
rendering, or partial modification, of their talk/experience (the typical sequential context for
these responses was formulation sequences—see figure 2); and (3) taking up or contradicting the
therapist’s perspective on their troubles/experience (interpretation sequences were where this
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usually occurred—see figure 3). There was not, in every instance, available data to ascertain the
level of patient alignment in various sequential environments, and in those instances, the graphs
begin at that point where data is available for a given patient group (i.e., the “successful” vs.
“unsuccessful” therapies) or end precipitously at that point where there is an absence of data.
The level of alignment is measured, on the x-axes, with ordinal numbers. A score of “0,” on the
graphs, represents the fact that a patient group’s typical response, at this point in their treatment,
was highly disaligning. A straightforward disagreement to a formulation or interpretation, as
well as a non-answer to a question, are examples of responses that were scored a “0.” In the case
of a score of “1,” we are dealing with a patient response pattern that evidences somewhat less
resistance. A minimal, unelaborated agreement to a formulation, or a response to a question that
deviates from what the question is trying to accomplish, are examples of responses that were
scored a “1.” Scores of “2” were reserved for responses that evidenced what I have been calling
“complex resistance” or complicated alignment—that is, extended responses that aligned with
the action preference of a sequence but disaligned with the understanding and/or lexical terms of
the FPP; or, alternatively, responses that disaligned at the level of action preference but that
evidenced strong alignment with the therapeutic project or agenda at play, such as when a patient
disagreed with an interpretation but then constructed his own, even more complex interpretation
of his situation, trouble, or internal state. Finally, a score of “3,” in the graphs, stands for
responses that are highly aligning—responses such as extended agreements and responses to
questions that adopt the latter’s agenda and terms.
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Figure 1
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Figure 2
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Figure 3

Patient alignment with interpretations
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With the patients who were deemed to have “successful” treatments, two general trends
are noted. First, at the level of “enquiry sequence” (Bercelli, Rossano, & Viaro, 2013), or first
phase, actions—which describe actions that solicit information and introduce only partial
changes to patients’ displayed understandings, usually in the service of preparing for a later
interpretation—their responses in the earliest phase of their psychotherapies are resistant and/or
outright disaligning. By the midpoint of their treatments, however, their responses to these types
of actions are mostly aligning or exhibit “complex resistance,” and this remains the case
throughout the remainder of the duration of their psychotherapies. This change is depicted in
figure 2, where we see a steep rise early on in their treatments that then remains at a relatively
high level of alignment.
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Second, we see a change in how the patients whose therapies were “successful” respond
to “elaboration sequence” (Bercelli, Rossano, & Viaro, 2013), or second phase, actions—that is,
actions that explicitly challenge a patient’s displayed understanding or advance an alternative
perspective on his troubles. Adam and Keith are highly resistant to these actions up until their
“late” sessions (3/4 through the trajectory of their overall treatments), after which they stabilize
at a level of alignment characterized by ambivalence. Their responses from this point forward
are typified by turns in which they variously (1) agree with an interpretation but display
disalignment with its point, agenda, and/or terms, or (2) disagree with a challenge to their
understanding but account for their disagreement by elaborating a complex, and psychological
astute, portrayal of their troubles. Again, the shift in these patients’ relationship to
interpretations and other discordant displays of understanding occurs rather late in the course of
their treatments, which in both cases ran over 100 sessions long; and even then, at no point did
they adopt a position of seizing on my perspectives without resistance.
With the patients whose therapies were “unsuccessful,” by contrast, there is little
evidence to go on to suggest a rigorous trend or trajectory in their level of alignment over time.
Bearing in mind the paucity of therapist-initiated interpretation and formulation sequences in
these sessions, which naturally limits any firm conclusions we can make, the patients show an
overall tendency of rejecting or resisting any action that alters—however minimally—their
understanding of their situation and experience. Where we do find alignment is in the patients’
responses to requests for information and other actions that work to elicit further talk—at least
during the middle to later phases of their treatments. Even in this category, however, we find, by
the time of Jon’s penultimate session, marked resistance to producing descriptions of his sadness
that affiliate with the psychological frame of my questions.
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Comparison with previous research
To my knowledge, only one previous conversation analytic study has attempted to track
therapeutic change over time. In their research, Voutilainen, Peräkylä, and Ruusuvuori (2011)
investigated how a patient in long-term cognitive-constructivist psychotherapy responded to her
therapist’s “conclusions” (something analogous to a challenge or an interpretation) at different
points in time over the course of 19 months. Similar to the findings of the present study, the
authors found that the patient responded to her therapist’s conclusions with less resistance as she
moved through three phases of her therapy (the “early” phase began 6 months into her treatment,
when recordings of the patient’s sessions started). They found that the patient’s responses in the
early phase of her therapy were marked by “resistance,” often taking the form of silence
following her therapist’s proposals of understanding; later, the patient produced “ambivalent
responses” in reaction to her therapist’s conclusions, initially agreeing with her therapist but
swiftly withdrawing or backtracking from the proposed conclusion; and in the last phase of her
therapy, the patient typically responded to such conclusions with [confirmation + agreement].
The study I have conducted and reported on, here, contrasts with the case study by
Voutilainen, Peräkylä, and Ruusuvuori (2011) by, among other things, finding that patients in
“successful” psychotherapies display differential, positive movement in alignment over time.
While the authors I have cited only investigated one sequence type, the design of the present
study permitted the observation that patients display different rates of alignment, over time, in
different sequential environments. Specifically, patients who remained in therapy moved from
low to very high alignment with “enquiry sequence” activities (Bercelli, Rossano, & Viaro,
2013)—such activities including requests for information and formulations—by the midpoint of
their treatments, while they did not display increased alignment with “elaboration” or
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interpretative sequence activities until rather late in their treatments, and even then evidencing
only modest alignment.
Though they did not utilize conversation analysis as part of their methodology, research
by Tracey and Ray (1984) bears on the question of alignment in the longitudinal study of
psychotherapy. The authors of this study operationalized the notion of “complementarity”—
which, broadly speaking, conceptualizes a state of interactional harmony—in terms of the
frequency that initiated topics were followed by his or her interlocutor. Topic-initiations that
were taken up by the interlocutor were said to represent a complementary sequence, while topicinitiations that were responded to with a different topic-initiation were coded as “symmetrical”
or non-complementary interactions. Three therapeutically “successful dyads” were compared to
three unsuccessful dyads. The authors concluded that change in psychotherapy is associated
with “a particular pattern of interaction over time and not with the overall level of interaction”
(p. 24). Psychotherapeutic change involves an initial stage of mostly client-led topic-initiations
that are closely followed by the therapist, a 'middle stage' in which therapist and patient compete
“over who [is] to define what [gets] discussed and how,” and a final stage in which topicinitiation is less contested (p. 25).
The significance of Tracey and Ray’s (1984) study is that its operational definition of
complementarity also describes alignment. That is, what the authors describe as high
complementarity can be recast, without any loss of meaning, in terms of high alignment (though
the inverse is not true—the notion of “alignment” is not exhausted by the authors’ operational
definition of complementarity). What their study found—in keeping with their theoretical
hypothesis that psychotherapeutic change involves a movement from a relatively conflict-free
state of “homeostasis” into a “state of flux,” which, once resolved, leads to a “different point of
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homeostasis” (p. 15)—is that successful psychotherapies move through a highlowhigh
pattern of complementarity. It would appear that the results of their study contradict the findings
presented here, which found that patients in “successful” psychotherapies evidence an overall
pattern of lowhigh alignment over time. In fact, whether the current study is at odds with the
findings of Tracey and Ray (1984) cannot be determined, because their investigation of
“complementarity”—a form of alignment—focused on environments of topic pursuit, not
question-answer, formulation-(dis)agreement, and interpretation-(dis)agreement sequences, as
did the present study. It would appear that topic pursuit in the context of psychotherapy would
be a valuable area of study for conversation analysts interested in psychotherapeutic change. At
present, there are no conversation analytic studies (that I am aware of) that can confirm or deny
that alignment around topic pursuit follows a highlowhigh pattern over time.
The study I have conducted, here, contrasts with previous longitudinal work on
interactional change in psychotherapy by investigating multiple sequential environments—most
notably question, formulation, and interpretation sequences. The surprising finding that patients
who remain in psychotherapy align more quickly, over time, with certain action types—namely
requests for information and various types of formulations and ‘non-challenging’ understanding
displays—while taking much longer to align with courses of action associated with
interpretations, will need to be confirmed by future studies.
Questions that are left unanswered by this study and that would be valuable sites of
research concern rates of change in alignment. That is, were a study to be conducted with a large
enough sample size to compute meaningful averages, what would we discover about the mean
length of time associated with movements from low to high alignment in various action
sequences? This information would be valuable, as it could be used as a benchmark to determine
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if an individual patient is slow to align with a particular course of action relative to a given
population, which in turn would serve as a warning of possible incipient termination or other
undesirable outcomes.

Who, exactly, is resisting?
From the summary I have provided of Jon’s and Monty’s progression through
psychotherapy, we might be inclined to imagine that these were particularly difficult patients—
the sort of patients that are often dismissed as “not psychologically minded,” “not ready” for
therapy, or simply “resistant” (in the psychoanalytic sense of the word). While there are
undoubtedly individual, psychological factors at play that influence the receptivity of a person to
talk therapy, a conversation analytic perspective helps us to situate phenomena like “resistance”
in their properly interactional context. Applying such a perspective to Jon and Monty, we
observe that an analysis of my own involvement in the sessions is crucial for understanding the
shape and courses of action of long stretches of talk in which nothing of much therapeutic
relevance occurs. It also provides a possible tool for explaining some of the more local
occasionings of patient resistance.
The beginning and ending sessions of Jon’s and Monty’s psychotherapies provide
examples of what can occur when a therapist doesn’t engage in eliciting specific expansion
(Muntigl & Zabala, 2008) of patient talk or is disaligned with a patient’s readiness to exit a
sequence. I emphasize specific expansion, because these extracts demonstrate that merely
declining to speak or confirming some local understanding of what the patient has said does not
reliably prompt the patient to deepen his account of his problems. It can lead patients to cycle
repeatedly through descriptions of their problems without a noticeable shift in their
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understanding, as was the case with Monty; or it can lead to an endless series of telling
sequences, as we saw with Jon, where the therapeutic work of unfurling some trouble or problem
for collaborative exploration is eclipsed. With specific expansion of patient talk, an avenue is
opened for the elicitation of information that the patient might not have thought to divulge,
which then prepares the ground for a reordering of their understanding of their problem.
We witness another kind of fruitless conversation in the case of Monty’s storytelling,
which, because I was not aligned to the many signals he provided that he was prepared to exit the
sequence, dragged on for over 100 lines of the transcript. Had I aligned appropriately, we might
have transitioned to a related topic that would have allowed more granular talk about a specific
aspect of his storytelling, such as the anxiety he experienced when he began working at his new
job. Again, it is my involvement that is pivotal in explaining the meandering quality of the
patient’s talk.
In other sessions, I could be seen engaging patients with questions, topic nominations,
and other actions that did target some psychologically relevant aspect of their talk. I have
previously pointed out their resistance to my topicalizations—usually of some troubling
emotion—but it is not clear to me that their resistance stemmed solely from some disinclination
to explore their feelings. In all of the extracts in which Jon and Monty avoided topicalization of
their emotions, we come across segments of talk, somewhere in the vicinity, where I variously
(1) allow an incidental description of strong emotion (in the case of Jon, this emotion was
attributed to someone else—a character in a book) to pass by, without underlining it for
discussion; (2) do not promote on-topic talk about an emotion following the patient’s acceptance
of the topic; and (3) align with curtailing talk about an emotion by validating the patient’s
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understanding that it is a nonissue. Clearly, I am implicated too in any ascription of topical
resistance.
I should note that there is nothing in the sequence organization of my conversations with
Jon and Monty that corroborates the hypothesis that one interlocutor’s resistance effects the
probability of the other interlocutor, in a later sequence, displaying resistance. Whether such a
relationship exists is unclear. Indeed, while it was not the focus of my analysis, I did not observe
anything in the turn-by-turn unfolding of our conversations that could have predicted, far in
advance, whether the patients would respond to my actions with disagreements or other
disaligning actions. The only exception to this was the presence of an already established pattern
of resistance, but this still leaves unexplained what interactional factors gave rise to this
resistance in the first place. Instead, I must restrict myself to describing the phenomenon of
resistance as it appears in our talk-in-interaction. In response to the question of who resists in
psychotherapy, the answer is both, though it is more often displayed by patients who are on track
to terminate therapy early.

Takeaways: What does this mean for the practice of psychotherapy?
While there are limits to the generalizations I can make on the basis of this study, owing
to its small sample size and the absence of inferential statistics, I offer a few conclusions that
come out of the study, focusing on those that may be useful to practitioners of psychotherapy.
One finding is that even those patients who are destined to do well in therapy seem to
display resistance to nearly all therapist actions at the beginning of their treatments. Questions
that seek to hone in on some particular aspect of a patient’s experience, interventions that
essentially mirror back or summarize a patient’s speech, and other ‘low risk’ actions are
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routinely responded to with evasions and minimal responses in the early stages, and this is not an
indication of something awry in the interaction. This finding should not be interpreted as
suggesting that such actions should be then avoided until the patient is more amenable to
receiving them, since such a course of action usually leads—as my analysis shows—to a
deadening of the conversation and a lack of movement in how patients understand their
problems. Practitioners should anticipate, I propose, that resistance will occur in the beginning
of treatment, and this should not dissuade them from carrying out the interventions and practices
associated with their clinical approaches.
Another finding coming out of this study is that even patients whose therapies are
successful do not tend to adopt or assimilate their therapists’ unique perspectives on their
problems until rather late in their treatments—in my study, about ¾ of the way through
treatments that averaged 123 sessions in length. Even then, the evidence from this study
suggests that patients display some version or another of “complex resistance” to the therapist’s
proposal for how to understand their troubles. They may, for instance, provide pro forma
agreement to an interpretation but show in other ways that they are not responding to all of its
parts, or are avoiding using the same lexical descriptors as the therapist; or, alternatively, they
may issue a disagreement but build on the therapist’s interpretation in a therapeutically beneficial
way, in this way manifesting a change in how they understand their problems. In the latter case,
the patient’s complex resistance is in the service of the treatment. While appearing on the
surface to disagree, in many instances patients may be using their therapists’ suggested
understandings as a form of scaffolding for erecting their own unique perspectives.
This study also demonstrated that “successful” therapies were distinguishable from
“unsuccessful” ones on the basis of shifts in interactional alignment over time. The suggestion
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coming out of this finding is that patients on track to benefit from psychotherapy will
increasingly align with their therapists’ questions, prompts, mirrored understandings, and other
actions as the treatment progresses. Patients who are at risk of terminating treatment early,
however, tend to remain stuck at the low level of alignment that characterizes the beginning
stages of psychotherapy. How to best intervene with such patients and increase alignment was
not, however, a focus of this study, though I refer the reader to the literature on “rupture” and
“repair” (Muran & Safran, 2002; Maroda, 2018; Benjamin, 2012).
Finally, I would propose, on the basis of an anecdotal finding from my analysis of one of
Adam’s later sessions, that therapist persistence in advancing her understanding of her patient’s
experience, even in the midst of patient disagreement, can reap rewards. Patients may modify
their understandings over time to more closely approximate those of their therapist, even while
failing to credit their change in outlook to the therapist. Therapists who abandon wholesale a
unique perspective on their patients’ problems, surmising, after the first rejection of their
proposal, that it is bound to lead nowhere, overlook the ubiquity of the phenomenon of
disalignment/resistance in psychotherapy. Patients do appear to adapt their understandings,
beneath the surface tension of their rejections and disagreements, when repeatedly exposed to a
new understanding of their experience.

The role of CA in psychotherapy
I anticipate that some of my readers will wonder whether conversation analysis could be
used as the foundation for a treatment approach, or whether it is strictly a methodology useful for
describing the interactions that take place in psychotherapy. In beginning to reflect on this
question, let us briefly recall the kinds of insights that, as I argued in the literature review, CA
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lends itself to making into the structured activities that constitute psychotherapy; and taking
these insights as characteristic of the contributions it can make towards understanding this
unique form of institutional interaction, we may assess whether it is suited to erecting a unique
approach to treatment on this foundation of knowledge. In particular, I would return to the
following arguments I made in the literature review: First, CA research on psychotherapy reveals
that many psychotherapies show themselves to be structured according to two “phases”—phases
that may alternate multiple times within the span of a single session or that might mark distinct
periods of interactional work over the span of multiple sessions. These phases are
distinguishable according to the types of activity sequences that belong to each, with the first
phase being populated by actions concerned with gathering information, empathically affiliating
with the patient’s troubles, mirroring a close understanding of the patient’s experience, and
covertly reframing the patient’s talk (in preparation for the second phase), while the second
phase consists of activities that introduce understandings that are disjointed and asymmetrical
with the patient’s own understandings of his or her troubles. The second argument I wish to
remind the reader of concerns the finding that psychotherapeutic interventions appear to be
exceptionally oriented to prompting expansion of patients’ utterances. In a multitude of ways—
whether through the systematic use of silence, various types of questioning, or the use of
continuers like “uh huh” and “hmm”—psychotherapists are frequently prompting patients to
“say more about that.” If we integrate this finding into the duplex model that I just reviewed, it
appears that psychotherapists have a large arsenal of practices at their disposal that lend
themselves to gathering information pertinent to the first “phase” of doing psychotherapy, and
many of these are shared across therapeutic orientations. It appears, however, that there are
fewer practices associated with the second phase of psychotherapeutic activity that are shared
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across schools or therapeutic approaches. Interpretations, for instance, are found more or less
exclusively in psychoanalytic psychotherapy (Vehviläinen, 2003), while making suggestions for
behavioral change is found in CBT and related psychotherapeutic approaches (Ekberg &
LeCouteur, 2014).
The question we are asking ourselves is whether this sort of information—an
understanding of psychotherapy proceeding through phases of activity, as well as an
understanding that many of the practices regularly used by therapists serve the purpose of
eliciting and expanding patient talk in support of the first phase—could provide the foundation
for a new, relatively atheoretical treatment approach. In short, the answer is no—at least not as a
standalone theory or approach to psychotherapy. The reason becomes self-evident when we
imagine ourselves applying a “phase” approach to treatment and arriving at the second phase,
which requires us to variously challenge, reformulate, or interpret the patient’s experience and/or
behavior. What a psychotherapeutic school or approach supplies, in part, is a hermeneutic that
translates the psychological meaning contained in the patient’s descriptions of his experience.
Cognitive behavioral therapy, for instance, applies a hermeneutical key that reads into depression
a need for “behavioral activation” (this is just one example), and the psychotherapist operating in
this tradition duly supplies such a proposal after probing the patient’s presenting problem
(Ekberg & Lecouteur, 2012). The psychodynamic psychotherapist, in contrast, might apply a
hermeneutic that understands a patient’s panic attacks as stemming from unexpressed anger
(Busch & Milrod, 2009). Conversation analysis is not a psychotherapy, because it does not come
equipped with a hermeneutic for psychologizing human experience and behavior; and thus, it
does not supply directives for how to appropriately challenge, reformulate, or interpret a
patient’s troubles.
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It has been only for the purposes of demonstration that I have imagined a CA approach to
psychotherapy based on a “phase” model—this phase model representing the kind of
understanding of psychotherapeutic interaction that CA lends itself to—but what it illustrates is
that doing psychotherapy requires more than a comprehensive description of what takes place in
these types of institutional conversations. That is, were we to construct a manual that describes
all of the various social actions that occur in psychotherapy, including when they occur and the
practices associated with them, I believe that we would still be at loss in effectively delivering a
“CA-based” psychotherapy. What would still be needed would be, at minimum, a certain
philosophy or vision of the “good life”—it would need an ethic, in other words—that would
guide the clinician’s actions in a certain direction. To employ an analogy to the field of building
construction, it is not enough to have a thorough understanding of how foundations and joists are
set, electrical wiring is strung, and plumbing is installed, the architect also needs to know in
advance what kind of house he wants to build. There is, I believe, an important role for CA to
play in providing descriptions of how psychotherapists accomplish their goals, which in turn
could, for example, serve the training of new generations of therapists; but it cannot be a
substitute for a psychotherapy. It lacks too many things—chief among these being a theory of
psychopathology and a vision of optimal human functioning—to serve the needs of a
psychotherapist. It is not enough for the psychotherapist to know, for example, that
psychotherapy usually entails prompting a patient to say more and, at a certain point, challenging
him or her to see things in a new way or to try out new behaviors; for without a method for
identifying what, in the patient’s speech, indexes a ‘problematic’ point of view, and without a
theory for what to replace this with, the therapist is left adrift.
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What I would suggest regarding the role of CA in psychotherapy is that it (1) can
demonstrate kinship among otherwise heterogeneous therapeutic approaches—that is, it can shed
light on the basic interactional projects that most psychotherapeutic approaches share in common
and how they accomplish these projects using many of the same interactional resources and
practices; (2) can serve an important function in demystifying the design and purpose (or action
type) of various therapeutic interventions; (3) may be an excellent framework for training new
psychotherapists, helping to build their understanding of the types of interactions that constitute
most forms of psychotherapy and in a way that permits the later adoption of a theoretical school
or approach to psychotherapy; and (4) can educate practitioners in the function and interactional
purposiveness of various micro features of talk—practices like oh-prefacing (Heritage, 1998) and
responding with “hmm” and “uh huh” (Schegloff, 1981). This is not meant to be an exhaustive
list but adumbrates some of the possible roles CA may play vis-à-vis the training, practice, and
study of psychotherapy. In the most ideal of scenarios, I would imagine CA being taught as a
precursor to any school-specific theory of psychopathology and treatment, establishing a
common language for describing psychotherapeutic talk-in-interaction in its own terms. Before
any outcome like this materializes, however, it will be necessary to build up the literature base
that describes the practices that make up the unique procedures and interventions of the various
psychotherapies, which at the moment is very sparse. This will demonstrate, I think, the
feasibility of adopting CA as a kind of universal language for describing the disparate
psychotherapies and the extent to which their interactional projects overlap.
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Limitations of the study
Among the limitations of this study, perhaps the most obvious is its small sample size,
which was necessitated by the constraints of time and space. An n of 2, for each of two groups
analyzed, limited to some extent the claims that might be made about larger populations. Had
the groups included a greater number of participants, I would still have run into the problem of
how to quantify their talk-in-interaction. Conversation analysis is a highly (sequentially)
contextual approach to the study of conversation, and it does not easily lend itself to coding in
light of the incredible richness of its object of analysis. A single, brief sequence permits analysis
at the level of its turn designs, preference organization, action ascription, displayed
understandings, epistemics, emotion displays, affiliation, and so on. A “binning” approach that
labels an utterance as such-and-such an action and moves on, without consideration for the
multiple orders negotiated in its production, fails to capture the granularity of what is being done
through its design. Had my study focused on a single interactional phenomenon, it would then
have been possible to construct a combined methodological approach that would have allowed
for quantification. However, at this still early stage in the conversation analytic study of
psychotherapy talk, we are still getting a lay of the land and a broader approach—one that cast a
wide net in its analysis of changes in psychotherapeutic talk-in-interaction—seemed more
advisable.
Related to the problem of small sample size, there is the issue of the diversity of the
interlocutors. While the patients in this study constitute a broad range of ages and ethnicities, all
the interlocutors were male, and it is unclear how this might have skewed the findings. While it
seems unlikely to me that people who identify as male or female align to therapeutic activities in
significantly different ways, this remains to be borne out by research.
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Another limitation of the study was the unequal session counts of the “successful” and
“unsuccessful” psychotherapies. The average length of treatment for the former group was 123
sessions, while Monty’s treatment lasted 40 sessions and Jon’s terminated within 7 sessions. It
was a mere analytic construct that allowed me, for instance, to treat Jon’s and Monty’s last
sessions as locatable at a temporally equivalent point to Adam’s and Keith’s last sessions. Could
it not be the case that Monty and Jon were, at the time of their terminations, truly still in the
beginning phase of their treatments, hence explaining their still high resistance to therapeutic
activities? This is a confounding variable in the study, and an updated design would select
patients whose psychotherapies are approximately the same length.
I count as another limitation the fact that the therapist in the study—myself—was, at the
time that these sessions were recorded, still in training. How the trajectories of these therapies
would have looked differently had they been conducted by a more seasoned clinician I can only
guess; but in any case, the findings would have had greater applicability to psychotherapists at
large, since most clinicians are not in training. Also, had the study analyzed conversational data
deriving from multiple psychotherapists, the confounding variable of clinical orientation could
have been ameliorated. As it stands, the results of this study are most applicable in the context of
someone practicing psychodynamic psychotherapy (Shedler, 2012), and it is not clear that
patients who benefit from other psychotherapies, such as cognitive behavioral therapy, exhibit a
similar pattern of increased alignment with therapeutic activities over time.
Finally, there is an assumption undergirding this study that should be addressed, which
concerns the unstated but implied suggestion that shifts in a patient’s understanding about her
problem, trouble, or symptom is tantamount to “success.” It will not do to appeal to the fact that
the patients who had “successful” therapies, who did not terminate their therapies unilaterally,
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displayed this pattern of updating their understandings over the course of their treatments.
Operationally defining a “successful” treatment as one involving mutually agreed upon
termination is an artifact of the methodology’s design, and so the finding that these patients
modified their understandings over time can only be correlated with “success” in a selfreferential way. What the study more accurately demonstrates is that my patients who
progressively aligned with my actions over time were the ones who did not precipitously
terminate their therapies; it does not prove that this pattern is true for all forms and
characterizations of “success.” In randomized controlled studies of psychotherapies, more
rigorous definitions of success—usually involving measures of symptom reduction—are
involved. My study cannot, unfortunately, make any claims that the patterns observed in its
analysis are connected to “success” as it is more usually defined.
But to return to the issue of shifts in patients’ displays of understanding, we should ask
the more fundamental question of why it seems so natural to suppose that changes in selfunderstanding are connected to symptomatic improvement. Should we not be more wary of this
assumption when it so obviously bears the stamp of a Eurocentric value of self-understanding—
that is, of the “Delphic injunction (often associated with Socrates) to ‘know thyself’” (Fink,
2014a, p. 9)? My study tacitly signs on to this insight-oriented model of therapeutic change,
depicting patients’ adoption of psychological frames of understanding as favorable. In doing so,
it overlooks another compelling model that suggests that understanding and knowledge of self
often undermine what is truly efficacious in psychotherapy: saying something new—something
“unsayable...unthinkable, unacceptable, and/or unimaginable” (Fink, 2014a, p. 7)—even if what
it means eludes both patient and therapist. As Fink (2014a) writes, “There is no need for the
analysand to know in order to get better, in order to stop sabotaging his life and his career” (p. 9,
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italics in original). While my methodology has some obvious advantages over lay descriptions
of what occurs in psychotherapeutic conversations, I am struck by what is left out in its
methodology. Perhaps in its focus on displays of understanding, alignment, action ascription,
preference organization, and other phenomena, conversation analysis misses some important
dimension of talk that does not lend itself to easy description but that is nonetheless the fulcrum
around which symptomatic change occurs. Perhaps what is essential in the process of
therapeutic change is a type of talk whose import is not captured through sequential analysis
and/or reference to displays of understanding. How we might go about systematically exploring
these uncharted domains of a patient’s talk, I am unsure. I hope, however, to have at least hinted
at a possible limitation of the conversation analytic approach.

Reflections and future research
My role as researcher and researched
It has been an eye-opening experience to be in the position of analyzing my own
psychotherapy sessions, entailing, as it has, realizations of regretful interventions, observing
failures to respond, questions about whether I could have been more affiliative/empathic, and so
on. But a more fundamental question I find myself pondering is how the results of my study are
inflected by the fact of my being constitutive of the data being analyzed.
For instance, I know that at a certain stage in my work with my patients, I was already
anticipating this study, and without a doubt, I was gripped by the question of change in
psychotherapy and reading widely on the topic, including the conversation analytic literature. If
we assume that these matters are not isolated facts that form part of the background of the study,
but rather that they had some effect, some influence, then it would seem that we have a case of
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(what shall we call it?) anticipated retroactive causation, in which this study—during the stage
that I was conceiving of it and reading relevant literature—influenced the way in which I was
doing psychotherapy and thereby influencing the results that constitute the findings of the
completed study.
To give a concrete example, I still recall a certain moment in my work with patients when
I was deliberately—consciously—“doing” formulations—and what is more, doing them in
anticipation of interpretations, exactly in line with the interpretative trajectory described by
Vehviläinen (2003). I am truly at a loss to follow the lines of influence from this fact through to
the analysis of my findings and the discovery, at the conclusion of the study, that patients in
“successful” psychotherapies evidence progressive alignment, over time, with various courses of
activity. That such lines of influence might exist, though, I find very probable.
How might the results have differed, we may wonder, had the principal psychotherapist
in the study been someone without knowledge of CA? At this early stage of the conversation
analytic study of change in talk-in-interaction in psychotherapy, we cannot say that the results
concerning increased alignment, over time, are robust enough to resist the influence of therapistspecific approaches to psychotherapy and theoretical commitments.
In designing this study as I did, using myself as part of the data, I have introduced a
cofounding variable that I strikes me as introducing tremendous complexity into the
interpretation of the findings. It is true that in doing a conversation analysis of any kind, one
often has the comforting feeling of employing a tool that is almost completely shorn of
subjective factors of interpretation: one need only look at the talk surrounding an utterance—so
one tells oneself—to see how the interlocutor-actors are themselves interpreting the action
significance of the utterance. I wish that I could appeal to the rigorousness of conversation
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analysis to say that at least my analysis is not impacted by the fact that I am one of the
interlocutors in the data—but I cannot be sure of this. Bias is a risk in any research, but I think
that in this study, in particular, the potential for bias was elevated. In future studies of this kind,
some of this risk could be reduced by separating the researcher from the researched, as it is not
clear to me that there were any significant benefits to occupying both roles in this study (one
possible exception being a greater knowledge and sensitivity to the supra-session context of
allusions made by both me and my patients in the transcripts).

The issue of “displays of understanding”
I have already pointed to improvements that could be made on the design of my study,
but what I believe is more needed in future investigations of change in psychotherapeutic talk -ininteraction is a new, more sophisticated approach to “understanding displays.” We indeed say
something important when we ascribe to an utterance a “display of understanding,” and it is
important that we locate it sequentially as an interactional phenomenon, along with its epistemic,
preference, and other organizations. But if I may ask the naive question, What is an
understanding? Does this notion simply reflect the phenomenon of displaying one’s cognitiveaffective stance towards some matter, which in turn may accomplish other social actions? I
wonder if theorizing understanding displays in this way—as stance and as action—misses
something important about “understandings” that is not reducible to what they do, socially.
In my analysis of displays of understanding, I frequently found myself wanting to say
something about them that exceeded the tools made available to me by conversation analysis.
Beyond what they do, I wanted to say something about what they are...but towards what
purpose, I couldn’t say, and so, I left these musings by the wayside. At the conclusion of this
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study, I again find myself objecting to a purely interactional approach to displays of
understanding, and this leaves me in the position of heeding the siren’s call of psychoanalysis
once again—my longtime theoretical home—unable to resist the notion of an “unconscious” that
speaks through us. In the strange vision offered by psychoanalysis, what we mean to display as
our “understandings” are not always the whole picture. Surely we possess understandings,
implicitly, but we are also inhabited by a speech that sometimes speaks us, communicating its
message through the affordances of the polyvalence of language and delivered, without our
awareness, in the package of our “displays of understanding.”
In the process of writing up this study, I have spent two years gaining further clinical
training and experience and have found myself most compelled, in my work with patients, by
what is unintentionally contained in so-called “understanding displays.” The psychoanalytic
perspective would have it that our articulated “understandings” are vitalized and shaped by a
force that Freud called simply “the It” (German, das Es)—something deeper than our conscious
standpoint and its intentions to carry out some action or display some understanding. It is this
that I believe must somehow be accounted for in our investigation of patient talk in
psychotherapy. When something truly novel is spoken that transcends our intended message,
this is a change—a happening, an event—that is part of the psychotherapeutic process, and
regardless of whether it is attended to as such in the interlocutors’ talk-in-interaction, it is worthy
of being described.
What am I calling for, then, exactly? Though I have no expectation that such a proposal
will be taken up, in a systematic way, by conversation analysts, I am advising that we read the
text of patient’s talk literally, analyzing “understanding displays” beyond what they seem to
mean and how they are oriented to. The suggestion is not, actually, as wild as it may appear, as

240

the veritable titan of conversation analysis, Emanuel Schegloff, showed precisely how we might
go about such an analysis through his examination of a phenomenon he called “the surfacing of
the suppressed” (Schegloff, 2003). Rather than describe this phenomenon in depth, I quote an
exceptional example of it, along with Schegloff’s analysis:

5

Just as if a woman comes in an’ says, ”.hh I’m

6

pregnant=I want ta have a baby, en I- try to give

7

her good prenatal ca:re, .hhh or .h I don’t want to

8

be pregnant en I g:et her on the pi.:ll, ‘f=sh=s’s I

9

am pregnant en I don’t want ta be:, .hh that’s- (.)

10

-helping her take care of that is just another

11

aspect. (0.8) of- of my jo:b. I don’t see it as any:

12

(0.2) more a less important. It’s j’s- it’s a part

13

of it.

At Lines 11–12, it seems apparent that Dr. Garrow is on the way toward summing
up how abortion presents itself to her in her practice—as “just another aspect of
my job” (Lines 10–11)—by saying “I don’t see it as any [moral issue].” In the
context of the public controversy that prompted the story and interview in the first
place, this would, of course, have been fuel on the fire. As she approaches the
problematic element of her TCU, she slows and pauses, and suppresses “moral.”
But note how it creeps out nonetheless. In a striking restructuring of her TCU, the
“any” is converted into the start of the idiom “any more or [/] less [important].”
But her articulation of this phrase, by reducing the “or” to “a”, incorporates the
suppressed “moral” like this: “any: (0.2) [more+a+1]+ess…” In the very swerving
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to avoid the publicly problematic “moral,” it occupies the turn in camouflaged
form and in the very next bit of talk. (pp. 216-217)

As I hope this quotation demonstrates, there is precedence for the sort of analysis I am
advocating. What is required now is for researchers and theoreticians to reinvigorate and refine
the notion of “understanding displays.” Conversation analysts would be inclined to admit, I
think, that interlocutors are often unaware of what they are doing, interactionally, when they
construct their utterances in given ways—would a speaker readily consent, for example, that her
oh-prefaced response to a question works to cast the question as problematic (Heritage, 1998)?
If the technology of talk-in-interaction so easily evades lay description and speaker awareness,
we would not be taking a great leap if we were to bracket speaker intention when approaching
“displays of understanding,” showing how they ‘say more’ than what a generous paraphrasing
would suggest. In the process, it is my hope that a largely neglected dimension of patients’ talk
would be made amenable to analysis, adding to our understanding of what, precisely, undergoes
change when a patient submits to psychotherapeutic treatment.

Reflections on change in psychotherapy
This study and its findings have been the cause for some reflection, on my part, about the
nature of change in psychotherapy. I wonder if the reader, too, will have pondered some of the
implications of this CA-based approach to psychotherapeutic change, with its depiction of
patients in “successful” therapies becoming, over time, less resistant—more aligned, more
cooperative—to therapist-initiated activities. That is, I wonder if the reader too will have felt a
twinge of discomfort at the implicit suggestion that therapy works when patients subscribe and
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submit—indeed, subjugate themselves—to the lines of inquiry and, most importantly, ways of
understanding that come from the therapist.
Why should this be so discomfiting? How else, someone might counter, should the
patient adopt hygienic, realistic, and psychically salubrious ways of thinking and perceiving if
not through the cooperative assumption of the therapist’s healthier ways of thinking and
perceiving? Or, if therapy is not in fact practiced as a form of transmission of healthy styles of
cognition, but rather as a pointing out and elaboration of unregistered, previously neglected and
unthematic aspects of the patient’s experience—whatever the impact might be on the patient—
would the patient still not need to be cooperative with the therapist’s insights, so as to consider
and make use of them?
The problem, as I see it, is we must assume either that the therapist’s training equips him
with knowledge of correct and healthy ways of thinking, perceiving, or behaving, or that the
therapist is not prone to error in his formulations of the implicit, unspoken dimensions of the
patient’s experience. Either way, if we are to defend a model of psychotherapeutic change in
which the patient ‘gives in’ to the therapist—in which the patient concludes that the therapist
has, after all, the keener point of view and is in a better position to appraise mature and adaptive
behavior—we must confer onto the therapist a privileged relationship to truth, otherwise we are
hard pressed to defend why the patient should follow his lead. Though I do not have the space to
elaborate on why such a position is deeply antithetical to my values, I am content to allude to the
fact that this view of the therapist “expert” makes epistemological assumptions that are at odds
with constructivist, postmodernist understandings of truth, and it reproduces power imbalances
that are potentially detrimental to the patient.
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Perhaps, however, there is a way of softening the implications of this study, such that we
can imagine, instead, a collaborative process in which the therapist offers possible
understandings of the patient’s experience, situation, or troubles, which the patient uses as
scaffolding, or as a sounding board, to develop for himself new perspectives on his situation.
This was clearly evidenced in one of Adam’s last sessions with me, where he disagreed with my
conclusions, which in turn prompted him to construct his own sophisticated, psychological
account of his troubles. This suggests that this study’s finding, that patients in “successful”
therapies increased their alignment, over time, with therapist-initiated activities, needn’t be
construed as denoting a situation of acquiescence. It may more accurately describe an increasing
readiness to be influenced by the therapist, not to assume the therapist’s vision wholesale.
Indeed, this is what the finding represented in figure 3 (reproduced below) would appear to
suggest. At no point did the patients who were successful in their psychotherapies align
completely with the terms and agenda of my interpretations. They always preserved a measure
of independence from—a certain disalignment with—the interpretative action sequences that I
initiated. I termed this quasi-resistance with my interpretations “complex resistance,” which
took the typical form of a pro forma agreement that failed to take up the agenda or terms of my
interpretation.
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Figure 3

Patient alignment with interpretations
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I believe more research is required to sort out this delicate question of whether so-called
“successful” psychotherapies entail a process in which patients contort themselves to
accommodate the views expressed by their therapists, or whether it is the case that such patients
are more open, over time, to collaborating with their therapists’ activities and building on their
therapists’ observations, formulations, and understandings. The question, which I choose to
leave open, amounts to this: Does psychotherapy compel patients to think, feel, and perceive like
their therapists? Or does success in psychotherapy only require that patients cooperate in
progressing therapist-initiated activities, not necessarily the views espoused by their therapists?

It seems to me now, in retrospect, that certain fundamental changes I have made to the
way I work clinically are partly the result of my engagement with the sorts of questions about
therapist influence, persuasion, and—at the extreme—indoctrination that this study has brought
up for me. I look back now at the transcripts of my dialogues with my patients and feel
uncomfortable with many of the interpretations and other displays of understanding that I
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presented to my patients. I am disquieted by these interpretations precisely because they are
neatly presented understandings, whereas now, in my work with patients, I strive towards an
interpretation that is basically polysemous, that forces the patient to interpret my interpretation,
to actively work at deciphering my utterance, just as he must actively work to decipher his own
situation. Rather than fixing and laying down understandings, I aim now to disrupt
understandings—to point out to a patient that his wording is ambiguous, that an idiom he has
used permits another meaning, that he has uttered, unintentionally, a double entendre. Rather
than replace the patient’s understanding of his troubles with my own, I strive to turn the
therapeutic encounter into an experience that destabilizes meaning, until, and in the process of
which, something decidedly new—ultimately, at the level of understanding—does emerge,
though it emerges from the patient, not from me.
I have a very different sense of what I am doing in my clinical work now as compared to
that time when I was in treatment with Adam, Keith, Monty, and Jon. Getting a patient to align
with my understanding of his experience or situation is decidedly not part of my therapeutic
intent and, because I work not to deliver such packaged interpretations, this aspect of alignment
would not be relevant, I think, to my current way of delivering psychotherapy. I wonder, though,
whether I would not have still reached the same conclusions, in this study, if my corpus of data
had reflected my current clinical approach. The fundamental finding of this study is that patient
alignment with various therapist-initiated actions increases over time—at least for patients on
track to continue psychotherapy. What we should bear in mind is that alignment does not simply
refer to responses that embody agreement. A response that works to progress a first action—a
response that is preferentially fitted to the expectations set out in a first pair part action—is an
aligned one. It is conceivable, then, that a therapy constructed entirely around questions and
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noticings (of, say, ambiguous patient utterances that permit more than one meaning) would yield
the same positively sloped correlation between time and degree of patient alignment. These are
matters that will require future research to settle.
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Conclusion
The major findings to come out of this study centered on the phenomenon of
“resistance.” This is a term that I have used as more or less synonymous with “disalignment”
(though in some cases, I have also used it to index the closely related term of “disaffiliation”).
(Note that the CA literature on psychotherapy also treats disaligning responses as equivalent to
resistance—see, for instance, Muntigl, 2013.) Alignment refers to a level or type of social
cooperation in which an interlocutor (1) designs her response to advance the activity sequence
initiated by another speaker; (2) adopts the agenda—or basic focus, presuppositions, or
framework—embodied in the speaker’s turn; (3) responds in a way that uses or shows
acceptance of the lexical or morphological terms of the speaker’s talk; (4) produces a response
that is fitted to the grammatical constraints of the speaker’s turn; and (5) facilitates what the
speaker is trying to accomplish with her utterance (Stivers, Mondada, & Steensig, 2011;
Raymond, 2003). In the most simple of cases, an agreeing response (such as to a candidate
understanding, formulation, or interpretation) is one that displays alignment (Sidnell, 2010).
The results of the study showed that the patients in “successful” psychotherapies tended
to display less resistance—to questions, prompts, expansion elicitors, formulations,
interpretations, and so on—over time, while the patients in “unsuccessful” psychotherapies did
not. In another way of stating this finding, the patients in the former group became more
cooperative over time with the therapeutic activities I initiated, which often extended into
cooperating with how I understood their lives and their problems, adopting these
understandings—with modification—as their own. In the case of the latter group, what emerged
was the unexpected finding that both the patients and I showed resistance to—that is, disaligned
with—one another’s activities.
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There are many conclusions that I cannot draw on the basis of these findings. If there is
indeed a robust relationship between cooperation and “doing well in therapy” (the study design
does not permit making such a correlation), we would still be unsure whether cooperativeness
effects healing, success in therapy yields improvement in cooperativeness, or if cooperation is
merely a moderating variable. What we have in the findings is, rather, a suggestion of some
important role that cooperativeness may play in successful psychotherapies.
For myself, though, I find this conclusion quite thought-provoking. If it should turn out
that cooperativeness is a moderating variable of successful psychotherapies, insofar as
cooperation facilitates acceptance of the bitter “pill” of some therapeutic intervention, then—
besides having good face validity—the finding would be unsurprising. Along these lines, there
was an implicit suggestion, in the way I went about my analysis and reported the results, that
patients who aligned with my actions and went on to form new understandings of their problems
in some way benefited from this change—that new understandings were, so to speak, the
mutative pill. But, if it should turn out that becoming more cooperative has a deeper relationship
with improved mental health, this would have important implications for how we conceptualize
psychopathology and treatment. It would suggest, for instance, that pathology somehow reflects
an uncooperative stance towards one’s neighbors. These are of course very speculative musings,
but they point to how much more is left to inquire into when studying change in psychotherapy.
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Transcription Symbols
The following transcription symbols, including explanations, are adapted from Sidnell (2010, pp.
ix-x) and Peräkylä, Antaki, Vehviläinen, and Leudar (2008, pp. 198-199).

(.)

Just noticeable pause, or about .1 seconds

(.2), (3.4)

Length of pause in tenths of a second

word [word
[word

Square brackets that align across two lines indicate where two
speakers begin speaking at the same time

.hh hh

In-breath—marked with a full-stop—and out-breath

wo(h)rd

Indicates location of “breathiness” or greater than normal
aspiration, often associated with laughing or crying

wo:rd

A colon indicates an elongation or stretch of a phoneme. Two
colons signifies even greater elongation.

(word)

Indeterminate word uttered—analyst’s ‘best guess’ at word spoken

(

Inaudible or very unclear talk

)

A: word=
B: =word

Equal signs are used to show that two words (by the same speaker
or different speakers) are “latched” together—i.e., no discernable
pause between the words

word WORD

Underlined phonemes indicate higher volume. Capitals are used
for even louder volume

°word°

Words or utterances enclosed in “degree signs” are spoken quietly

>word word<

Words or utterances enclosed in inward arrows are spoken quickly

<word word>

Outwards arrows denote talk that is spoken slowly

↑word

Indicates that word was spoken with upwards intonation

↓word

Word was spoken with downwards intonation

#word#

Uttered with a “croaky” voice

250

£word£

Spoken in a “smiley” voice

~ word ~

Produced in a “wobbly” voice.

,.?

Commas are used for “continuing” intonation (not necessarily a
clause boundary), while question marks are used for rising
intonation. A period denotes a falling or terminal intonational
contour.

((touches hand to head))

Used to describe an action or sound otherwise too difficult to
transcribe
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